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ABSTRACT 
 
Over the last four decades, the performance of initial public offerings (IPOs) has remained an interesting topic 
for the academia, researchers and policy makers. Questions pertaining to how the prices of new issues behave 
in short-, intermediate- and long-term have been shown to have economic and academic implications. 
Empirical evidence suggests that IPOs significantly outperform most benchmarks from the listing day to one-
month trading periods. The conclusions reached in studies of longer-term IPO performance have been 
controversial because researchers generally disagree on the methodologies used to identify longer-term 
abnormal performance. The problems investigated in this study are whether: (a) IPOs generate abnormal 
returns on initial trading day and subsequently in short- and intermediate-term and (b) IPOs systematically 
produce abnormal price performance.  
 
The purpose of this study is to assess whether IPOs produce abnormal returns over a period of six-months and 
to identify abnormal IPO performance over three-year period lasting from issuance to the three years 
anniversary of the newly issued shares. The research has accomplished this by developing matched-firm 
benchmark, based on market capitalization, to gauge abnormal performance using event- and calendar-time 
strategies. In addition, this study has investigated the determinants of short-, intermediate- and long-term 
performance using Extreme Bounds Analysis, which analyzes the sensitivity and robustness of explanatory 
variables and identifies true predictors. Moreover, this study has examined the growth rate implicit in offer 
prices using a reverse engineering DCF model. Based upon the implicit growth rate, the research will 
determine the estimated degree of overvaluation of IPOs by underwriters. The findings of this study are that: 
(a) IPOs outperformed in short-term, which indicates that investors can earn significant abnormal returns up to 
15-trading day from listing day, (b) IPOs outperformed in intermediate-term, which illustrates significance of 
abnormal returns over two months of trading, (c) IPOs underperformed over three-year period, and (d) the 
growth rate embedded in IPO prices illustrating that on average the cash flow of IPO firm is expected to grow 
by one-fourth annually over five-year. The robust factors influencing short-term and intermediate performance 
include: oversubscription, aftermarket risk level of the IPO, offer price, rate of return on assets and percentage 
of shares offered. In terms of longer-term IPO underperformance, the observed pattern is not always 
statistically significant. Equal-weighted buy-and-hold abnormal returns and cumulative abnormal returns are 
used to find true predictors of three-year underperformance. The results suggest that underpricing, financial 
leverage, hot activity period, issue proceeds, oversubscription, age of the firm, aftermarket risk level of the 
IPO, post issue promoters‟ holding and affiliations with textiles, technology & communications and other 
industries caused long-term underperformance. This study concluded that short-term implied growth rate, 
market momentum, firm‟s age and size of sales significantly affect longer-term IPO performance. These 
findings provide opposition to the theory of market efficiency and infer that there is an unfair distribution in 
the premarket IPO pricing and allocation process. A review of the pre-market pricing as well as the method of 
allocation may bring significant positive change; revisions to the process could avert unfair benefits obtained 
by investors with privileged premarket IPO allocations, which would provide identical opportunities for 
investors participate in the price discovery process.  
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CHAPTER 1 
 
INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY 
 
1.1 Introduction 
In this study, I have analyzed events that influence the price performance of unseasoned 
initial public offerings (IPOs). Prior studies have widely documented the price performance of 
unseasoned IPOs on the first trading day and all have unanimously agreed that IPOs have, on 
average, historically generated positive returns. Of these, a few studies measured the short-term 
performance of unseasoned equity issuance over a longer period of time (i.e. up to one-month of 
trading). These studies documented an evidence that investors may obtain significant abnormal 
returns earned over a longer period of time (Algaidede and Heerden, 2012; Khurshed and 
Mudambi, 2002). In this study, I investigated the short- and intermediate-term price performance 
of unseasoned equity shares. Short-term performance is examined from listing day to the 15
th
 
trading day and intermediate performance is evaluated from the first month to 6
th
 month of 
trading.   
In terms of long-run IPO performance, there has been a long-standing debate about the 
magnitude of abnormal performance as investors use different statistical methodologies to test 
abnormal performance (Brav, Geczy and Gomples, 2000; Schultz, 2003; Cheng, Chueng and Po, 
2004). Consequently, researchers do not agree on a single methodology for the assessment of 
abnormal performance. To ascertain whether IPOs obtain abnormal long-term performance, 
researchers choose to use benchmarks or market proxies to model normal performance. To 
construct a model of normal performance that does not rely on the correlation of the market and 
event firms‟ historical performance, researchers need to find a model that captures systematic 
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and idiosyncratic risk involved in a stock‟s price performance. Researchers have used firm 
related characteristics to examine IPO performance because portfolios based matching 
procedures are typically mis-specified and lack power and there is no historical IPO performance 
to use to capture the systemic risk of the IPO and the market (Zachary, 2008). Thus, it is 
appropriate to develop benchmarks based on the market capitalization, book-to-market or 
industry affiliation. The majority of the problems affecting the results of event studies occur 
when the event horizon is lengthened. Barber and Lyon (1997) and Lyon, Barber and Tsai (1999) 
provided examples of the biases that influence the results of short-term analyses. 
 The biases that are likely to influence the result of longer-term analyses are, according to 
Lyon, Barber and Tsai (1999), the rebalancing, survivorship and skewness biases. In addition, 
Lyon et al. (1999) found that “the analysis of long-run abnormal returns is treacherous” (p. 198), 
because of these biases, therefore, the importance of addressing each of these biases and ensuring 
that the statistical method used accurately identifies abnormal performance is a critical 
component to consider when longer-term analyses of abnormal IPO performance.  
 After I constructed a sized based matched-firm benchmark that can appropriately identify 
abnormal performance, I began testing hypotheses related to long-term underperformance of 
unseasoned equity shares. Researchers have tested this hypothesis using different samples and 
methodologies. The reasons why I have examined this hypothesis include evidence of biased 
benchmark, empirical disagreements regarding the significance of abnormal performance and a 
need for researchers to update some of the tests. Previous studies conducted on long-run 
performance in Pakistan did not combine tests of the methodology to detect abnormal 
performance. This combination is necessary to evaluate the accuracy of the conclusions derived 
from the analyses according to Lyon et al. (1999). 
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 To determine the prices for unseasoned IPOs is always critical. Koller et al. (2005) and 
Rossenboom (2012) reported that the DCF is a commonly used method to estimate IPO prices. 
However, it is imperative to find the rate that IPO firms expect to grow? To answer this Cogliati 
and Paleari (2011) devised a reverse engineering discounted cash flow method. This study 
focuses in on determining the growth rate that is implicit in IPO prices over the 5-year period? 
The hypotheses that I have evaluated in this study are as follows: First, whether IPOs 
produce substantially positive abnormal performances between the offering and closing price on 
the first trading day (Reilly and Hatfield, 1969; McDonald and Fisher, 1972; Loughran and 
Ritter, 2004). Historically, researchers have found that the magnitude of these gains are 
significant; Ritter (2003) found an average initial IPO return of 18.40% for IPOs listed during 
1960–2000. Second, IPOs underperform in long-term studies of abnormal performance relative 
to standard benchmarks. Ritter (1991) found that IPOs underperform standard market indices by 
27.39% over a 3-year period; this is equivalent to an investor underperforming the benchmark by 
9.13% a year. Third, IPOs are overvalued at offer prices by the underwriter, which indicates 
whether the growth rate is implied in the offer price. To determine the growth rate expectation 
embedded in offer prices, Cogliati and Paleari (2011) reported that IPO firms, on average, grew 
by 33.80% annually over the first 5-year from 1995–2001.    
 
1.2 Background of the Study 
 The historical price performance of IPOs traded on the Karachi Stock Exchange provides 
interesting questions regarding what return investors should require for their invested capital. 
First, the issuance of IPOs to the market generates initial excess returns of 35.66% (Sohail and 
Nasr, 2007), 36.48% (Rizwan and Khan, 2007) 42.20% (Sohail and Rehman, 2010), 39.87% 
(Kayani and Amjad, 2011) and 28.03% (Afza et al., 2013). Performance of these magnitudes 
4 
 
indicate that the market is either misvaluing IPOs by pushing the price above its fundamental 
value or the underwriters of IPOs are consistently undervaluing these issues; both of these 
outcomes do not fit well within the efficient market paradigm. Second, the mysterious 
performance of IPOs seems to continue as they mature; researchers have shown that the IPOs, 
when compared against standard benchmarks, obtain long-term negative performances. For 
instance, Sohail and Nasr (2007) found that if investors used a buy-and-hold investment strategy, 
investing in all IPOs that firms have issued to the public and holding these issues for one-year, 
would have obtained a -38.10% BHAR. In the case of CAR, investors faced -19.67% returns. 
Subsequently, Rizwan and Khan (2007) reported using a buy-and-hold investment strategy; 
investors incurred a -23.70% return over a two-year period.    
To study the anomalous behavior of IPOs, researchers have employed various statistical 
methodologies and found flaws in testing abnormal returns which caused major disagreements in 
the interpretation of their findings and conclusions (Barber and Lyon, 1997; Mitchell and 
Stafford, 2000). The flaws in researchers‟ methodologies are biases that are evident when 
researchers use different methods to aggregate cumulative returns and different portfolios 
constructions to attempt to approximate normal performance. Researchers contaminate portfolios 
because they fall prey to the rebalancing, skewness, new issue, and survivorship biases. 
To investigate abnormal IPO performance, researchers have attempted to use estimates of 
ex-post values for testing the accuracy of valuation (Purnanandam and Swaminathan, 2004). 
Researchers found that IPOs are generally overvalued against their benchmarks and examined 
the accuracy of valuation models employed by the underwriters. To inquire about the growth rate 
embedded in offer price, Cogliati and Paleari (2011) found that IPOs are generally priced in 
terms of the high degree of expectations of future growth. Further, they found that on average 
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IPO firm is expected to grow by 1/3 per year over 5 years. To investigate the performance of 
unseasoned equity issues and growth rate implicit in IPO prices, I propose the following: 
 
1.3 Problem Statement 
The questions that I will address in this dissertation are threefold: (a) short-term and 
intermediate IPO performance, (b) long-term IPO performance and (c) growth rate implied in 
IPO prices. The questions addressed in this study using a sample of unseasoned IPOs issued on 
the Karachi Stock Exchange from 1995–2011: 
1. Is there significant initial excess returns earned by the investors? If investors hold 
IPOs upto 15
th
 trading day, at what level investors obtain significant positive 
returns? At what level if investors earn significant abnormal returns from the first 
month to sixth month of trading?  
2. Is the relationship between long-term negative performance and IPO issuance 
valid? If it is so, is this negative abnormal performance significant? I used a 
similar approach formulated by Ritter (1991) to evaluate long-term abnormal 
performance.  
3. Does the matched-firm benchmark technique detect the abnormal performance in 
event- and calendar-time studies?  
4. What are the true determinants that affect short-, intermediate and long-term IPO 
performance? To identify the robust predictor, Extreme Bounds Analysis is used 
(Leamer, 1983, 1985; Leamer and Leonard, 1983). 
5. Is the growth rate implied in offer price? If so, then at what level? To what extent 
of bias, ex-ante can identify by the investors‟?   
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1.4 Purpose of the Study 
 To examine the price performance of IPOs using different methodological techniques to 
detect abnormal performance that were issued during the period lasting from January 1995 to 
December 2011: (a) at its public offering and (b) at subsequent time intervals in response of this 
offering. The goals of this dissertation were to investigate theories related to the performance of 
IPOs and to test these theories using historical pricing data. In addition, this study also 
investigates the growth rate that may be implicit in IPO prices. 
 
1.5 Limitations 
 The data set includes the issuance of IPOs from 1995 to 2011 on the Karachi Stock 
Exchange. Due to small sample used in the analyses, I have not attempted to generalize the 
conclusions drawn to all IPOs issued due to the non-availability of data pertaining to IPO 
prospectus as well as securities prices. As a major chunk of IPOs took place during 1991 to 
1994, I understand that the study may broaden the scope attempting to find abnormal 
performance.  
 While analyzing the results and significance of the conclusions drawn by conducting 
event studies, researchers may consider the sample size as either a limitation or strength. It may 
be appropriate if the researcher analyzes the performance of all IPOs historically listed on the 
KSE. However, it may take an extraordinary amount of time but the rationale behind not 
implementing this strategy is the access to data. I have, therefore, selected to use the data readily 
available in this analysis. To ascertain normal performance, I have constructed a matched-firm 
benchmark on the basis of market capitalization due to small size of the overall market. If 
matched-firm benchmark is formulated on the basis of market capitalization, book-to-market and 
industry affiliation, it would capture normal performance more precisely. To examine the growth 
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rate implicit in offer prices, this study focuses only on manufacturing firms. If non-
manufacturing firms are considered which were not taken by earlier study, the results may be 
more generalized and it may provide the growth rate of the entire sample.     
 
1.6 Significance of the Study 
 The present study is useful for the academics, policy makers and professionals on account 
of results may provide acumen as to why researchers have categorized performance of IPOs as 
an anomaly. Prior to this study, researchers have employed different samples, methodologies and 
event horizons to evaluate abnormal performance. Researchers have attempted to describe these 
anomalies which require integration of the testing procedures and methods for estimating 
abnormal performance to access the accuracy of conclusions drawn.    
 The intent of this study is to detect abnormal performance related to unseasoned IPO 
issuance while using a significant sample of existing data (1995–2011). The concepts that will be 
tested are that: (a) IPOs produce abnormally positive performance in short- and intermediate-
term, (b) in the long-term they produce abnormally negative performance, (c) factors that 
influence the short-, intermediate- and long-term performance of unseasoned IPOs, and (d) 
growth rate embedded in the offer prices.  
 
1.7 Summary  
 According to the assumptions implied in financial theory, the financial markets are 
efficient because a stock price shows its intrinsic or fundamental value at any point of time. The 
analysts consider different methods to ascertain the value of a security which provides ground of 
its valuation. By taking into account, the past analyses of price performance of securities support 
this argument that the market may respond to a predetermined event in a specific manner 
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resulting to move the prices of stock in either direction. Ultimately the market may have linkage 
of the information about the price of a security which becomes accessible.  Importantly, if the 
investors are aware regarding movements of significant performance expected to happen in 
future, they are at liberty to alter the current prices by opting to discount the future value of the 
firm. In terms of IPO pricing and performance, it does not reflect as the same adjustment is being 
made by analysts or investors.  
 The emphasis of this study is to assess the validity of anomalies with respect to 
performance of IPOs. The study is divided into two parts covering four chapters each. In chapter 
2, the literary review focuses in on the following topics: (a) initial and short-term IPO 
performance, (b) long-term IPO performance, and (c) growth rate implied in the offer price. In 
chapter 3, historical and current perspectives of IPOs in Pakistan are discussed. In chapter 4, the 
data and research methods are used to measure abnormal performance and in chapter 5, the 
short-term and intermediate IPO performance are investigated. In chapter 6, I have analyzed 
long-term performance of IPOs and in chapter 7, the growth rate implied in offer prices has been 
examined. In chapter 8, I summarized and concluded the analysis.       
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CHAPTER 2 
 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
In this chapter, I examined fundamental concepts and issues related to the measurement 
of abnormal IPO performance and have identified the key events that occur as a result of 
unseasoned equity issuance. The research is broken down into three major focal areas: (a) A 
study of initial and subsequent short-term IPO performance, (b) An analysis of longer-term IPO 
performance, and (c) An analysis of whether the growth rate of IPOs is implicit in their offer 
price.  
 
2.1 Initial and Subsequent Short-term IPO Performance  
Researchers provided evidence that IPOs earn abnormal excess returns on initial trading 
day (see Agathee et al., 2012; Aggarwal et al., 1993) depicting that the first closing market price 
is more than the offer price. The magnitude of underpricing in developing markets is higher as 
compared to the developed markets (e.g. Loughran et al., 2013; Banerjee et al., 2011). There are 
a few studies that have examined the short-term underpricing up to one-month. Ljungqvist et al. 
(2006) argued that the post-issue prices in developing markets may take more time towards 
reaching its equilibrium. I extend the existing literature by examining the short- and intermediate 
IPO performance up to 6-trading month to detect abnormal returns.  
A number of theoretical explanations have been formulated to describe short-term 
performance. First, winner‟s curse hypothesis is one of the most prominent models developed by 
Rock (1986). It assumes that asymmetric information caused underpricing. Rock categorized 
investors into two forms: (a) informed, and (b) uninformed. To determine the worth of the firm 
as well as offer price, informed investors have sought information through evaluation costs while 
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uninformed investors do not have an access to obtain readily available information. Informed 
investors participate only in those issues that tend to be underpriced leading to an impression that 
the IPO stocks may be oversubscribed. The problem of information asymmetry suggests that 
uninformed investors may invest in overpriced issues obtaining negative returns (Ritter and 
Welch, 2002). This position is known as winner‟s curse. Second, the signaling hypothesis 
explains that this mechanism used by firms (Welch, 1989) caused underpricing whereby 
prominent companies deliberately underprice their issues to provide indication to the market and 
“leaving a good taste in investors‟ mouths” (Ibboston, 1975, p. 264). Subsequently, these firms 
issue seasoned offerings at higher prices. Third, the ex-ante uncertainty hypothesis is related to 
information asymmetry emphasizing about the investing risk faced by the prospective investors. 
In presence of the ex-ante uncertainty, offering price will be too low thereby increasing the level 
of oversubscription. IPO stocks are intentionally underpriced to reduce the possibility that issue 
may fail. Moreover, underpricing is correlated positively with the ex-ante uncertainty. Fourth, 
ownership dispersion hypothesis posits that issuers deliberately underprice securities to generate 
more demand so a large number of small shareholders may be attracted (Ritter, 1998). This 
dispersed ownership may increase the liquidity of the firm. Prior studies documented a negative 
relationship between promoters‟ holding and underpricing. Fifth, the monitoring hypothesis 
describes that firms have benefit to underprice IPOs leading to decrease the monitoring by large 
institutional investors and new shareholders as well. As a result, conflicting interest arise because 
benefits of both the managers and the shareholders are misaligned. Brennan and Franks (1997) 
argued that underpricing is a way to dispersed ownership by managers. However, managers use 
it as a tool to determine the level of underpricing. Sixth, hypothesis of law avoidance presents 
that companies underprice their issues to minimize the possibility of lawsuits from the investors 
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that may arise because of any error or omission in the issuance of the prospectus. Banerjee et al. 
(2011) found a direct association between the accessibility of legal recourse and underpricing.  
Empirically, it is found that IPOs outperform in short-run. In an early study, Reilly and 
Hatfield (1969) documented initial underpricing of 11% in the US market from 1963–1965. 
During the decade of 1980s, underpricing was just 7% while it was almost double (15%) from 
1990–2000. Liu and Ritter (2010) reported the underpricing of 12% during 2001–2008 period. 
However, the level of underpricing was more than 65% during the bubble period (i.e. 1999–
2000) illustrating that abnormal excess returns are varied with the time period. In the U.K. 
market, Khurshed and Mudambi (2002) argued the degree of underpricing depends on the 
benchmarks used. Belghitar and Dixon (2012) examined 335 UK IPO and found initial 
underpricing of 12.07%. Additionally, they documented that venture capitalist IPOs are less 
underpriced than non-venture capitalist IPOs. Table 2.1 reports the initial underpricing in 
developed countries. 
 
Table 2.1 
IPO underpricing in developed countries 
Study Period 
Sample 
Size 
Country 
Initial 
Underpricing (%) 
       
Aijo et al. (2014) 1994-2006 67  Finland 15.60  
Falck (2013) 2003-2012 117  Norway 3.14  
Henricson (2012) 1994-2001 185  Sweden 11.49  
Perera and Kulendran (2012) 2006-2011 254  Australia 25.42  
Alqahtani and More (2012) 2005-2011 30  New Zealand 9.16  
Belghitar and Dixon (2012) 1992-1996 335  UK 12.07  
Chambers and Dimson (2009) 1989-2007 1987  UK 19.00  
Drobetz, Kammermann and Walchi (2005) 1983-2000 120  Switzerland 34.97  
Loughran and Ritter (2004) 1980-2003 6391  USA 18.70  
Cassia, Giudici, Paleari and Redondi (2004) 1985-2001 182  Italy 16.33  
Ritter and Welch (2002) 1980-2001 6249  USA 18.80  
Khurshed and Mudambi (2002) 1989-1996 575  UK 6.56  
Levis (1993) 1980-1988 712  UK 14.30  
Reilly and Hatfield (1969) 1963-1965 53  USA 11.00  
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Engelen and Essen (2010) examined underpricing of 21 countries using 2,920 IPOs and 
reported the existence of underpricing in all the countries except Israel. Among others, they 
found the underpricing of 21.14% in USA (640), 43.95% in Japan (609), 20.16% in UK (471), 
18.04% in Australia (437), 13.12% in France (171), 37.20% in Germany (132) and 34.97% in 
Greece (124). Perera and Kulendran (2012) found underpricing of 25.47% in examining 254 
Australian IPOs from 2006–2011. The results of cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) described 
underpricing of 24.63%, 24.06% and 23.34% on the 3-, 6- and 10-trading day respectively. 
Alqahtani and More (2012) investigated 30 IPOs in New Zealand and found initial underpricing 
of 9.16% during 2005–2011 period. They reasoned that financial leverage, risk and firm‟s age 
are determinants variables of IPO underpricing. To investigate the underpricing of 117 
Norwegian IPOs from 2003–2012, Falck (2013) found an initial underpricing of 3.14%. By 
analyzing different theories to explain IPO underpricing, information revelation theory is found 
more critical as in the presence of favorable information. Swedish IPOs also outperformed 
obtaining initial returns of 11.49% using 185 IPOs during the period 1994–2001 (Henricson, 
2012). In a recent study, Aijo et al., (2014) reported the underpricing of 15.60% considering 67 
Finish IPOs during 1994–2006.  
Prior research argued that the underpricing in the emerging markets is more than 
developed markets due to higher uncertainty associated with new issues. Borges (2007) 
examined 41 Portuguese IPOs and found initial underpricing of 11.12%. To analyze different 
IPO methods, Kucukkocaoglu (2008) concluded that underpricing is higher in fixed offer and 
book building mechanism. To analyze 34 Tunisian IPOs from 1992–2008, Zouari et al. (2009) 
found underpricing of 16.1%, 16.8% and 17.8% on the 1, 2 and 3-trading day respectively. They 
determined that oversubscription, capital retention, underwriters‟ reputation, offer price are the 
significant factors of underpricing. Underpricing of 47 Gulf firms is found by 290% during the 
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period 2001–2006 (Omran et al., 2010). Moshirian, Ng and Wu (2010) comprehensively 
analyzed the initial excess returns during 1991 to 2004 in six Asian-Pacific countries and found: 
(a) 202.63% in China, (b) 70.30% in Korea, (c) 61.81% in Malaysia, (d) 21.43% in Hong Kong, 
I 34.04% in Japan and (f) 33.10% in Singapore. In Hong Kong market, Yan et al. (2010) reported 
initial underpricing of 16.8% during 1993–2003 period. 
Adjasi et al. (2011) studied 80 Nigarian IPOs reporting initial underpricing of 43.10% 
during 1990–2006 period. They identified that offer size, firm‟s size and auditing firms are 
significantly impacting underpricing. However, size of the firm is positively associated with 
underpricing. Initial underpricing of 476 Malaysian IPOs is reported by 35.87% (Abubakar and 
Uzaki, 2012) and found offer size, age of the firm and offer size influencing underpricing.  
Jewartowski and Lizinska (2012) concluded the significant abnormal returns of 13.95% covering 
186 Polish IPOs from 1998–2008. Agathee et al. (2012) argued that the level of underpricing is 
more in small issues than the large issues. Further, they found that financially healthy firms 
caused lower underpricing. They reported that underpricing of 44 Mauritius IPOs is 13.14% 
from 1989–2005. This underpricing affected due to financial strength, risk and prestige of 
auditors. Alagidede and Heerden (2012) examined 138 South African IPOs from 2006–2010 and 
documented abnormal excess returns of 108.3%, 102.4%, 195.8%, 201.2% and 197.8% on the 1, 
5, 10, 15 and 20-trading day respectively.  
Using 129 Brazilian IPOs, Avelino (2013) observed that IPOs are underpriced by 4.79% 
(2004-2011). He concluded that offer price is embedded partially incorporated information. 
Underpricing of 53 Thai IPOs from 2001–2011 reported at 18.03% (Chuanrommanee and 
Boonchuaymetta, 2013). They concluded that hot issue market, issue proceeds and length of lock 
up period are the key factor affecting underpricing. To analyze Indonesian IPO market, Darmadi 
and Gunawan (2013) reported initial underpricing of 22.20% between 2003 and 2011. Song, Tan 
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and Li (2014) measured 948 Chinese IPOs from 2006–2011 and found initial underpricing of 
66% depicting that the recent level of underpricing is much lower as compared to earlier studies 
in China.  
Banerjee et al. (2011) analyzed 8,700 IPOs in 36 countries between the period 2000–
2006 and provided evidence of initial underpricing in all the countries illustrating it a general 
phenomenon. Average underpricing is less than 10% in few European countries and more than 
20% in some Asian and North American countries. Banerjee et al. reported the evidence of 
average abnormal returns in 11 Asian countries: (a) 57.14% in China, (b) 22.21% in Hong Kong, 
(c) 31.18% in Malaysia, (d) 45.50% in Philippines, I 54.57% in Korea, (f) 19.15% in Thailand, 
(g) 45.14% in Japan, (h) 52.25% in Indonesia, (i) 25.01% in India, (j) 17.25% in Taiwan and (k) 
12.94% in Singapore. They found information asymmetry and agency cost hypotheses are 
influencing factors in determining underpricing. In addition, they argued that underpricing can be 
reduced through an effective contract enforcement mechanism. Loughran et al. (2013) measured 
the initial underpricing of 50 countries including 11 Asian countries which were: (a) 137.4% in 
China, (b) 15.4% in Hong Kong, (c) 62.6% in Malaysia, (d) 21.2% in Philippines, I 61.6% in 
Korea, (f) 36.6% in Thailand, (g) 40.2% in Japan, (h) 25.7% in Indonesia, (i) 88.5% in India, (j) 
37.2% in Taiwan and (k) 26.1% in Singapore. IPO underpricing in developing countries is 
summarized at Table 2.2. 
The Indian IPO market has also been examined by many researchers. Ghosh (2005) 
found underpricing of 91.06% during 1993–2001 whereby underpricing in recession phase was 
substantially higher than in boom phase. He identified that offer size, hot period activity and 
secondary offerings significantly caused IPO underpricing. During 2002–2004 period, Pande and 
Vaidyanathan (2009) found underpricing of 22.62%. Sahoo and Rajib (2010) reported 
underpricing of 46.55% during 2002–2006. Lately, Sahoo and Rajib (2011) documented the 
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underpricing of 35.61% from 2002–2007. Yet in another study, Sahoo (2012) postulates that 
underpricing is higher in book building mechanism than fixed price method and finds that offer 
price, return on net worth of IPO firm, post issue promoters‟ holding and age of firm are the 
main determinants of IPO underpricing.  
 
Table 2.2 
IPO underpricing in developing countries 
Study Period 
Sample 
Size 
Country 
Initial 
Underpricing (%) 
       
Song, Tan and Li (2014) 2006-2011  948  China 66.00  
Chuanrommanee and Boonchuaymetta (2013) 2001-2011    53  Thailand 18.03  
Darmadi and Gunawan (2013) 2003-2011   101  Indonesia 22.20  
Avelino (2013) 2004-2011   129  Brazil 4.79  
Abubakar and Uzaki (2012) 2000-2011   476  Malaysia 35.87  
Jewartowski and Lizinska (2012) 1998-2008   186  Poland 13.95  
Agathee et al. (2012) 1989-2005     44  Mauritius 13.14  
Alagidede and Heerden (2012) 2006-2010   138  South Africa 108.30  
Adjasi, Osei and Fiawoyife (2011) 1990-2006     80  Nigeria 43.10  
Chong, Yuan and Yan (2010) 1993-2003 92  Hong Kong 16.80  
Sahoo and Rajib (2010) 2002-2006     92  India 46.55  
Samarakoon (2010) 1987-2008   105  Sri Lanka 33.50  
Islam, Ali and Ahmad (2010) 1995-2005   117  Bangladesh 156.16  
Omran et al. (2010) 2001-2006     47  Gulf 290.00  
Chorruk and Worthington (2010) 1997-2008 136  Thailand 17.60  
Pande and Vaidyanathan (2009) 2002-2004     55  India 22.62  
Zouari et al. (2009) 1992-2008     34  Tunis  16.10  
Hasan and Quayes (2008) 1991-1997     90  Bangladesh 108.00  
Borges (2007) 1988-2004     41  Portugal  11.12  
Ghosh (2005) 1993-2001 1842  India 91.06  
Kiymaz (2000) 1990-1996   138  Turkey 13.60  
Allen et al. (1999) 1985-1992 150  Thailand 63.49  
Huang (1999) 1971-1995 311  Taiwan 42.40  
       
 
Samarakoon (2010) found underpricing of 33.50% using 105 Sri Lankan IPOs during 
1987–2008. Empirically, he determined that large size issues underpriced less than small size 
issues which support the ex-ante uncertainty hypothesis. In the Bangladeshi IPO market, Hassan 
and Quayes (2008) reported underpricing on the first and 21-trading day was 108% and 119% 
respectively. They reasoned that foreign ownership, oversubscription, capital retention and 
volatility of returns significantly affected underpricing. Islam et al. (2010) found sever 
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underpricing of 156.16% which is comparatively much higher than international evidences. 
Further, they reported that offer size is crucial in determining the underpricing.  
In the contest of Pakistan, a very few studies examined the underpricing of IPOs (Table 
2.3). Like the international experiences, Pakistani market is also evident of underpricing. To 
begin with, Sohail and Nasr (2007) examined 50 IPOs listed on KSE from January, 2000 to 
April, 2005 and documented an average initial return of 35.66%. They found that 
oversubscription, market capitalization, offer size, and risk are the significant determinants that 
caused IPO underpricing. Rizwan and Khan (2007) analyzed 35 IPOs during 2000 to 2006 and 
reported the initial underpricing of 36.48%. Sohail and Rehman (2009) further investigated 
sector-wise underpricing using the same sample and observed an average underpricing of 
35.52% for financial firms and 36.80% for non-financial firms.  
 
Table 2.3 
IPO Underpricing in Pakistan 
Study Period Sample Size Initial Underpricing (%) 
    
Sohail and Nasr (2007) 2000-2005 50 35.66 
Rizwan and Khan (2007) 2000-2006 35 36.48 
Sohail and Rehman (2010) 2000-2009 73 42.10 
Kayani and Amjad (2011) 2000-2010 59 39.87 
Afza et al. (2013) 2000-2011 55 28.03 
    
 
Sohail and Rehman (2010) analyzed the short-term performance of 73 IPOs illustrating 
three different states i.e., normal, boom and recession. They found that the average underpricing 
was 42.2%, 41.0%, 37.4%, 38.1% and 39.4% at the close of 1, 5, 10, 15, and 20-trading day 
respectively during the period 2000–2009. Comparing boom and recession phases, the 
underpricing was found higher in boom period. In addition, wealth relative is more than one in 
all the states representing that Pakistani IPOs outperform over the first 20 trading days. Kayani 
and Amjad (2011) examined 59 IPOs and reported on an average initial underpricing of 39.87% 
during 2000–2010. They observed that the volatility of large volume IPOs caused higher 
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uncertainty. The prime determinants explained that IPO underpricing is due to oversubscription, 
ex-ante uncertainty, issue proceeds and market capitalization. Recently, Afza et al. (2013) 
reported initial underpricing of 28.03% analyzing 55 IPOs from 2000–2011. They argued that 
information asymmetry significantly affects underpricing. However, corporate governance adds 
value of the firm in reducing underpricing.  
 
2.2 Long-Term IPO Performance 
 Long-term post-IPO pricing behavior has been examined to analyze whether or not the 
investors are better off to hold on to IPOs in a longer window over 3 or 5-year? Jenkinson and 
Ljungqvist (2001) argued that investors‟ returns deteriorate if they hold on IPO stocks for a 
longer period. In support thereof, the researchers have provided empirical evidence that IPO 
underperform in long-term when measured against standard benchmark (Ritter, 1991; Loughran 
and Ritter, 1995). Conversely, Brav and Gompers (1997) and Zarchary (2008) developed 
matching-firm techniques considering size, industry affiliation and book-to-market so as to 
reduce the potential biases for gauging abnormal performance. Most of the studies argued that 
IPOs suffer long-term price underperformance because the magnitude of underperformance is 
lower as compared to standard benchmark used therefor. The results of long-term IPO 
performance depend on the methodology used to examine abnormal performance (see Eckbo et 
al., 2000; Loughran and Ritter, 1995; Gompers and Lerner, 2003). Jenkinson and Ljunqvist 
(2001) pointed out that the evidence of long-term performance is controversial because of 
researchers contrasting reporting results.  
To explain long-term IPO performance, different theoretical explanations have been 
advanced. First, impresario or fads hypothesis explains the process of IPO issuance which does 
not instantly determine the value of new stocks. Overvaluation of shares, therefore, implies 
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abnormal excess returns earned by the investors at the start of market trading (Aggarwal and 
Rivoli, 1990). This hypothesis elaborates that investors earn excess returns on listing day which 
consequently correct overpricing resulting lower returns in long-term. Second, divergence of 
opinion hypothesis argues that optimistic investors may participate in the IPOs. The value of IPO 
shows ambiguity about the existence of variation in views with regard to optimistic and 
pessimistic investors. Because of surge of information, the disagreement of expectations reduces 
which results in price correction (Miller, 1977). Third, window of opportunity hypothesis 
describes that IPOs during high trading periods are more expected to be overvalued as compared 
to other IPOs because of issuance of shares by young firms without having growth prospectus. 
This overvaluation fails to justify the valuation and stock prices are adjusted quickly with real 
valuation. Further, it reflects that high activity periods may be correlated with the lowest returns 
in long-term (Loughran and Ritter, 1995). Fourth, entrenchment theory describes the relationship 
between the company control and long-term underperformance. Morck et al. (1988) argued that 
ownership‟s control affects the risk of management entrenchment. High effect of entrenchment 
represents that IPO stocks underperform significantly in the long-term (Mazzola and Marchisio, 
2003). Fifth, agency cost elaborates the conflict of interest between managers and shareholders 
(Jensen and Meckling, 1976). This assumes that long-term underperformance is the result of 
agency cost but when a firm issues a large number of shares, it reduces the shareholdings of the 
management. Hence, it may affect to maximize earning options and inflate agency cost. 
Consequently, this model explains the poor operating performance of post-IPO.   
Empirical findings argued that the abnormal performance depends on the methodology 
employed (Jenkinson and Ljungqvist, 2001). Using the sample of 1,526 IPOs in the US market 
during the period 1975–1984, Ritter (1991) found that IPOs underperform significantly against 
matched-firm benchmark based on the size and industry affiliation in the 3-year period following 
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the listing. Levis (1993) found the evidence of long-term underperformance considering 712 UK 
IPOs over 3-year period from 1980–1988. Hwang and Jayaraman (1995) investigated the long-
term pricing performance of 182 Japanese IPOs over 3-year following the listing. They 
documented that both the value- and the equal-weighted CAR were significantly at 16.44% and -
14.98%. Likewise, Espenlaub et al. (2000) indicated that the sensitivity of long-term 
performance depends on the selection of empirical method. As noted by Canina et al. (1998), the 
benchmark index is not an appropriate measure to investigate abnormal performance which 
creates survivorship, rebalancing and skewness biases. According to Lyon et al. (1999), these 
biases could be eliminated by developing matched-firm benchmark considering size and/or 
book-to-market. The skewness problem can also be eliminated using bootstrapping test statistics. 
Gomper and Lerner (2003) measured the abnormal performance of 3,661 IPOs in US market 
over 5-year after listing during 1935–1972. In event-time BHARs, they found existence of 
underperformance while in CARs and calendar time strategies, it disappear i.e., no abnormal 
performance. To analyze the Canadian market, Kooli and Surat (2004) used 445 IPOs over the 5-
year during the period 1991–1998, wherein the evidence of underperformance was found. They 
reported that observed pattern was not statistically significant sequentially as it depend on the 
choice of methodologies used. Their findings support the hot issue market and the fads 
hypothesis. Bessler and Thies (2007) analyzed 218 German IPO concluding that long-term 
performance relies on the benchmarks employed. Goergen et al. (2007) found underperformance 
over the 3-year considering 240 UK IPOs during the period 1991–1995. Further, they found that 
the level of underperformance of small firms is more than the large firms. The study of Belghitar 
and Dixon (2012) provided evidence of underperformance over 3-year using 335 UK IPOs 
during the period 1992–1996. Gounopoulos et al. (2012) studied 254 Greek IPOs from 1994–
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2002 and found overperformance in first two years but not thereafter. A glimpse of past studies 
related to IPO underperformance is presented at Table 2.4. 
 
Table 2.4 
IPO underperformance – Glimpse of past studies 
Study Period 
Sample 
Size 
 
Country 
Abnormal 
Returns (%) 
Underperformance 
up to 
Gounopoulos et al. (2012) 1994-2002 254  Greece -16.12  36 months 
Belghitar and Dixon (2012) 1992-1996 335  UK -14.00  36 months 
Jewartoski and Lizinska (2012) 1998-2008 142  Poland -22.62  36 months 
Su, et al. (2011) 1996-2005 936  China 8.60  36 months 
Sahoo and Rajib (2010) 2002-2006 92  India 41.91  36 months 
Chi, WcWha and Young (2010) 1991-2005 114  New Zealand -27.81  36 months 
Chorruk and Worthington (2010) 1997-2008 141  Thailand -25.39  36 months 
Chi, Wang and Young (2010) 1996-2002 897  China 9.60  36 months 
Sohail and Nasr (2007) 2000-2005 36  Pakistan -38.10  12 months 
Rizwan and Khan (2007)  2000-2006 35  Pakistan -23.70  24 months 
Goergen et al. (2007) 1991-1995 240  UK -21.98  36 months 
Ahmad-Zaluki et al. (2007) 1990-2000 454  Malaysia -2.01  36 months 
Drobetz et al. (2005) 1983-2000 53  Switzerland -173.46  120 months 
Kooli and Surat (2004) 1991-1998 445  Canada -20.70  60 months 
Gomer and Lerner (2003) 1935-1972 3661  USA -33.40  60 months 
Ritter and Welch (2002) 1980-2001 6249  USA -23.40  36 months 
Espenlaub et al. (2000) 1985-1992 588  UK -21.30  60 months 
Allen, et al. (1999) 1985-1992 143  Thailand 10.02  36 months 
Ritter (1991) 1975-1984 1526  USA -29.10  36 months 
Levis (1993) 1980-1988 712  UK -22.96  36 months 
        
 
 In case of emerging markets, long-term post-IPO performance has been investigated by 
many researchers. Ahmad-Zaluki et al. (2007) analyzed 454 Malaysian IPOs during 1990–2000 
period. They reported significant overperformance when event-time CARs and BHARs 
estimated using market benchmark but not upon matching-firms benchmark. The results of 
Fama-French (1993) three-factor model and value-weighted schema reported the non-existence 
of overperformance. In the Pakistani market, Sohail and Nasr (2007) study one-year performance 
of 36 IPOs from January, 2000 to April, 2005 after listing and reported the average market 
adjusted CARs and BHARs at -19.67% and -38.10% respectively. Sehgal and Singh (2007) 
analyzed ten-year performance of 438 Indian IPOs during 1992–2006 and found that 
underperformance exist up to 3-year but not thereafter. Sahoo and Rajib (2010) documented that 
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underperformance of 92 Indian IPOs persisting up to one-year. It thereafter disappears during the 
sample period 2002–2006. Further, they found no evidence of underperformance over three-year 
following the offering date. Chen et al. (2011) studied the performance of 934 Chinese IPOs 
from 1996–2005 over the 3-year period following the listing. Using equal-weighted BHAR, they 
found significant overperformance but not for value-weighted BHAR. Further, no evidence is 
found regarding overperformance/ underperformance applying CARs or calendar-time 
techniques.  
 Prior research highlighted various explanatory variables which caused long-term IPO 
underperformance. To find the determinants through regression analysis, almost all the studies 
postulate that a few variables are significant while others are insignificant. In order to overcome 
the problem and identify the true predictors, few empirical studies have used the EBA method to 
examine the robustness of the explanatory variables. In this research, I use the EBA technique to 
find the influencing factors of long-term IPO underperformance.  
With regard to determinants of the long-term performance, researchers have identified 
different variables that significantly influence varying with the country-specific analyses, sample 
size, and time period. In a seminal paper, Kooli, L‟her and Suret (2006) argued that underpricing, 
financial firms and analysts‟ long-term forecast of earnings growth are caused long-term IPO 
performance in the Canadian market. In the UK market, Goergen et al. (2007) postulated that 
underpricing, percentage of equity at offering and average three years earnings before listing are 
influencing factors. Cai, Liu and Mase (2008) indicated that three-year underperformance in 
Chinese IPO are affected due to offer size, underpricing, oversubscription and growth rate in 
earnings using the CAR and the BHAR methodologies. Sahoo and Rajib (2010) found that 
Indian IPO market is affected due to underpricing, offer size, leverage, and timing of issue. Chen 
et al. (2011) argued that the signaling and ex-ante uncertainty hypothesis support long-term 
22 
 
underperformance but not the divergence of opinion hypothesis. They concluded that EPS, offer 
size, aftermarket risk, seasoned equity offerings are impacting factors of IPOs in Chinese market. 
Belghitar and Dixon (2012) identified that underpricing is a critical determinant to gauge three-
year underperformance. Gounopoulos et al. (2012) pointed out that activity period of IPO and 
ownership retention are important factors in determining long-term underperformance. For 
divergence of opinion hypothesis, the study of Jewartowski and Lizinska (2012) supported three-
year underperformance. Zarafat and Vejzagic (2014) argued that underpricing, offer size and 
book-to-market are affected the 3-year underperformance in the Malaysian IPO market.  
 
2.3 IPO Pricing: Growth Rates Implied in Offer Prices 
The IPO valuation has gained limited attention in the empirical studies. To measure stock 
valuation, different methods have been developed by the researchers. The most widely used 
valuation methods are: (1) Dividend Discount, (2) Discounted Cash Flow, (3) Earnings 
Capitalization, and (4) Residual Income. To determine true value of stock before going public is 
always crucial.  
There are two approaches typically used for firm valuation: (a) Direct Valuation – the 
value of a firm is determined by its fundamentals, and (2) Relative Valuation – the value of a 
firm is measured by the prices of comparable firms. Both the approaches may face particular 
problems relating to timely decision of IPOs. For instance, firms may plan to issue IPO to obtain 
benefit of „window of opportunity‟. According to Lourghran and Ritter (1995), time periods 
during market buoyancy reflect that those countries which operate in a similar industry are to be 
overvalued. Using relative valuation techniques, the risk of investors is over-rewarding for the 
IPO firm. In particular, the firms may intend to enlist on the stock market as it depends on the 
possibilities of positive growth prospects resulting optimistic valuation. To follow this, firms 
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may issue their IPOs at high transitory earnings, as investors find it difficult to segregate between 
transitory and permanent income. Sometimes managers may use window dressing to present 
good picture of its financials. Thus, it results investors risk caused by overvaluation of respective 
firms. 
Kim and Ritter (1999) and others (e.g. Purnanandam and Swaminathan, 2004; Berkman 
et al. 2000) have examined how to determine IPO prices by selecting multiples from the similar 
industry? The studies analyzed the estimation of ex-post values to measure the accuracy of 
valuation developed by researchers and found the overvaluation of IPO prices with regard to 
their comparables. The accuracy of the valuation postulates that P/E multiples is preferable than 
other multiples. Likewise, the forecast of next year EPS is also preferred than the earnings of 
existing year. While estimating the value of IPOs going public, the DCF model is most 
commonly used. Considering all the direct valuation models as suggested in the empirical 
studies, DCF and Residual Income (RI) are two important approaches. RI method has been 
employed extensively in the scientific literature. This model is defined as explicit charge of 
equity which deducts it net income. Current value of RI is inserted to equity‟s book value to 
drive valuation of equity. The different changes have been made to this model that now 
emphasize on the present value of FCF (Ohlson, 2009).  
In general, underwriters used traditional methods i.e. the DCF or comparable multiples to 
find the offer price. Usually IPOs are priced using both the techniques. By taking into account of 
existing market trends, latest transactions or industry norms, investment banks may commence 
with reasonable estimate of the offer price. As indicated by Cogliati and Paleari (2011), 
investment banks use different methods for valuation of IPOs. Most importantly, the DCF model 
is employed by almost all the investment banks to value IPOs. It is, therefore, imperative to 
determine the growth expectation implied by IPO prices using reverse engineering DCF method.  
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While going public, firms consider an important decision that how to determine the offer 
price? The prime consideration is to find true offer price which results to overcome the 
overvaluation thereby reducing high initial returns. Empirically, various valuation methods have 
been used by the researchers to value IPOs. Kaplan and Ruback (1995) reported that DCF model 
perform better than the comparable methods. To use algorithms selecting comparable firms, Liu 
et al. (2002) suggested that it can reduce the performance of multiple valuations. Conversely, the 
comparable firms are chosen carefully by underwriters; however, these aspects are not 
undertaken (Ritter and Welch, 2002).  
Cassia et al. (2004) investigated the valuation techniques deployed by investment banks 
to price 83 Italian IPOs from 1999–2002. They reported that investment banks consider different 
methods to value IPOs, whereas commonly used method is relative valuation (87% of IPOs) 
followed by the DCF (80%). Purnanadam and Swaminathan (2004) analyzed the sample of more 
than 2,000 IPOs during the period 1980–1997 and found the median firm is overvalued by 50% 
in US as compared to industry peers. Their empirical findings described that overvalued IPO 
yield high initial day returns but underperform in long-run. Overvalued IPOs earn low profits 
and forecast higher growth relative to undervalued IPOs. The ex-post results showed that the 
projection of growth expectation is unable to materialize due to declining of profitability from 
pre-IPO level. This finding postulated that investors are misled by optimistic growth forecast and 
underwriters emphasized less towards profitability in determining IPO prices.  
Koller et al. (2005) used the DCF method and infer that „cash is king‟. They stated that 
practically DCF is used to value IPOs while popularity of RI is also increasing. To inquire that 
how underwriters value IPOs, Houston et al. (2006) analyzed target prices set by investment 
banks one-month after the IPO? They concluded that IPO prices are based on a 10% discount 
relative to average comparable firm multiple applied to determine the target price and the 
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discount rate is not significantly different from zero. Deloof et al. (2009) examined 49 Belgian 
IPOs during 1993–2001 and reported the Discounted FFCF is the most prevalent method to price 
IPOs as it generate unbiased value estimates. However, Dividend Discount method reports 
underestimate values. To price IPOs using multiples, underwriters emphasize typically on cash 
flows and future earnings. These multiples constructed on post-IPO cash flows and estimated 
earnings thereby resulting more accurate valuations.  
Cogliati and Paleari (2011) developed the reverse engineering DCF model to enquire that 
the growth is incorporated in offer prices. It is a two-stage model and working backward short-
term implied growth rate (g1) is estimated with an assumption that growth rate (g2) is constant. 
Using a sample of 184 IPOs during the period 1995–2001 which includes three European 
countries i.e., Germany, France and Italy, they reported the cash flow of IPO firms on average 
grew by 33.8% annually over 5 years. Moreover, estimation of cash flow growth is much higher 
than actual growth indicating the median IPO is overestimated by 74%. Empirical analysis 
exhibited that increase in estimation errors is the result of underpricing and leverage while 
decrease is caused by book-to-market, size and age of the firm. Specifically, short-term implied 
growth rate is negatively correlated with post-IPO performance. In addition, the significant 
determinants include estimation errors, underpricing, book-to-market and excess returns of the 
particular sector that influenced long-term IPO performance.   
Rossenboom (2012) examined 228 French IPOs from 1990–1999 and found that 
underwriters frequently used two or more methods whereas their valuation is based on a single 
method. Due to volatility of aggregate benchmark index returns, underwriters often used the 
DCF model to determine IPO prices. He suggested that all the methods faced a positive bias 
relative to equilibrium market value. While determining the IPO prices, investment banks 
intentionally discount the fair prices. Bunyamin (2012) measured the accuracy of P/E and DCF 
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methods commonly used in valuation of stocks using 210 Turkish IPOs during the period 1993–
2010. Of which, 160 firms used P/E ratio whereas 119 firms applied DCF method. By comparing 
both the methods, he documented that forecast errors were 35% and 18% using P/E ratio and 
DCF model respectively. Due to low forecast errors, DCF method is more appropriate towards 
estimating the offer prices.  
To summarize, investment banks use different methodologies to determine the offer 
price. The best method of the valuation of IPOs is to set price in which estimation errors can be 
reduced. Almost all the researchers emphasized to consider DCF model to value IPOs. To infer 
that growth rate is embedded in offer price, I employ the reverse engineering DCF model 
(Cogliati and Paleari 2011) to estimate the level of growth added in IPO prices as well as to 
measure estimation errors and over-valuation index.   
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CHAPTER 3 
 
INITIAL PUBLIC OFFERINGS IN PAKISTAN 
 
3.1 IPOs in Pakistan 
In the Pakistani market, the issuance of unseasoned IPO shares is not new proposition for 
firms that desire to raise the capital. To this end, the first unseasoned equity issuance was the 
Karachi Electric Supply Corporation, which did not issue a prospectus but was listed on the 
Karachi Stock Exchange on April 2, 1949. M/s Hussain Industries, a company limited in shares, 
took the initiative to become the first to issue its prospectus in 1953 inviting subscription from 
the general public. From 1953 to 1990, the pace of IPO issuance remained sluggish due to 
political disturbances and the instability of law and order in the country.  
 As a result of liberalization, deregulation, and the privatization process there were various 
reforms that the government undertook in 1991 to strengthen the efficiency and transparency of 
the capital market. Since 1991, the pace of issuance of IPOs increased at large as privately held 
companies wanted to diversify their ownership, improve financing opportunities, and create exit 
strategies for mature firms. To ensure transparency and compliance with laws, the Corporate 
Law Authority (CLA), as a regulator, had to administer the reforms that took place in the capital 
market. During the period lasting from January 1991 to December 1996, there was a 
considerable increase in the number of unseasoned equity issues. To improve the financial 
market the CLA was abolished and an independent organization was established in 1997, which 
was named the Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan (SECP). On January 1, 1999, 
the SECP began its operational functions, which were to execute the reforms in the capital 
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market to make the process of going public more efficient.  These changes created a more robust 
environment for private companies introduce their shares to the public.  
 
 
 
 Figure 3.1 provides the annual IPO activity in Pakistan from 1991 to 2013. Over a period 
of 23 years, 415 IPOs issued their shares and these companies had paid-up capital of Rs.267.110 
billion. During the period lasting from January 1991 to December 1996, a major chunk of IPOs 
(329 – 79% of total deals) were issued with the paid-up capital of Rs.81.752 billion. It is evident 
that the privately traded companies were encouraged to issue their shares due to the liberalization 
reforms in Pakistan. The period lasting from January 2004 to December 2008 included 46 deals 
which attracted Rs.111.135 billion. Of these deals, a small number of the deals took in a huge 
amount of the deal volume because they were issued at opportune times. From 2009 to 2013, 
only 20 IPOs were issued with paid-up capital of Rs.58.516 billion, which illustrates that the 
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activity of IPOs had decreased. The deterioration in number of IPO‟s issued during this time 
horizon seemed to be the result of a decline in overall economic conditions and political 
instability in the country.  
 
3.2 IPO – Offering Methods 
In Pakistan, IPOs are issued by way of fixed price mechanism, which is the most popular 
method used globally. The book building process, which is another method, was initiated in 2010 
to attract equity capital. Since its initiation, 11 IPOs have been issued using this method. The 
characteristics of both of these methods are summarized below: 
(i) Fixed Price Method: The offer price is determined at par or a premium based upon 
the company‟s financial reports or due diligence conducted on the firm. The issue 
is underwritten by the investment banks to ease the investor‟s concerns.   
(ii) Book Building Process: Is the process of determining the price of new issued 
shares by obtaining interest regarding an investment in the shares of company and 
information collected from institutional investors and high net worth individuals 
through a bidding process. Subsequently, a book is formed, which describes the 
demand for the shares which trade at different prices. The floor price is formulated 
by the issuer in consultation with book runner whereas the strike price is 
determined at the end of bidding. The process is known as Dutch Auction Method 
– the result is a price at which the entire shares are offered for sale. 
 
3.3 Listing Process of IPOs in Pakistan 
To list on the stock market, a firm has to submit an application under Section 9 of the 
Securities and Exchange Ordinance, 1969. Any firm or corporate body with minimum paid-up 
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capital of PKR 200m may apply for issuance. In the case of a new issue, an application may be 
initiated under Section 57(1). For divestment, shareholders of the company may submit an 
application under Section 62(1) of the Companies Ordinance of 1984. After approval, the 
publication of the prospectus, time frame for bidding (in case of book building method), and the 
allocation time of public subscriptions are matched with the mutual consent of the respective 
Stock Exchange. Further, an application is furnished to the National Clearing Company of 
Pakistan Limited (NCCPL) for the allocation of the trading symbol. The time frame for 
subscription to the public is not earlier than 7 days and not later than 30 days from the issuance 
of the prospectus. Provisional listings are based on the public offerings in terms of value of PKR 
150 million or above. 
On the subscription date(s), the investors participate in the initial public offerings and the 
Exchange will notify whether the issues are over or undersubscribed. In the event of 
oversubscription, a process of balloting is carried out to allocate the shares to successful 
investors. In the case of undersubscription, the shares are subscribed by the underwriters. Hence, 
the application for a no objection certificate and the release of funds along with the auditors‟ 
certificate are received from the underwriters. Afterwards, these shares are transferred to Central 
Depository Company (CDC – a lawful custodian of shares in Pakistan) allowing the subscribers 
to do their trading through accounts maintained with CDC. Accordingly, the firm advertises the 
formal listing in the newspapers and the trading of newly issued shares is routed through the 
CDC account. The listing process of IPOs in the Pakistan Markets is elaborated in Figure 3.2. 
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3.4 Global Perspective of IPOs 
 Globally, the concept of issuing unseasoned equity is the oldest process through which 
funds are raised. During the 17
th
 century (i.e. March, 1602), the first ever Dutch East India 
modern company named “Vereenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie (VOC)” offered its tradable 
shares to the general public. This was considered the first modern IPO, the number of shares 
issued was 2,142 shares, and each had a value of US$1,500. Initially, this method was more 
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prevalent in the United States and the European countries but with the passage of time other 
countries adopted this practice. Hence, the global IPO activity gradually increased in the 
international markets after the reforms took place in 1991 and thereafter, this method of issuance 
became popular in the emerging markets. It is evident that the Chinese and the Hong Kong 
markets are the main issuers of unseasoned equity. Furthermore, few Asian markets have shown 
some improvement in issuing IPOs.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.3 exhibits the annual global IPO activity including capital raised and the number 
of deals during the 1995 to 2013 period. It seems that global IPO activity showed a mixture of 
trends over the 19-year period. The largest number of IPOs (2,014) were offered in 2007 and the 
smallest number of IPOs (577) were offered in 2009, which indicates that the financial collapse 
occurring in the 2008 to 2009 period significantly impacted the international market‟s IPO 
issuance. The highest amount of capital (US$295 billion) was raised in 2004 whereas the lowest 
number of capital (US$58 billion) was raised in 2003. It appears from the Figure 3.3 that from 
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2001 to 2004 there was a decrease in the number of deals as well as the capital raised. This was 
the result of the aftershocks that occurred due to internet bubble from 1997 to 2000.  Thereafter, 
the market conditions improved and as a result IPO activity increased. During the 2008 to 2009 
period, the market fell due to effects of the financial collapse faced by international community. 
After the substantial increase in unseasoned deals issued and amount of equity raised in 2010, the 
market moved downward sharply and registered a decrease in number of deals during the period 
lasting from 2011 to 2013.  
To make listing process more efficient, IPO companies are required to deliver clear and 
transparent financial information to prospective purchasers in order to improve the issuance 
process. Given that the shares of newly issued shares seem produce abnormal performance 
researchers and analysts have continually examined the performance of IPOs in the short-, 
intermediate- and long-term. Currently, examinations of the performance of IPOs listed on the 
emerging market exchanges seem more controversial and less explored. This study examines the 
performance of IPO listed on the Pakistani market to inquire as to whether investors obtain 
abnormally positive or negative returns in short- as well as long-run. 
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CHAPTER 4 
 
DATA AND RESEARCH METHOD 
 
4.1 Introduction 
In this section, I emphasize the components of the research methodology those: (a) are 
used to conduct event studies and (b) current methodological technique for evaluating abnormal 
performances pertaining to issuance of IPOs. In the beginning, I will describe how assessed are 
the hypothesis tested in event study design. Thereafter, I will explain the sample size used in this 
dissertation, and will present the database whereby I gathered the data required for testing of the 
hypotheses. Eventually, I explained the methodologies used in this study and will provide a 
comprehensive review of the elements of the research method and support the applicability of its 
selection.  
 
4.2 Research Design and Methodology 
4.2.1 Justification for Using the Event Study Methodology 
 In this study, I have selected to apply the event study methodology. The rationale behind 
using this method is to analyze the change in the performance of securities‟ price formation as 
systematic events occurrence. I explained the event study design as a subset of existing data 
research methodologies. Earlier, researchers have applied the event study methodology to 
measure performance consequences to a significant number of corporate events (e.g. mergers and 
acquisitions, dividend changes, stock splits, etc.). Campbell, Lo and MacKinlay (1997) stated 
that Dolley presented in the first published event study in financial literature in 1933. Dolley 
studied the effects of stock splits on a firm‟s common stock. Particularly, two studies have 
provided a more recent rationale for wide acceptance of this method. Ball and Brown (1968) 
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analyzed how a change in income affects the performance of a security and how quickly the 
market adjusts to this change? Fama, Fisher, Jensen and Roll (1969) studied to document that 
how the stocks‟ markets adjust to securities‟ pricing splits and a stock‟s dividend history. Prior 
developments of this method formulated the event study methodology to measure the impact of 
information of the performance of a security.   
 The objectives for selecting the event study technique to evaluate abnormal performance 
changes in response to IPO issuance are as follows: (i) I selected the event study methodology to 
examine some specific events that had already occurred, i.e., changes in the performance of a 
stock probably resulting from information relating to a specific event, (ii) assessing the number 
of studies that have implemented the methodology, the event methodology is the preferred 
method used by researchers attempting to examine questions related to market efficiency. As I 
am examining whether the markets efficiently price and adjust for information implied in the 
issuance process, it is appropriate to employ the event study methodology to perform my 
analysis of market efficiency regarding IPO performance, (iii) this method has been around for 
more than 75 years which would argue that it is not in its infancy and a realistic tool for 
evaluation, and (iv) in the ensuing paragraphs, I emphasized that event study is the most suitable 
methodology from perspective of my research relative to survey methodologies (longitudinal, 
cross-sectional and time series), correlational or casual comparative methodology, case study 
approach and experimental designs methodology.  
 Survey methods appeared to be a reasonable approach upon thinking as how to assess 
potential abnormal performance occurring throughout the IPO maturation process? However, 
when I briefly studies into the details of how researchers should apply each method it became 
apparent that the event study framework would be better suited to examine abnormal 
performance occurring throughout the IPO process. For cross-sectional approaches, researchers 
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look at occurrences at one point in time, in this study I used historical data for obtaining 
observations over a substantial time horizon. If I select to use the longitudinal approach, I would 
have to use the same sample throughout the entire study. Because my sample spanned a 17-year 
period during which new firms went public every year and given that IPO performance has the 
potential to change over time – the longitudinal approach would not be appropriate for this type 
of analysis.  
 The event study methodology is also more suitable than the causal comparative approach. 
Rumrill (2004) argued using the causal comparative method; researchers are interested in 
comparing, “differences between derived or intact groups on theory-driven dependent measures”. 
He further suggests that causal comparative approach is appropriate for the study of naturally 
groupings such as race, gender and socioeconomic strata (p. 258). However, this research 
measures the abnormal performance of IPOs resulting from information transmitted into the 
market and as such the event study methodology is a more suitable approach than the causal 
comparative approach.  
 Other research methodologies also considered before deciding on the event study 
approach, they were: (a) case study, (b) correlational, and (c) experimental. After reviewing the 
description of the case study approach found in Leedy and Ormrod (2005), I felt that one of the 
overarching focuses of the event study is to pay particular attention to the contextual clues that 
influence the events occurrence. I understand that using a case study, it would be emphasizing 
more on explaining why IPOs are performing abnormally and less focus on the question of 
whether IPOs produce abnormal performance. It is the latter question I was interested to answer. 
In correlation studies, researchers are interested in describing a relationship between two or more 
variables, which is the focus of this study. However, I am interested in describing how much 
returns on IPOs differ from expectations. The identification of a correlation between two of 
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variables, would not enable me to state that there is a potential anomaly; therefore, I found a 
correlation between these issues. Therefore, the event methodology is preferred to correlational 
methodology. Lastly, when researchers conduct experiments, they need to manipulate some 
factors in one group and not the other. Because I am using historical data and cannot manipulate 
events already occurred and experimental design methodology is not appropriate for this study.  
4.2.2 Approach to Implementing the Event Study Methodology 
 While conducting event studies, researchers have to focus on various elements of the 
methodology. According to Campbell, Lo, and MacKinley (1997), the outline of the event study 
is as follows: (i) event definition, (ii) selection criteria, (iii) estimation procedures, (iv) testing 
procedures, (v) empirical results, and (vi) interpretations and conclusions (pp. 151-152). In the 
hypothesis, subsection of the data analysis section of this chapter, I have addressed four steps as 
narrated above i.e. (i) to (iv). In addition, I have evaluated steps (v) and (vi) in respective 
chapters. IPOs, thus, have no pre-event returns. However, I compared event firm returns to 
benchmark index for examining short-term IPO performance. 
 For testing procedures, I used calendar-time strategies besides event-study methodology 
to examine the significance of abnormal returns obtained by investors in longer-term. To 
estimate the return on the benchmark, I developed matched-firm index on the basis of market 
capitalization. With the proceeding components of design of this event study specified, I will 
move on to a discussion of the setting and sample form which I will make inferences about 
abnormal performance.  
 
4.3 Setting and Sample 
 I could not obtain data throughout the entire sample to analyze IPO performance 
occurring on the first day of public trading. My initial sample was comprised of all securities 
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traded on Karachi Stock Exchange that went public from 1995 to 2011. I used this sample for the 
analyses conducted on: (a) short-term and intermediate IPO performance, (b) long-term IPO 
performance, and (c) growth rate implicit in IPO prices. However, data from the SECP used for 
the above analyses are not readily available. The sample shrank to 110 IPOs for short-term and 
intermediate analyses, to 90 IPOs used to evaluate performance for longer-term analyses and to 
35 issues for the analyses of growth embedded in offer prices. Short-term performance relates to 
daily abnormal returns from listing to fifteen trading days and intermediate performance 
examines monthly abnormal returns from the first to six months. In long-term analyses, monthly 
abnormal IPO performance is examined over the period of three-year.  In the analyses associated 
with the short-term and intermediate, time period covers the sample during 1995-2011. The time 
horizon shrank to January, 1995 to December 2010 for tests conducted to detect abnormal 
performance. Imposing different filters and considering only manufacturing firms to analyze the 
growth rate implicit in offer price, the sample substantially reduced to January 1995 to December 
2008. 
 
4.4 Data Collection 
 The data collection process may also prove to bias the research. In this study, since I am 
interested in evaluating existing data, I have pooled data from a variety of sources to produce the 
most accurate reflection of the population. The potential sources that I have used to obtain data 
are the Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan (SECP), Karachi Stock Exchange 
(KSE) database, various governmental and financial websites (The News, DAWN and Business 
Recorder). The first goal of this study was to identify all IPOs went public in the 17-year period 
from 1995 – 2011.  
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For the 1995 to 1998 period, I have collected prices of stocks from the daily quotations of 
the Karachi Stock Exchange. The firm related characteristics are gathered from IPO prospectus 
and stock prices are collected through KSE database. After searching through the preceding 
resources for pricing and other relevant data, if I unable to obtain the data using the identified 
resources, I have decided to drop the IPOs from the analysis.  
 
4.5 Research Methodologies 
4.5.1 Short-term and Intermediate IPO performance 
 Short-term and intermediate IPO performance is examined through market adjusted 
abnormal returns which is computed as:       ,*
      
      
   +- where Ri is the raw return and 
calculated as  i  (
 1
 0
)    where P1 is the first day closing prices and P0 is the offer price of 
stock i. Rm is the market return and estimated as  m   (
 1
 0
)    where I1 = market index (KSE-
100) value at the first trading day of stock i and I0 = market index value on the offering date of 
stock i. 
 Wealth relative (WR) is another measure used to examine the short-term and intermediate 
IPO performance (Brav et al., 2000 and Aijo et al., 2014). WR is calculated by including and 
excluding the initial returns. WRi,d for stock i at the dth trading day is assessed as: WRi,d = 
1+(1/n) 

n
i 1
   /1+(1/n) 

n
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   .  where Ri,d is the stock i return at the particular day derived  
through offering / listing day and Rm,d is market index return calculated from market index on 
offering / listing day. Short-run performance is measured from listing to 15-trading days while 
intermediate performance is examined from the first to six month of trading. If WRi,d > 1.00 =  
IPO outperformed while WRi,d < 1.00 = IPOs underperformed (Ritter, 1991). After examining 
short-term and intermediate IPO performance, the next step is to find the determinant factors that 
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cause IPO performance. This study used the Extreme Bounds Analysis (EBA) technique to 
determine the factors that affect short-term and intermediate IPO performance.  
4.5.2 Extreme Bounds Analysis 
 A regression model comprises on various explanatory variables which affect the 
dependent variable. However, the influence of explanatory variable over dependent variable 
varies, that‟s why developing a model remained an issue. In empirical modeling, model 
uncertainty is an important problem (Temple, 2000). Thus, a preferred model is used followed by 
result of diagnostic tests. Temple (2000) argue that “several different models may all seem 
reasonable given data, but lead to very different conclusions about the parameter of interests”. 
For analyzing the determinants of short-term and intermediate IPO performance, theoretical 
framework for the researcher formulating a proper regression model is desired. Though various 
underpricing regression models have been developed so far by many researchers but the question 
is to examine the robustness of variables of interest. To have extreme bounds analysis (EBA), 
this study is being deployed in order for eliminating the uncertainty of regression model.  
 Initially, Cooley and LeRoy (1981) argued that the economic theory does not elaborate as 
to which variables are to be kept constant by applying statistical tests. To investigate the 
determinant variables that influenced the dependent variable, EBA was developed by Leamer 
(1983, 1985) and implemented practically by Levine and Renelt (1992). Prior studies predict a 
number of models to explain the dependent variable but the reliability of these models is 
questionable. The EBA technique is useful process to evaluate and provide the sensitivity of 
expected outcomes to specification changes. Further, EBA reduces the model uncertainty 
(Leamer and Leonard, 1983) because the extreme values of coefficient on the variable of interest 
minimize the chances of uncertainty. The explanatory variable is classified as „robust‟ if 
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expected outcomes remains significant and do not alter its sign when set of explanatory variables 
is changed.  
 To determine the influencing factors, Moosa and Cardak (2006) defined the following 
regression: 
 
       

n
j 1
                                                                                                                                                     
 
where  
 
 Yi  :   the dependent variable of firm i; 
 Xji :   the jth explanatory variable of firm i; and  
 ϵi  :   error term.  
 Earlier studies proposed various regressions that elucidate the combination of explanatory 
variables. The purpose of applying this technique is to select true predictors of the dependent 
variable. For instance, x1 may be significant when x2 and x3 are included in the regression and not 
when x4 is included. Generally, it is an issue for selecting of which set of all variables xj‟s do we 
select? Prior studies have shown that after extensive data mining and research, appropriate 
regressions can be found that support a preconceived idea.  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Dependent 
variable, Y 
Fixed variable(s), 
X 
In
d
ep
en
d
en
t 
va
ri
a
b
le
s 
 
                    Figure 4.1: Extreme Bounds Analysis describing the explanatory variables 
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 To investigate the explanatory variables, EBA technique is used to a linear regression. 
The model can be specified as: 
 
 
       

n
j 1
               

m
j 1
                                                                                                             
 
where  
 
 X  :    an important explanatory variable(s) as indicated by previous studies, called  
                      the free or fixed;  
 Q  :    the variable of interest of which robustness is tested ; and 
 Z   :   potentially important determinant. 
 
 It can further be explained with a diagram shown at Figure 4.1. This technique estimates 
the coefficient of variable of interest Q of which robustness is tested. To examine the sensitivity 
of an explanatory variable, thousands of regressions are run to find the values of the respective 
coefficient. Fixed variable(s) X is used in every regression, the variable of interest Q and the set 
of Z variables are selected from a predetermined pool.  
This technique is based on estimated values of coefficient on the variable of interest, Q. 
Owing to more Z variables, the number of regression increases. For instance, Sala-i-Martin 
(1997) ran almost two million regressions. Initially, Sala-i-Martin (1996) ran nearly four million 
regressions to examine the robustness of explanatory variables under EBA method.  
 In front of criticism, it creates the problem of multicollinearity inflating standard errors. 
Generally it happens because of weak data problem. To overcome, Levine and Renelt (1992) 
proposed three conditions: (a) in each regression, only three explanatory variables are used, (b) 
small group of variables comprised three Z variables, and (c) the selection of Z variables as 
variable of interest. In addition, this approach is too stringent. If a coefficient alters its sign in a 
single out of many thousand regressions, it is treated as “fragile”.  
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 In empirical testing, EBA is the robust predictor of explanatory variables which 
emphasizes that it is superior from relative to conventional cross-sectional analysis. It is a 
procedure that gives a sensitivity analysis and generates robust results. In conventional reporting, 
Leamer and Leonard (1983) opposed the empirical results arguing that “the reported findings are 
extensively regarded to overemphasize the accuracy of estimate and possibly to distort them as 
well” (p. 306).  
 This technique has been extensively used in diversified fields such as: (a) economic 
performance (Ahrend, 2012), (b) demand for money (Kumar and Rao, 2012) (c) democracy 
(Vreeland et. al., 2012), (d) R&D investment (Wang, 2010), (e) foreign direct investment 
(Moosa, 2009; Moosa and Cardak, 2006), (f) corruption (Haan and Seldadyo, 2006), (g) long-
term growth (Sturm and Haan, 2005), and (h) stock prices in Kuwait stock exchange (Al-
Deehani, 2005). 
 To summarize, EBA is an effective tool which reduces the ambiguity by way of selecting 
the explanatory variables. After rigorous regressions, it selects only those variables that are the 
true predictor of dependent variable. To find the true determinants of IPO underpricing, I use this 
technique in my analyses. I determine the robust factors that influence the short-term 
performance on the first and fifteen-trading days whereas intermediate performance on third and 
six-month of trading.   
4.5.3    Long-term IPO Performance 
Insofar as long-term abnormal returns, it may be a long-standing debate in the literature 
of financial economics. Researchers do not have concurrence and differ over one methodology 
owing to sensitivity of method applied. Fama (1998) postulates that anomalies concerning 
abnormal performance portrayed in earlier studies cannot establish validation to construe as no 
abnormal return. The observing changes in efficient market, thus, offset each other because there 
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is no existence of a theory that explains both over-reaction and under-reaction. Extensive debate 
in the research creates three important critiques: (1) the use of biased benchmarks, (2) time 
period for which IPO stocks and benchmark returns are evaluated, and (3) issues pertaining to 
rationality of statistical inferences considering the significance level as biased.       
Event studies (Ball and Brown, 1968; Fama et al., 1969) and calendar-time studies 
(Mitchell and Stafford, 2000; Hou, Olsson and Robinson, 2001) were developed to examine the 
market efficiency. The event study methodology is the most popular method used for measuring 
the performance of IPOs in short- and long-term (Ritter, 1991). The calendar-time approach is 
considered as an important technique in the presence of correlating sample returns due to 
overlapping estimation period (Lyon et al., 1999). Both the methodologies have been used to 
analyze the IPO performance in empirical studies. Through these methodologies, it was analyzed 
that whether or not the positive or negative return over the specific time period has been 
obtained? Researchers have emphasized to evaluate the process of methodology encompassed in 
implementing event studies that have been tremendously increased over the last decade. To 
authenticate calendar-time studies, researchers have chosen various measures involved to 
analyze abnormal performance e.g., asset pricing model of Fama-French is used as benchmark. 
In the present research, I apply both event- and calendar-time approaches to analyze and 
compare the abnormal returns. 
4.5.4 Benchmark Construction 
 Researchers have indicated that the methodologies employed to examine the long-term 
performance stock returns are prone to misspecification (Lyon et al., 1999, p.165). The cause of 
misspecification varies relying on the methodologies deployed to measure the normal 
performance. Researchers can estimate about the extent of a poor model used to test the accuracy 
of an abnormal performance in simulations. For this they can use the past historical data for 
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examination of specification as well as power analyses. At large, the researches pertaining to 
methodological tests on this account increased tremendously. In the beginning, the performance 
was measured by comparing event firm returns to standard benchmarks (e.g. KSE 100 or S&P 
500 – benchmark index of the respective country), but this was ineffective when researchers 
attempted to analyze IPO performance because IPOs lack the historical performance data that 
would be used to measure the strength of relationship between a firm and the matching index. To 
develop a precise benchmark in the absence of past information, researchers have formulated 
portfolios or matched the IPO firm to a non-event firm. These methods are more valid in contrast 
as the IPO firm is compared with standard benchmark. Resultantly, the level of stocks‟ returns 
between event and non-event firm is reduced with an abnormal return equivalent to zero.  
 The different benchmarks have been constructed to investigate the normal performance. 
Major differences among these benchmarks are: (a) it is based on a matched-firm or a portfolio 
technique, (b) the factors considered to model normal performance and (c) the weight (market- 
or value-weight) of securities in portfolios. In recent studies, the common benchmarks have been 
used as: (a) traditional indices, (b) the Fama-French 3-factor model, (c) reference portfolios, and 
(d) matched-firm portfolios. Importantly, the matching-firms technique is well specified and 
more powerful to examine the normal performance. In this research, I will only explain the 
portfolio- and matching-firm strategies for examination of normal performance.   
 Skewness bias. When the matching techniques are used, it will cause skewness bias 
which is more crucial in the matching portfolio technique as a benchmark. Further, it adversely 
effect on the specification and power analyses. If the returns of the securities are evaluated in a 
longer window, the stock return may found more than 100% higher than in excess of -100%. 
Practically, it is not possible that the value of investment is impaired by above 100% (Barber and 
Lyon, 1997). Using the standard tests, a number of observations may be attracted by the 
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researchers in the event of falling below 100% as against their expectations of -100%. The 
positive extreme values of the observations, more than 100%, will inflate the standard deviation 
of the sample. These extreme values are then overstated if we suppose that the underlying 
assumption is normal (Barber et al., 1997). In simulation, as per observations sketched through 
distributional mean may conclude that the population mean is significantly less than the known 
mean due to skewness bias (Barber and Lyon, 1997, p. 348). 
 Matched-portfolios. Matched-portfolio technique is well known to measure the normal 
performance in event studies. This approach is popular through which researchers have to 
develop few portfolios and identifies that how portfolio should be matched? In contrast, when 
using the matching-firm technique, each event firm is matched to a non-event firm. In portfolio, 
researchers would have an index based upon deciles of market capitalization or industry 
affiliation.  
 The matching portfolio technique is likely to be misspecified due to the following biases: 
(a) new listing, (b) rebalancing, (c) survivorship, and (d) skewness problem. By adding new 
securities in the portfolio used to gauge normal performance, it results listing bias. Prior research 
have indicated that new issues generate positive (negative) abnormal performance at different 
times resulting underestimate (overestimate) abnormal returns experienced by the event firm 
(Lyon et al., 1999). On account of rebalancing bias, the returns of the matching portfolio 
increases impacting negatively on the abnormal performance of event firm (Lyon, Barber, and 
Tsai, 1999). The survivorship bias may decrease (increase) the performance of event firm as a 
result of which it outperforms (underperforms) the matching-portfolio. 
 Matched-firm.  To examine the normal performance, Ang and Zhang (2004), Lyon et al. 
(1999) and Barber and Lyon (1997), analyzed the 3- and 4-factor carefully constructed reference 
portfolio and matched-firm techniques. These studies argued that the matched-firm technique is 
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well specified and powerful as compared to other methods. Presently, the matched-firm approach 
is constructed on the basis of firm‟s market capitalization, book-to-market, industry affiliation or 
correlation to detect abnormal performance (Ang and Zhang, 2004; Lyon et al., 1999). For 
applying the matched-firm technique, it is essential to identify the most applicable benchmark. It 
is important that when researchers construct different benchmarks, they may find varying results. 
When benchmark is constructed on the basis of market capitalization and industry affiliation, 
researchers are required to indicate the nature of filter (size or industry) to oppose initially and 
the boundaries set across the filters. The results may differ relying on the filters which 
researchers impose to select the matched-firms i.e. market capitalization or industry affiliation. 
Matching by industry is difficult as the researchers first select the event firms on the basis of 
market capitalization. In this regard, Loughran et al. (1995) argued that firms go public to take 
benefit of industry wide misevaluation. Matching-firms based on industry affiliation, therefore, 
reduces the ability to investigate abnormal performance. According to Barber and Lyon (1997), 
the matching-firm benchmark constructed on the basis of size and BM reduces the unbiased 
estimates. Eckbo, Masulis and Norli (2000) postulated that underperformance of an event firm is 
reflecting a lower systematic risk exposure as opposed to the matching-firms. To determine 
abnormal performance, generally the matching-firm criteria devised considering the size and BM 
(Barber and Lyon, 1997; Ang and Zhang, 2004; Lyon, Barber and Tsai, 1999).  
 To summarize, Barber and Lyon (1997) concluded that matched-firm technique for 
detection of abnormal performance reduces the new listing, rebalancing, and skewness biases. I 
used matched-portfolio and matched-firm approaches in this study to determine abnormal 
performance. The matching-firm criteria is selected on the basis of market capitalization. To 
avoid the reduction in sample size, filters like industry affiliation and book-to-market are 
ignored. For an event firm, a non-IPO firm is selected. To match the firms, it is imperative that 
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all firms registered on Karachi Stock Exchange on each December; however, they have not 
floated their shares for the last 3-years are then categorized through their market capitalization 
(Loughran and Ritter, 1995). For selecting, the market value of the matched-firm is closed to but 
in excess of event firm. The firms delisted during three-year period are not chosen as matching-
firm.  
4.5.5 Measuring Abnormal Performance 
To measure abnormal performance, it is an important concern for the researchers how to 
find an aggregate returns if IPO firm has an abnormal event which becomes critical? In the 
literature, there exists a long-standing debate as to which method is employed for measuring 
abnormal performance? Is the CAR or the BHAR approach the right metric to deploy for 
gauging of abnormal performance? Calendar-time approaches also used to examine abnormal 
performance. To elaborate on these methods, I have explained the differences as under: 
4.5.5.1 BHAR versus CAR 
Researchers generally used the CAR and/or BHAR method to investigate the aggregate 
abnormal returns. While measuring returns, both these methods have some pros and cons. I 
highlight some of the differences between these two approaches. Barber and Lyon (1997) argued 
that CAR is a biased estimator of BHAR particularly when benchmark index is used; the returns 
would be affected due to new listings bias. This implies that newly listed firms included in the 
benchmark while the event firm is having a long returns history. Thus, significance levels of 
CARs are overstated. Conrad and Kaul (1993) pointed out that the CAR generates spurious 
biases but in event-time studies, CAR can maneuver the results in either direction due to bid-ask 
bounces.  
To examine the abnormal returns, Barber and Lyon (1997) among others, suggested the 
following calculation of the CAR method: 
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where Rit is the return on stock i in time t, E(Rit) is the estimated return on stock i in time t and  
To aggregate and evaluate abnormal returns, Barber and Lyon (1997) used the following 
calculation: 
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 The BHAR is based on the returns earned by a day trader i.e. opening and closing prices 
of the trading day each day. To aggregate and calculate the BHAR, analysts prefer to employ the 
geometric method while researchers emphasize to use the arithmetic method to calculate the 
CAR. By comparing both the methods, it infers that the BHAR precisely measures stocks‟ 
returns (Ecker, 2008). Moreover, average periodic return obtained through the geometric method 
is smaller than the arithmetic method. For example, if the stock is selling at Rs.100 at the end of 
one month, its price drops to Rs.50. However, in the following month, its price increases to 
Rs.100 resulting in a CAR of 25% and the stock is now selling at its initial price (Schaeffer, 
2005). In BHAR as the returns are compounded, it accurately presents an investor‟s experience 
towards investment (Barber and Lyon, 1997). In contrast, Mitchell and Stafford (2000) opposed 
this method because all the investors are not interested to compare their returns with those who 
calculate their returns using buy-and-hold investment strategy. This argument is plausible. Most 
of the researchers argue in favor of BHAR as the returns are determined on the basis of buy and 
hold investment strategy depending on the geometric method. Though CAR is a biased predictor 
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of BHAR, yet it may not provide true results of the abnormal returns relying on the arithmetic 
method. Ignoring this aspect that the BHAR is better than the CAR, I use both these methods to 
aggregate and calculate abnormal returns in my analyses of IPO performance.  
4.5.5.2 Fama-French Three-Factor versus Carhart Four-Factor  
Fama-French (1993) developed 3-factor model to capture the size and the BM risk factors 
when calculate abnormal returns. The model can be described as under: 
 
                    (        )                                                                          
 
where Rpt is the return of the IPO portfolio in month t, Rft is the one-month treasury bill rate in 
month t, αi is the excess or abnormal return in month t; Rmt is the return on value-weighted index 
in month t, SMBt is the return on value-weighted portfolio of small minus large stocks in month 
t; and HMLt the return on value-weighted portfolio of high minus low BM stocks in month t. βi, 
si, and hi denote loadings of each factor on the portfolio. 
 Loughran and Ritter (2000) suggested that multi-factor model of Fama-French cannot 
reject the market efficiency but in case of an anomaly, it simply explains other factors. In view of 
Fama and French (1996a), 3-factor model is termed as an equilibrium model as investors 
consider two important proxies i.e. size and book-to-market. On criticism, Fama-French (1993) 
pointed out that this model fails to produce the results of 25 portfolios developed considering 
market capitalization and BM quintiles. For ascertaining abnormal returns of the portfolio, I use 
the Fama-French model covering both the size and value mimicking factor.    
Carhart (1997) model was developed to incorporate a momentum factor which classifies 
last year‟s best and worst performers. Carhart model can be measured as follow: 
 
                    (        )                                                        
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where WMLt is the winners minus losers capture the momentum factor in one-year period t. I 
also apply four-factor model for measuring IPO performance to inquire the abnormal returns 
earned by the investors.   
4.5.5.3 Growth Rate Implied in Offer Prices 
According to the DCF model, the Enterprise Value in time period t (EVt) is determined at 
the present value of expected FFCF (Et[FFCFt+i]) depending on the available information in time 
period t and then discounted it at business level risk. Deducting the outstanding debt in time 
period t (Dt) and afterwards obtains an expected equity value (Et). The important condition for 
terminating the ongoing concern is to determine the future cash flow values over an infinite 
period. Similar to other direct valuations, the DCF model segregates the future into two periods. 
According to Penman (2007), valuations are generally equal to indefinite forecasting periods. 
The going concerns are treated to operate for indefinite time period whereas practically it 
transacts finite horizons. The objective of the different IPO valuation methods is to forecast for 
finite horizon. During the first period, an individual forecast of cash flow is developed every 
year. The steady-state value of post-horizon assets is estimated through continuous formula i.e. 
terminated value of firm‟s cash flow is measured through the growth of steady-state. Hence, it is 
supposed that cash flows constantly increase at a rate (g2) in future.  
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The model is segregated into two-stage where the growth rates of the cash flows would 
be different, i.e., before and after the event. The first stage assumed cash flow to grow at constant 
(extra) growth (g1) annually. Therefore, the EVt is shown as a function of five variables: (1) 
FFCFt = Firm Free Cash Flows at time t, (2) T = length of the first stage growth, (3) g1 = growth 
of the first stage, (4) g2 = growth of the second stage, and (5) WACC = Weighted Average Cost 
of Capital.  
 
From Eq. (4.8) 
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To find the value of IPO with DCF model (t = IPO in Eq. 4.9), actual FFCF at IPO 
(FFCFt ≡ FFCFIPO) is used to find cash flows after IPO. When fixed growth rates, g1 and g2 to 
the cash flows before IPO are applied, thus, FFCFs are calculated. By taking into account the 
assumptions, the EV prior to IPO (EVIPO) is measured as the addition of discounted cash flow 
expectations which can be written as a function of the cash flow at the IPO.  
 
Further, supposing in Eq. (4.9)   
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The above equation can be solved by considering firm related variables but might not 
appropriately estimate for those firms operating in high-tech business with no earnings.  
Cogliati and Paleari (2011) developed the reverse engineering model to determine the 
expectation of growth embedded in offer prices by inverting the DCF model. It is a two-stage 
model that provides the provision to estimate consistently the short-run implied growth rate by 
IPO prices. The following model (Eq. 4.11) is used to determine the short term implied growth 
rate (g1) with the public information available for every investor: 
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The equation (4.11) can be solved by using variables obtained from the IPO prospectus as 
well as calculated from financial statements. From view point of the investors, this method is 
more effective to estimate the growth that implicit in offer prices. It also concentrates to 
determine the estimation errors as well as overvaluation index.  
 
4.6 Summary 
 The earlier section provided the fundamental relationships in evaluation of my 
dissertation as how I endeavored to test them? Short-term IPO performance compared to 
benchmark index in this study. Researchers have provided strong evidences regarding the 
occurrence of significant abnormal returns. The particular interest was how well the different 
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benchmarks estimated normal performance. Presently, researchers seem to be emphasizing on 
identifying and examining different methodological tools used to perform event studies, 
therefore, the significance is critically importance for the academic interpretation of the results. 
Further, growth is examined implicit in offer prices implemented by using reverse engineering 
DCF model. At the conclusion of the proposed analysis, I have provided the academic and 
professional communicates with direct tests analyzing whether events associated with a firm‟s 
issuance generated abnormal performances. Given that I have used daily data to evaluate short-
term performance and monthly data to assess intermediate and long-term performance. Focusing 
on the three-year dataset may enable investors to improve their expectations regarding long-term 
IPO performance. In addition, investors may find the imposition of ratio of growth in IPO prices 
so as to make investment decision on the basis of past evaluation.   
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CHAPTER 5 
 
SHORT-TERM AND INTERMEDIATE IPO PERFORMANCE  
 
5.1 Introduction 
 Over the past four decades, IPO underpricing has been a pervasive phenomenon for 
which prior research documented that new issues generally tend to be underpriced (e.g. Logue, 
1973; Ibboston, 1975). It is defined as the percentage premium that an investor receives at initial 
market trading. Researchers attempted to shed light in determination of abnormal returns in 
different countries as well as across time periods. They argued that on average, IPOs earned 
significant abnormal return on initial trading day. However, the magnitude of the underpricing 
varies from country to country. Banerjee et al. (2011) argued that underpricing is not a country 
specific issue but is a general phenomenon. Loughran et al. (2013) observed higher underpricing 
in developing markets relative to developed markets. They postulated that higher underpricing is 
attributed to volatility of developing countries markets entailing high risk. Moshirian, Ng and 
Wu (2010) documented that initial underpricing in Asian countries is comparatively higher than 
other markets.  
 In Pakistan, Sohail and Nasr (2007) examined 50 IPOs during 2000–2006 period and 
documented the existence of initial underpricing of 35.66%. Sohail and Rehman (2010) further 
measured short-run underpricing of 73 IPOs over 20-trading day starting from listing during 
2000–2009 and found the evidence of underpricing ranged between 37% and 42%. Additionally, 
Kayani and Amjad (2011) reported initial underpricing of 39.86% using 59 IPOs from 2000–
2010. Recently, in yet another study carried out by Afza et al. (2013) using 55 IPOs found the 
existence of initial underpricing by 28.03% during 2000–2011. All these studies have examined 
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underpricing in the Pakistani market i.e. (1) at listing day, (2) over 20-trading day starting from 
listing comprising the periodicity as 2000 to 2011. This research adds the existing literature by 
measuring the short-term and intermediate performance of 110 IPOs from 1995 to 2011. Short-
term performance is measured from listing to 15-trading days and intermediate performance is 
examined from one- to six-month of trading. To examine the robust determinants of short-term 
and intermediate IPO performance, a comprehensive analysis has been carried out using the EBA 
technique.  
 In line with earlier studies, this research documents the strong evidence of short-term 
underpricing in Pakistani market. IPOs are underpriced on average by 15.33% on listing day. 
The results of short-term performance predict that investors earn significant positive abnormal 
return over 15-trading days. However, intermediate performance suggests that investors get 
positive returns at the end of 2-month but thereafter no evidence of abnormal returns is found 
over 6-month. Wealth relative is more than one indicating the evidence of abnormal returns over 
the sample period. Further, it finds that: (a) large-size issues are more underpriced than small-
size issues -- contrary to ex-ante uncertainty, (b) high prestige underwriters‟ are underpriced less 
than low prestige underwriters‟, and (c) underpricing is positively correlated with investor 
sentiments. Above all, robust predictors of short-term IPO performance are investigated through 
the EBA technique on the first and fifteen trading days and results thereof suggest 
oversubscription being foremost factor followed by aftermarket risk level. Other robust variables 
include (a) rate of return on assets, (b) offer price and (c) percentage of shares offered. The 
determinants of intermediate IPO performance are examined over third and six month of trading 
and found that oversubscription and rate of return on assets are the robust predictors.  
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5.2 Empirical Methodology 
 This study examines the empirical validity of short-term and intermediate IPO 
performance. The effect of market adjusted abnormal returns on issue proceeds, underwriters‟ 
prestige and investor sentiment is also investigated. To determine the robust predictors that affect 
short-term and intermediate performance, EBA technique is used.  
5.2.1 What is abnormal return? 
 Abnormal return is an excess return earned by investors participating on offer price and 
sell on the first closing market price (Stoll and Curley, 1970). This excess return is, thus, known 
as underpricing. Alternatively, abnormal return is the premium percentage that an investor 
obtains at the start of market trading. Generally, new issues envisage some benefits in the form 
of abnormal returns. However, abnormal returns deteriorate due to post-issue price adjustment 
period (Ljungqvist et al., 2006). Empirical studies have provided a number of reasons for 
abnormal performance, e.g., (a) information asymmetry, (b) ex-ante uncertainty, (c) 
underwriter‟s prestige, (d) signaling mechanism, and (e) ownership dispersion.  
5.2.2 Estimation of the level of underpricing 
To estimate the underpricing, different methods have been used. This study follow the 
same methodology used in previous researches (e.g. Aggarwal et al., 1993; Mok and Hui, 1998; 
Sohail and Nasr, 2007; Agathee et al., 2012). Importantly, almost all the empirical studies 
documented underpricing on the initial trading day while a few concentrated in a longer 
window
1
. Ljungqvist et al. (2006) argued that it is appropriate to measure the short-term 
underpricing in a longer-window as emerging markets may take more time to adjust the post-
issue prices towards its equilibrium. Kooli and Suret (2004) argued that initial underpricing is 
                                                          
1
 Short run performance examined up to one month (for instance, Khurshed and Mudambi, 2002; Hassan and Quayes, 2008; 
Sohail and Rehman, 2010; Alagidede and Heerden, 2012; Perera and Kulendran, 2012).   
58 
 
desirable when difference between subscription and listing date persists. From the perspective of 
Pakistani market where persistence of time gap is long as compared to developed markets, it is 
more suitable to investigate short-term as well as intermediate performance (i.e. over 6-month 
period).  
Short-term IPO performance is, therefore, estimated through MAAR (i.e. underpricing) 
for stock i at dth trading day as: 
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where MAARi,d is the abnormal excess return for stock i at the close of dth trading day (d = 
1,2,3,….15). Ri,d
2
 is raw return for stock i at the dth trading day and Rm,d
3
 is market return of the 
corresponding day to the offering by stock i. Average MAARi,d of the sample IPOs at the dth 
trading day is measured as:  
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For testing the null hypothesis that mean MAARd equals to zero, test statistic is measured 
as: 
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where s represents the standard deviation of MAARi,d and n denotes total sample firms. Following 
hypothesis is developed to test the mean MAAR on the first to fifteen trading days which is 
equal to zero: 
                                                          
2 Ri,d = the raw return for stock i is at the end of the dth trading day. It is computed as:        (
    
    
)    where Pi,d  = price of 
stock i at the end of dth trading day and Pi,0 = offer price of stock i. 
3 Rm,d = the market return (benchmark index i.e., KSE-100). It is calculated as:         (
    
    
)    where Im,d = value of market 
index at the end of the dth trading day and Im,0 = value of market index on the offering date of stock i. 
 
59 
 
 Hypothesis 1: 
H0:   MAAR1 to 15-trading day = 0     
H1:     MAAR1 to 15-trading day ≠ 0     
Subsequently, I investigate the intermediate IPO performance over 6-trading month 
starting from the first month, it is hypothesized as: 
Hypothesis 2:   
H0:   MAAR1 to 6-trading month = 0 
H1:     MAAR1 to 6-trading month ≠ 0 
 Following prior studies, e.g., Ritter (1991); Levis (1993); Brav et al. (2000); Aijo et al. 
(2014), Wealth relative (WR) is another measure used to examine short-term and intermediate 
IPO performance. WR is calculated by including and excluding the initial returns.  
 WRi,d for stock i at the dth trading day is assessed as follows: 
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where Ri,d is the stock i return at the particular day derived  through offering / listing day and Rm,d 
is market index return calculated from market index on offering / listing day. Short-run 
performance is measured from listing to 15-trading days while intermediate performance is 
examined from the first to six month of trading. If the value of WRi,d > 1.00 it represents that 
IPO outperformed while WRi,d < 1.00 it reflects that IPOs underperformed (Ritter, 1991). 
5.2.3 Econometric methodology for testing determinants of short-term and intermediate IPO 
performance 
 There are a numbers of variables which have been identified by prior studies influencing 
the underpricing. The purpose of the regression analysis is to identify those variables that affect 
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the underpricing, a few of which are significant. This study applies EBA technique so as to find 
the determinants of short-term and intermediate IPO performance. Short term performance is 
examined on the first and15-trading days while intermediate performance is investigated on third 
and six months of trading. Aiming to mitigate the uncertainty for selection of those factors that 
influence the short-term and intermediate performance, the EBA technique can be described as 
MAARi =     + 

n
j 1
      +     + 

m
j 1
          εi. Where X is a fixed variable(s) to be included 
in entire set of regressions, the robustness of Q (i.e. variable of interest) is tested and Z is a 
prospective variable. The EBA technique elaborates that an exhaustive regressions are run to find 
the robustness of the particular variable. For maintaining the same sign as well as significance of 
the extreme values of the coefficient of variable of interest may be categorized as robust variable 
otherwise a fragile one.  
 Following explanatory variables have identified that may affect short-term and 
intermediate IPO performance:    
 
                                                                     
                                                                                       
                                                                                                                                 
where  
MAAR         Underpricing i.e. market adjusted abnormal return; 
   
Sub + Oversubscription ratio obtained from shares demanded by shares offered; 
   
Risk + Aftermarket risk level of the IPO. Calculated as standard deviation of post-issue 
pricing of first 30 trading days; 
   
ROA – Rate of return on assets. Estimated as net income by total assets; 
   
Oprice – Offer price is a log of issue price; 
   
UW – A dummy variable classifying high prestige underwriters‟ for 1 and 0 otherwise; 
   
PSO – Proportion of shares offered to the general public;  
   
LDel + Listing delay measured by logarithm of number of days differentiating between 
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offering and listing day; 
   
FinLev + Financial leverage of firm prior to IPO. It is derived as long-term debt divided by 
total assets; 
   
Mkt_vol + Standard deviation of market return over 45 days prior to IPO; 
   
Age – Age of event firm prior to IPO. It is scaled as the difference between year of 
establishment and going public;  
   
YDum +/– A dummy variable if IPOs are issued during 2000–2011 which is classified as 1 
and 0 for 1995–1998;  
   
FSize – Firm size measuring by natural logarithm of total assets; 
   
EPS + Earnings per share is obtained by net income to number of shares outstanding; 
   
Mkt_ret + Market return estimated on KSE-100 index over 45 days before listing; and 
   
Hot – A dummy variable if IPO is issued in hot activity period which is categorized as 1 
and 0 otherwise. 
   
 
 Earlier studies documented different control variables that influence the level of 
underpricing, therefore, it is crucial to choose only those factors that truly cause short-term and 
intermediate IPO performance. This study employs EBA technique to enquire the determinant 
factors of short-term and intermediate performance. Therefore, fifteen explanatory variables are 
considered, out of which two X-variables are selected as fixed to be used in every regression 
while from rest of thirteen variables, Q and Z variables are selected. In empirical testing, the X 
variable(s) are important determinants with regard to theoretical and empirical evidences 
mentioned by earlier studies. Out of thirteen, the robustness of the variable of interest Q is 
examined. However, three Z-variables are chosen from the rest of twelve variables, giving 2,860 
regressions (220 regressions for each variable of interest) and in total 11,440 regressions.  
 Table 5.1 presents the characteristics of 110 IPOs issued on KSE from 1995–2011. Rate 
of return on assets (ROA), proportion of shares offered (PSO), financial leverage (FinLev), 
market return (Mkt_ret) and market volatility (Mkt_vol) are shown in percentages. Firm size 
(FSize) is in PKR (Pak Rupee) in millions and offer price (OPrice) in PKR. Oversubscription 
ratio (Sub) is estimated in times and earning per share (EPS) is measured in PKR per share. Age 
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and listing delay (LDel) are scaled in years and days respectively. Aftermarket risk level of the 
IPOs (Risk) is estimated by standard deviation of post-issue pricing.  
 
Table 5.1 
Descriptive statistics of variables 
Variables Mean Median Max. Value Min. Value Std. Dev. 
      
Sub 2.71 1.08 28.51 0.01 4.90 
Risk 1.52 0.94 16.57 0.00 1.98 
ROA 2.46 0.02 26.73 -12.54 5.58 
OPrice 20.04 10.00 235.00 10.00 27.25 
PSO 29.54 25.00 100.00 2.50 19.04 
LDel 58.15 48.50 211.00 9.00 28.85 
FinLev 17.47 6.52 78.00 0.00 21.41 
Mkt_vol 1.35 1.23 3.05 0.63 0.53 
Age 8.36 4.00 66.00 0.00 11.81 
FSize 16,738.65 762.43 562,915.76 0.00 69,412.45 
EPS 2.23 0.00 28.10 -4.93 4.77 
Mkt_return 1.83 1.78 32.70 -28.24 11.88 
      
 
It presents descriptive statistics of 110 IPOs issued on KSE from 1995 to 2011. The variables include oversubscription ratio 
(Sub), aftermarket risk level of IPO (Risk), rate of return on assets (ROA), offer price (OPrice), proportion of shares offered 
(PSO), listing delay (LDel), financial leverage (FinLev), market volatility (mkt_vol) firm‟s age (Age), size of the firm (FSize), 
earnings per share (EPS) and market return (mkt_ret). Underwriter prestige (UW), dummy for year (YDum) and hot period 
activity (Hot) are considered as dummy variables.  
 
   
 On average, IPOs are subscribed by 2.71 times and median value is slightly more than 
one time indicating the nominal oversubscription in Pakistani market. The mean value of Risk is 
1.52 whereas median value is 0.94 illustrating the small variability in post-issue pricing. ROA, 
on average, is 2.46% describing the negligible returns earned by firms prior to going public. 
Median ROA is just 0.02% along with a standard deviation of 5.58%. Highest and lowest OPrice 
are PKR 235 and PKR 10 respectively. OPrice is PKR 20.04 on average and a median value is 
PKR 10. This implies that matured firms offer high prices because of their sound financial 
credentials while small and young firms offer low prices with an objective to achieve the desired 
results. Average PSO is 29.54% showing the proportion of shares offered to general public. 
Median PSO is 25% with standard deviation of 19.04%.  
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  Listing delay is 58.15 days on average and median value is 48.50 days. This reflects that 
firms take a long time from the offering and listing which creates uncertainty and affect 
underpricing. On average, financial leverage is 17.47% while median value is 6.52% 
representing firms‟ borrowed small proportion of funds. On an average, Mkt_vol is 1.35% 
explaining small fluctuations in market return. Average age of firm is 8.36 years. In sample, 
eleven firms having life of more than 25 years, excluding these, average age of the firm reduces 
to 5.02 years closing to median age of 4 years. The mean value of FSize is PKR 16,739 million. 
The lowest and highest firm size include PKR zero million and PKR 562,916 million 
respectively. Large variations of firm size depicts that diversified IPOs are included in the 
sample. Every share of IPO firm earns on average EPS of PKR 2.23 indicating the minimal 
income earned by firms prior to listing. Maximum and minimum EPS is PKR 28.10 and PKR -
4.93 respectively. Market return is 1.83% on average indicating a low return obtained by 
benchmark index.  
 
5.3 EMPIRICAL FINDINGS 
5.3.1 Short-term IPO Performance 
Short-term performance of IPOs is measured to examine whether or not an investor 
participates on an offering price and selling on the listing day or at any other appropriate day up 
to 15-trading day, earned a significant abnormal returns? The purpose of measuring short-term 
performance over 15-trading day starting from listing is that post-issue prices may take more 
time to reach its equilibrium in emerging markets (Ljungqvist et al., 2006). Table 5.2 reports the 
short-term performance of 110 IPOs listed on KSE during the period lasting from January 1995 
to December 2011.  
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 Table 5.2 
  Short-term performance of IPOs 
 
Trading Day Raw Return (%) Market Return (%) MAAR (%) Std. Dev. t-Statistics p-Value 
 
 1 14.74 -0.10 15.33
***
 33.12 4.86 0.00 
 2 14.95 -0.19 15.59
***
 34.05 4.80 0.00 
 3 14.96 -0.20 15.51
***
 34.26 4.75 0.00 
 4 15.59 -0.02 15.92
***
 36.22 4.61 0.00 
 5 14.59 -0.04 14.89
***
 35.81 4.36 0.00 
 6 14.30 -0.07 14.77
***
 35.48 4.37 0.00 
 7 13.79 -0.13 14.26
***
 35.19 4.25 0.00 
 8 13.54 -0.27 14.13
***
 35.08 4.23 0.00 
 9 13.61 -0.15 14.19
***
 35.74 4.16 0.00 
10 13.02 -0.12 13.67
***
 35.85 4.00 0.00 
11 12.71 -0.06 13.27
***
 35.16 3.96 0.00 
12 12.86  0.07 13.15
***
 34.89 3.95 0.00 
13 12.36  0.07 12.57
***
 35.77 3.68 0.00 
14 12.38  0.13 12.32
***
 36.06 3.58 0.00 
15 12.16  0.27 11.86
***
 35.98 3.46 0.00 
       
 
The table depicts the short-term performance of 110 IPOs from 1995–2011. MAAR is computed as: = [(1+Ri,d)/(1+Rm,d) – 1] x 
100 where Ri,d denotes raw return and Rm,d represents market returns.        (
    
    
)    and         (
    
    
)   . d denotes number 
of trading day, i.e., 1, 2……,15. *** indicates statistical significance at 1% level. 
 
The results show that average raw return is 14.74%, market return is -0.10% and market 
adjusted abnormal returns (i.e. underpricing) is 15.33% on listing day. This indicates that, on 
average, IPOs are significantly undervalued on the listing day showing evidence of the 
underpricing in Pakistani market. The degree of underpricing is the highest on the 4-trading day; 
however, it reduces if investors hold on IPOs upto 15-trading day. This represents that an 
investor who purchased IPOs on an offering day and sold on 4-trading day can earn highest 
abnormal excess returns than any other day up to 15-trading day. The significance of the returns 
assures that investors are confident to obtain positive abnormal returns in Pakistani IPO market 
over the 15-trading days from listing. The standard deviation of the underpricing shows marginal 
variation in abnormal returns from listing to 15-trading days. The initial underpricing in 
Pakistani IPO market is lesser as compared to other developing economies which is consistent 
with prior studies (e.g. Guo et al., 2006; Zouari et al., 2009; Yan, Chong and Yuan, 2010; 
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Agathee et al., 2012; Jewartowski and Lizinska, 2012; Aijo et al.,  2014). Further, the magnitude 
of underpricing in Pakistan is lower relative to other South Asian countries, for instance, Sri 
Lanka, 33.50% (Samarakoon, 2010), India, 46.55% (Sahoo and Rajib, 2010) and Bangladesh, 
108% (Hassan & Quayes, 2008). 
 Out of 110 IPOs, 41 (37%) are overpriced showing that their list prices are below than 
offer prices. When overvalued IPOs are eliminated from the sample, underpricing, on average, 
jumped to 31.71% on listing day relatively higher than international evidences (Chahine, 2008 
and Kooli and Surat, 2002). The short-term performance of undervalued IPOs over 15-trading 
days indicates that the underpricing ranged between 32% and 28% reflecting Pakistani issuers 
leaving too much money on the table.  
 
5.3.2 Intermediate Performance of IPOs 
The purpose of measuring intermediate performance of IPOs is to analyze that how IPOs 
perform from the first- to six-month of trading if investors participate on the offering date. It also 
determines that how long an investor earns positive abnormal returns? Table 5.3 exhibits the 
results of intermediate performance of 110 IPOs from the first- to six-month during the sample 
period. At the close of one-month, average raw return is 10.24%, market return is 0.64% and 
market adjusted abnormal return is 9.74%. These returns are highly significant at 1% level 
illustrating that investors are 99% confident to get positive abnormal returns if participate in 
offering. At the end of 2-month, abnormal returns deteriorate to 6.52% and their significance 
reduce to 10% level. By analyzing the trading period from 3- to 6-month, it is observed that 
average market adjusted returns decrease from 5.16% to 1.57%. Importantly, these returns are 
insignificant elaborating non-assurance of investors to get positive abnormal returns.  The 
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standard deviation of underpricing marginally increases over 6-month describing the risk 
attached with the inclusion of diversified IPOs.  
It can be inferred from the results that investors obtain significant positive abnormal 
returns over the period of 15-trading day from listing illustrating the strong evidence of 
underpricing in Pakistan. However, the significance of the abnormal returns deteriorated in 
evaluation of intermediate IPO performance reflecting that investors earn significant excess 
returns in the first two month of trading but thereafter there is no evidence of yielding positive 
abnormal returns.  
   
 Table 5.3 
  Intermediate performance of IPOs 
 
Trading Day Raw Return (%) Market Return (%) MAAR (%) Std. Dev. t-Statistics p-Value 
 
1-month 10.24 0.64    9.74
***
 34.69 2.95 0.00 
2-month   8.47 2.28  6.52
*
 36.22 1.89 0.06 
3-month   5.89 1.93 5.16 36.29 1.49 0.14 
4-month   5.63 1.94 5.32 39.63 1.41 0.16 
5-month   5.77  2.99 4.43 37.92 1.22 0.22 
6-month   3.72  3.56 1.57 39.93 0.41 0.68 
       
 
The table shows the intermediate performance of 110 IPOs from 1995–2011. MAAR is computed as: = [(1+Ri,t)/(1+Rm,t) – 1] x 
100 where Ri,t denotes raw return and Rm,t represents market returns.       (
    
    
)    and        (
    
    
)   . t denotes trading 
month i.e., 1,2….6. *** and * represents statistical significance at 1 and 10% level.  
 
Table 5.4 presents descriptive statistics on short-term and intermediate performance using 
110 IPOs between January 1995 and December 2011. On the listing day, minimum overpricing 
is 39.14%. However, it slightly surged from 39% to 42% during 15-trading days from listing 
which describes dilution in the stock prices. Maximum underpricing is 107.10% on listing day 
which ranged between 107% and 123% over 15-trading days which shows increase in the stock 
prices. This gap confirms large variations in underpricing. The median underpricing is reported 
at 4.58% on the first trading day whereas it decreased to 3.95% on 15-trading day.  
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Skewness measures symmetric observation from the mean which is zero for a normal 
distribution. Table 5.4 shows that mean is greater than median in all the event windows 
indicating thereby the returns are positively skewed. Kurtosis determines the thickness in tails of 
a probability density function and excess kurtosis is zero for a normal distribution. Again in all 
the cases, excess kurtosis is different from zero depicting that the stock prices are non-normal. 
To test the non-normal distribution, Jarque-Bera (JB) test is used and p-value for test statistics is 
calculated as a chi-square distribution probability. The results of JB and p-values confirm the 
distribution of stock prices as non-normal during the first 15-trading days.  
 
 
Table 5.4 
Descriptive statistics on market adjusted abnormal returns in short- and intermediate-term 
Trading Min Max Mean Median Skewness Kurtosis Jarque-Bera p-Value 
Short-term 
         
  1-day -39.14 107.10 15.33 4.58 1.21 0.88 30.32 0.00 
  2-day -34.62 117.57 15.59 3.52 1.26 1.08 34.63 0.00 
  3-day 35.56 126.48 15.51 3.10 1.30 1.24 37.88 0.00 
  4-day -35.70 141.25 15.92 3.18 1.43 1.97 55.09 0.00 
  5-day -35.77 127.98 14.89 3.28 1.57 2.59 76.01 0.00 
  6-day -35.77 122.06 14.77 4.69 1.42 1.89 53.42 0.00 
  7-day -36.47 123.83 14.26 3.12 1.40 1.78 50.68 0.00 
  8-day -36.16 136.85 14.13 4.61 1.40 1.94 53.06 0.00 
  9-day -36.05 135.01 14.19 2.71 1.46 2.31 63.59 0.00 
10-day -36.30 140.15 13.67 3.09 1.47 2.42 66.23 0.00 
11-day -43.02 131.22 13.27 4.25 1.27 1.58 40.83 0.00 
12-day -44.53 131.61 13.15 3.78 1.33 1.97 50.23 0.00 
13-day -44.10 128.80 12.57 3.42 1.42 2.15 57.99 0.00 
14-day -41.83 127.83 12.32 3.63 1.40 2.01 54.56 0.00 
15-day -41.80 123.13 11.86 3.95 1.38 1.84 50.45 0.00 
Intermediate 
         
1-month -47.93 113.93 9.74 2.98 1.29 1.88 46.65 0.00 
2-month -49.02 122.24 6.52 0.24 1.17 1.27 32.68 0.00 
3-month -54.13 131.74 5.16 -0.51 1.22 1.74 41.01 0.00 
4-month -53.85 174.11 5.32 -3.70 1.42 2.95 77.01 0.00 
5-month -61.62 117.10 4.43 -5.92 0.87 0.36 14.36 0.00 
6-month -63.78 126.58 1.57 -3.84 1.18 1.39 34.29 0.00 
         
 
The table shows the descriptive statistics on short-term and intermediate performance covering 110 IPOs issued on KSE from 
1995 to 2011. 
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While analyzing the descriptive statistics of intermediate IPO performance, it is observed 
that overpricing and underpricing ranged from 47.93% – 63.78% and 113.93% – 126.58% 
respectively over 6-month of trading starting from the first month. The median returns reports 
that IPO underperform after 2-month of trading. The values of abnormal returns are positively 
skewed showing that mean is greater than median in all the event windows. The results of 
kurtosis and JB confirm the distribution of stock prices as non-normal in intermediate IPO 
performance.  
5.3.3 Short-term and Intermediate IPO Performance by Issue Year and Different Periods 
Panel A of Table 5.5 reports the short-term and intermediate IPO performance by issue 
year. The allocation of initial abnormal returns reflects the persistence of underpricing in all 
years except in year 2010 whereby only two issues were underpriced out of nine. This generally 
happens due to economic as well as adverse movements in the stock market. Comparing year-on-
year analysis, the underpricing (39.84%) is observed in 2004 followed by highest underpricing 
(80.63%) in 2006. This shows that the investors earned abnormal excess returns due to economic 
upswing. Taking a more specific look at the results, it shows that ten years have practiced more 
than 10% of underpricing on listing day. Hence, it shows a strong evidence of short-term 
underpricing. With regard to intermediate performance, it is observed over 6-month of trading 
the level of average market adjusted abnormal returns deteriorated. It could have been better not 
to hold on to the IPOs for a longer period. However, it is observed that there has been a 
substantial decline in abnormal excess returns at the end of 6-month trading except in 1998, 2001 
and 2002. The highest number of IPOs issued during 1995 and 1996 poses underpricing as lower 
and returns substantially declined if hold on over 6-month. Importantly, most of the IPOs were 
undersubscribed during these years. 
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Panel B exhibits the average returns earned in short-term and intermediate performance 
of IPOs in different periods. During 1995–1998 and 2006–2011, the underpricing was almost the 
same on listing day. The abnormal returns, however, deteriorated and disappeared at the end of 
6-month. It can be inferred that these two periods were not beneficial from view point of 
investors as they incurred negative returns over 6-month. The underpricing is higher during 
2000–2005 on gearing up the stock market as a result of which investment activities generated a 
pace of business opportunities. The trend on these returns confirm to priori expectations with 
positive returns in 2000–2005 and negative returns both in 1995–1998 and 2006–2011 over 6-
month owing to adverse economic as well as stock market conditions.  
5.3.4 Short-term and Intermediate IPO performance by Industry 
The analysis of average underpricing by industry shows that on listing day, the industries 
yielded initial positive returns except investment companies, textiles and engineering (Table 5.5). 
Banking industry was one of the most attractive industries wherein investors obtained the highest 
positive excess returns followed by Cement (17.53%), other financial institutions (17.23%) and 
fuel & energy (16.15%). The short-term performance shows that there is a slight decrease in 
average underpricing over the period of 15-trading day.  
In case of intermediate performance, investment and engineering companies faced 
negative returns over the period of six-month. In textiles, investors were able to earn positive 
returns commencing from 3-month of trading. Banking industry recognizes itself as an important 
sector from the point of view of investors earning positive abnormal returns (22.10%) at the end 
of six-month. Only technology & communication earned positive initial returns which 
subsequently converted into negative returns over 6-month. It could have been appropriate if the 
investors while making investment in these industries could have sold IPO stocks in a few days 
after listing in order to earn positive abnormal returns. Fuel and energy, cement, insurance and 
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Table 5.5 
 Panel A:  Short-term and intermediate IPO performance by issue year 
 
Panel A depicts the position of short-term and intermediate IPO performance by issue year during the period 1995-2011.  No IPO in 1999.  
 
Panel B describes the short-term and intermediate IPO performance by different periods i.e., 1995-1998, 2000-2005 and 2006-2011.  
 
***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at 1, 5 and 10% level. 
 
 
  
 
Year 
No. of 
IPOs 
Short-term Intermediate 
1-day 5-day 10-day 15-day 1-month 2-month 3-month 4-month 5-month 6-month 
            
1995  23   14.02
**
   14.72
**
   17.71
**
   13.12
*
   12.96
*
 11.66 10.38 8.90 3.46  0.17 
1996  16   6.68   9.23   7.09   6.21   3.16   7.91   1.27 -4.49 1.56 -6.07 
1997    3 39.03 36.67 31.68 33.52 15.46     -10.41     -20.64 -13.67 -19.76     -23.03 
1998    1 20.57 19.07 19.15 27.85 24.34 25.95 98.12    174.11 117.10    117.99 
1999   – – – – – – – – – – – 
2000    2 18.02   7.40   7.71   4.47   4.70   3.63 18.80 10.87 19.50   4.25 
2001    3   2.24   0.98   1.92   0.50   4.79   1.23   0.45  -5.02  -2.05   7.27 
2002    4   7.83 12.32   8.59 18.39 11.40   8.04  -4.05  2.50 11.13 13.58 
2003    4 32.88 36.41 31.85 44.84 50.84 33.58 22.95 19.70 14.67   9.16 
2004    7   39.84
**
   46.31
**
 43.78
*
 39.69
*
 33.96 40.66 35.54 35.48 26.09 26.72 
2005  13 13.00 11.51 10.84 11.63   6.44 -1.43 -0.11  1.97   5.83   3.39 
2006    2 80.63 72.52  60.61
*
  48.17
*
  42.11
*
 29.99 25.13 17.69   8.57
*
 17.44 
2007    7 20.85 15.54   8.82   3.95  1.14 -0.81   0.17   5.48   7.54   7.73 
2008    8 17.56 13.54   9.93   6.48  5.88 4.96   1.82   2.38 13.33   8.80 
2009    2  6.74 12.78   9.21   8.04  4.54 7.30   1.93  -5.95     -10.52     -14.78 
2010    9 -1.29  -6.06  -3.73 -11.14
*
 12.24
**
  22.47
**
     -13.65  -8.77     -14.88     -21.16 
2011    6  2.76   0.47  -1.54  -1.55 3.36      -3.75  -5.97  -8.63     -15.23     -12.56 
 
Panel B:  Short-term and intermediate IPO performance by different periods 
 
95-98   43   13.19
**
   14.31
**
    14.77
**
   12.31
**
  9.75
*
 9.06   6.86   6.19   3.78  -1.03 
00-05   33   19.80
***
    20.80
***
   19.10
**
   20.98
**
     18.00
*
 13.44
*
 10.97 11.20 11.95 10.68 
06-11   34  13.71
**
   9.88
*
   7.00   2.42 1.71 -3.42  -2.61  -1.47  -2.05  -4.00 
95-11 110   15.33
***
    14.89
***
    13.67
***
    11.86
***
    9.74
***
   6.52
*
   5.16   5.32   4.43   1.57 
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 Table 5.6 
 Short-term and intermediate IPO performance by industry 
 
The table shows the short-term and intermediate performance of 110 IPOs pertaining to various industries from 1995-2011. Other financial institutions include: insurance (6 
Nos.), leasing (6 Nos.), mutual funds (6 Nos.) and modaraba (4 Nos.). ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at 1, 5 and 10% level.  
 
 
 
Industry 
No. of 
IPOs 
Short-term Intermediate 
1-day 5-day 10-day 15-day 1-month 2-month 3-month 4-month 5-month 6-month 
            
Other financial institutions 22  17.23* 18.96* 15.84* 12.15 10.78 11.20  3.48  2.44  1.28 -7.17 
Fuel & Energy  15   16.15** 14.51* 15.62* 12.05*  6.80  5.08   6.11 10.53  3.78 1.42 
Banks 11    40.29***    33.86***    29.62***    30.13***    27.96***   23.09**    19.65**   22.58**   24.51**  22.10** 
Investment Cos. 11 -1.17 -4.48 -7.48 -8.29 -9.25 -11.79 -11.17 -14.90* -6.40     -6.21 
Textiles 11 -3.79 -4.31 -0.63 -2.31 -5.10  -5.51   1.38  8.75  7.01 7.59 
Tech. & Comm. 11 17.31 18.41 16.10 19.26 17.18  7.45   3.28  2.08 -1.39   -12.69 
Chem.& Pharm.  9  8.72 10.05 18.71 13.00 12.71  6.60   8.08 13.99 12.35    14.87 
Cement  7   17.53**   17.51**  13.18*  13.50* 10.29  5.27   5.87  2.18  3.66      2.34 
Engineering  2 -5.62 -8.54 -11.98   -13.72   -12.42   -22.18    -22.80   -31.16 -18.93 -15.51 
Food  2    8.27**  7.03   4.85   4.96** 11.37 2.19 -0.06 -7.84 -3.78 11.28 
Industrial Metals  2 0.37   -4.36**    -7.22**  -8.48**   -9.06**  -7.05**   -8.89**   -14.36***   -25.54*** -26.50*** 
Miscellaneous  7 39.87 46.21* 39.27 36.09 32.50 29.47 29.29 19.40 14.43 14.46 
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chemicals & pharmaceuticals are also attractive industries where investors occurred negative 
abnormal returns at the start of trading days but they remained earn positive abnormal returns 
over six-month. The main reason to have positive returns is the demand and growth opportunities 
in these industries.  
5.3.5 Short-term and Intermediate IPO Performance by Issue Size 
Previous studies argued that size of issue affects the level of underpricing. This study 
investigates the impact of short-term and intermediate IPO performance on the size of issue. To 
measure the effect, the sample is divided as per median market capitalization of the firm. This 
capitalization is determined by number of shares issued times offer price. Agathee et al. (2012) 
postulates that the underpricing is higher in smaller firms due to higher uncertainty attached with 
new issues whereas lower underpricing shows large firms having lesser uncertainty. Loughran 
and Ritter (2004) predicted that underpricing of IPOs is associated with the size of issue but has 
changed over time. During the era of 1980, large issues were underpriced less while in 1990 and 
2000 large issues were underpriced more (Loughran and Ritter, 2004).  
 Table 5.7 shows that short-term performance is lower for small firms while higher for 
large firms illustrating small firms may take small risk whereas large firms may attain higher risk 
to obtain higher returns thereby increasing uncertainty. This finding is consistent with prior 
studies, for instance, Loughran and Ritter (2004), Alagidede and Heerden (2012) and Abubaker 
and Uzaki (2012). Over 15-trading day, it is observed that small firms obtain higher returns than 
large firms. Continuing with intermediate performance, the results support this fact that small 
firms obtain higher return at the end of 4-trading month. However, the results predict that large 
firms may obtain higher return relative to small firms if IPOs hold on upto 6-month. Further, the 
Wilcoxon test indicates that the difference in short-term and intermediate IPO performance 
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between small and large firms is statistically insignificant in all the event windows. While 
dividing the sample into quartiles, no specific patterns found between market adjusted abnormal 
returns and market capitalization, consistent with the results of Agathee et al. (2012) and 
Alagided and Heerden (2012) which reflects that large firms are not really large in the sample. 
Further, the issue size and short-term and intermediate performance are positively correlated 
contrary to empirical evidence and with provision of no support to the ex-ante uncertainty 
hypothesis.  
   
  Table 5.7 
  Short-term and intermediate IPO performance by issue size 
 
Trading 
Market capitalization  
Wilcoxon Z-value 
< Rs100 m Rs101-150 m Rs151-500 m > Rs500 m Small Large 
Short-term 
        
    1-day 17.79    9.37 16.98 17.33 13.58 17.16 -0.375 (0.7080) 
    5-day 20.62    9.90 16.67 12.33 15.26 14.50  0.039 (0.9691) 
  10-day 20.14 12.80 12.71   8.81 16.47 10.76  0.357 (0.7208) 
  15-day 16.26 10.36 13.63   7.08 13.31 10.35  0.151 (0.8802) 
Intermediate 
        
1-month 12.94 6.68 13.86 5.48 9.81 9.67 0.022 (0.9828) 
2-month 11.89 6.88 7.27 0.52 9.39 3.54 0.719 (0.4722) 
3-month 10.78 3.75 1.98 3.99 7.27 2.99 0.409 (0.6826) 
4-month 9.34 1.88 1.70 8.36 5.61 5.03 -0.426 (0.6700) 
5-month   5.11   1.47   2.25   8.98   3.29   5.61 -0.650 (0.5156) 
6-month      -1.31   0.45        -0.42   7.69  -0.43   3.63 -0.753 (0.4512) 
        
No. of IPOs 28 28 27 27 56  54 - 
        
 
The distribution for 110 IPOs listed on KSE from 1995–2011 categorized through market capitalization. Rs.100 m, Rs.150 m 
and Rs.500 m are used as cut-offs being close to the first, median and third quartile values, respectively. Small group relates 
to value of size equals or less than Rs.150 m. 
 
5.3.6 Short-term and Intermediate IPO Performance by Underwriters’ Prestige 
 According to Kenourgios et al. (2007), the prestige of underwriter affects the degree of 
underpricing. Earlier studies documented that high prestige underwriters have more resources to 
determine the true value of new issues resulting in lower underpricing. Table 5.8 examines the 
underwriter prestige and short-term and intermediate performance of 110 IPOs listed on KSE 
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between January 1995 and December 2011. In line with earlier studies, it is found that high 
prestige underwriters are less underpriced due to the ability of identifying the offer price by 
covering all the risk factors. As far as low prestige underwriters are concerned, they are more 
underpriced due to non-availability of resources for determination of precise offer price. The 
result is consistent with prior findings, for example, Carter and Manaster (1990), Kenourgios et 
al. (2007) and Sahoo and Rajib (2010). In all the event windows relating to short-term and 
intermediate performance, it shows that high prestige underwriters are less underpriced than low 
prestige underwriters. Moreover, the Wilcoxon test identifies that abnormal return between high 
and low prestige underwriters is statistically insignificant in all the cases.  
 
 Table 5.8 
 Short-term and intermediate IPO performance by underwriter‟s prestige  
Trading day High prestige Low prestige Wilcoxon Z-value 
Short-term 
    
    1-day 9.57 19.63 -0.656 (0.5118) 
    5-day 8.42 19.72 -1.058 (0.2900) 
  10-day 7.84 18.01 -1.016 (0.3097) 
  15-day 7.44 15.15 -1.079 (0.2804) 
Intermediate 
    
1-month 6.31 12.30 -0.910 (0.3628) 
2-month 1.83 10.01 -0.995 (0.3199) 
3-month -0.51 9.40 -0.709 (0.4783) 
4-month 0.33 9.05 -0.063 (0.9494) 
5-month                   -1.29   8.70 -0.762 (0.4461) 
6-month                   -2.86   4.87 -0.720 (0.4718) 
    
No. of IPOs 47 63 - 
    
 
Tabulated above is average market adjusted returns with perspective of high and low prestige underwriters. Megginson and 
Weiss (1991) and Kenourgios et al. (2007) measure underwriter‟s reputation as: prestige = CRj / ∑    
 
    where CRj is capital 
raised by each underwriter j and i is firm which went public. Total number of underwriters in sample IPOs is represented by n. 
The value of underwriter prestige varies between 0 and 1. By using above equation, higher value of underwriter is 0.0738 and 
lower value is 0.0000. High prestige underwriter is defined as ratio of which is above 0.0100. From sample, 157 underwriters‟ 
participated for 110 IPOs and only 27 are classified as high prestige underwriters.  
 
5.3.7 IPO Underpricing by Investor Sentiment 
Investors‟ sentiment before listing has been depicted as directly related to the 
underpricing (Kunz and Aggarwal, 1994). To examine the effect, cumulative market returns for 
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the 3-months period ending prior to listing day is used as a proxy of market sentiment 
(Ljungqvist, 1997 and Kiymaz, 2000). From the table 5.9, it shows that IPOs are underpriced 
depending upon the positive and negative market returns preceding the listing day trading. When 
the market decline of about 20%, it shows that IPOs are underpriced on average by 13% whereas 
on increase in market by 16%, it reflects underpricing of about 21%. It appears that level of 
underpricing increases with positive investor sentiment. This finding supports with the investor 
sentiment hypothesis explaining a positive relationship between market return and underpricing 
(Amihud et al., 2002 and Samarakoon, 2010). 
 
Table 5.9 
 IPO Underpricing by investor sentiment 
Investor sentiment (market 
return %) 
Average initial 
return (%) 
Standard deviation 
of initial returns (%) 
Average sentiment 
(market return %) 
IPOs 
Number % 
      
-42% < market return < -5% 13.34 28.62 -19.63 36 32 
-5% < market return < 7% 12.07 28.65    1.47 37 34 
7% < market return < 40% 20.54 40.74  16.29 37 34 
      
 
The sample covers 110 IPOs issued on KSE from 1995 to 2011. Initial return is percentage premium between initial closing and 
offer price. Investor sentiment is measured by market return over 3-month period prior to trading day.  
 
5.3.8 Short-term and Intermediate Wealth Relatives 
 Table 5.10 reports the short-term and intermediate wealth relative for 110 IPOs listed on 
KSE from 1995–2011. Short-term and intermediate IPO performance are estimated by including 
and excluding initial returns to find abnormal excess returns earned by investors if participate on 
the offering or listing day. If WR>1, it shows that the portfolio of IPOs outperformed whereas 
WR<1 it represents that IPOs underperformed.    
 Table 5.10, Column (A) shows the short-term wealth relative excluding initial 
underpricing. The value of wealth relatives is reported less than one during 15-trading days 
except second, third and fourth day of trading when wealth relatives are 1.002, 1.003 and 1.004 
respectively. As can be seen from the table, the wealth relative is 0.971 on the 15-trading day  
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             Table 5.10 
     Short-term and intermediate wealth relatives  
 
 
Trading 
WR (excluding initial return) 
 (Column A) 
WR (including initial return) 
(Column B) 
Short-term 
   
  1-day  NA 1.149 
  2-day 1.002 1.152 
  3-day 1.003 1.152 
  4-day 1.004 1.156 
  5-day 0.996 1.146 
  6-day 0.995 1.144 
  7-day 0.991 1.139 
  8-day 0.990 1.139 
  9-day 0.990 1.138 
10-day 0.986 1.132 
11-day 0.984 1.128 
12-day 0.983 1.128 
13-day 0.977 1.123 
14-day 0.975 1.122 
15-day 0.971 1.119 
Intermediate 
   
1-month 0.954 1.095 
2-month 0.928 1.061 
3-month 0.914 1.039 
4-month 0.912 1.036 
5-month 0.908 1.027 
6-month 0.890 1.001 
   
 
It depicts equally-weighted mean wealth relatives by including and excluding initial returns 
using 110 IPOs issued on KSE from 1995 to 2011. Wealth relative is calculated as: WRi,t = 
   (
 
 
) 

n
i 1
      /    (
 
 
) 

n
m 1
      where Ri,t = return for IPO stock i at tth trading 
day/month, Rm,t = return on market index. n = number of sample IPOs.  
 
 
illustrating that Pakistani IPOs slightly underperform the market index. Table 5.10, Column (B) 
reports the short-term wealth relatives including initial day returns which is greater than one in 
all the event windows (up to 15-trading days) elaborating that underperformance does not exist if 
the initial underpricing is included. Alternatively, the investors who participate in IPOs yield 
positive returns throughout the short-term period. The pattern of wealth relatives shows that the 
value is slightly decreasing in short-run illustrating that positive return decreases. It can, thus, be 
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interpreted that IPO investors should either sell their shares on listing day to earn profit or retain 
their shares to sell at any appropriate day up to 15-trading days to earn abnormal returns.  
Intermediate wealth relative shows that the portfolio of IPOs underperform over six-
month relative to the market index reflecting as sample IPOs‟ portfolio is impairing  values 
excluding first day returns. Initial subscribers who invested in Pakistani IPOs at the first day of 
trading and held for six months cannot expect to earn positive market-adjusted returns. In 
conclusion, the set of IPOs underperform and expect to earn negative returns. Intermediate 
wealth relatives including initial returns shows that the value is decreasing over the period 
representing that positive return diminished over six-month. At the end of 3-, 5- and 6-month, 
wealth relative is 1.039, 1.027 and 1.001 respectively. This shows that investors can earn 
positive excess returns if participate on offer price. This result is in accordance with the finding 
Aijo et al. (2014). In short, an investor can earn maximum return on the first month of trading 
over the period of 6-month. 
 By taking into consideration the result of Column (A) and Column (B), it can be 
concluded that investors participating in IPO stocks excluding initial underpricing do not benefit 
over the period of six-month from the listing date. This finding is consistent with international 
evidence (Ritter, 1991; Levis, 1993; Sohoo and Rajib, 2010; Alagidede and Heerden, 2012). 
With the inclusion of initial return, the investors can earn abnormal returns over six-month from 
the date of listing.  
5.3.9 Determinants of Short-term and Intermediate IPO Performance  
 To investigate the determinants of short-term and intermediate IPO performance, the 
EBA technique is employed so as to evaluate the sensitivity of the control variables. The 
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determinants of short-term performance are examined on the first and fifteen trading day and 
intermediate performance are measured on the third and six month of trading.  
5.3.9.1 Some preliminary results 
Under the EBA technique, the significance of preliminary factors is tested which affect 
short-term and intermediate IPO performance identified by prior studies. Preliminary regressions 
include the oversubscription ratio (Sub) and the aftermarket risk level of the IPO (Risk). These 
regressions are estimated using the Newey-West HAC to calculate t-statistics for the regression 
coefficients. To test the robustness of the results, two extreme values excluded as outliers from 
the sample. The results of preliminary regressions using 108 IPOs can be specified as:  
 
     -                                                                                                                             
                                                             ***                         ***                                                                                                                            
 
 
      -                                                                                                                              
                                                                                                                                       
 
 
     -                                                                                                                            
                                               **             ***                         *                                           
 
 
     -                                                                                                                             
                                               **               **                       **                                           
 
The t-values are shown in parentheses. Both variables (i.e., Sub and Risk) are 
significantly affecting the underpricing on the first trading day (Equation 5.6) but insignificant 
on the 15-trading day (Equation 5.7). By analyzing the determinants of intermediate 
performance, both preliminary factors are significant on third- and six-month of trading. The 
coefficient of both variables is correlated positively with the market adjusted abnormal returns. 
Oversubscription is highly significant on the 1-trading day and 3-trading month whereas it is 
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significant at 10% on 6-trading month illustrating that demanded shares are more than offered 
shares, thus, investors are interested to participate in IPOs having low offer price thereby 
resulting higher abnormal returns. Aftermarket risk of the IPO is significant at 1% level on the 
first trading day, at 5% on 6-trading month and at 10% on 3-month of trading. Higher fluctuation 
in post-issue prices demonstrates uncertainty associated with the respective IPOs, consequently 
facing higher abnormal returns. Oversubscription is found the most important factor that affects 
both the short-term and intermediate performance.  
5.3.9.2 Results of Basic Model Without Z-variables 
To examine the determinants of short-term and intermediate performance, four 
regressions are estimated excluding Z-variables. X-variables (i.e. Sub and Risk) are used in all 
regressions. To test the sensitivity of Q-variables, thousands of regressions are regressed to 
enquire whether a particular variable is maintaining a same sign. The same sign ensures that a 
variable passes the sensitivity test. Rate of return on total assets (ROA) is only variable used in 
all regressions, offer price in first three regressions, underwriters‟ prestige (UW) in regression I, 
III and IV, proportion of shares offered (PSO) in regression I and IV, listing delay (Ldel) in 
regression I and age of the firm (Age) in regression II are used as the Q-variable.  
Table 5.11 presents the result of regression I to IV. From X-variables, oversubscription is 
significant in regression I, III and IV but aftermarket risk is only significant in regression I. This 
translates that oversubscription is the key factor in determining the short-term and intermediate 
performance. The coefficient of oversubscription is positive which illustrates that new issues are 
oversubscribed when offer price is lower leading to higher underpricing (Ljungqvist et al., 2006; 
Agarwal et al. 2008). Positive effect of aftermarket risk of IPOs describes uncertainty of post-
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issue pricing. This implies that higher the fluctuations will be, higher the underpricing may be 
(Sohail and Nasr, 2007; Sahoo and Rajib, 2010).  
 
 Table 5.11 
 Estimation results of benchmark models without Z-variables 
 
Regression 
Short-term Intermediate 
I II III IV 
     
Constant 0.3699 
(1.10) 
0.4552 
(2.54)
**
 
0.1394 
(0.76) 
-0.0621 
(-0.67) 
     
X-variables     
   Sub 0.0365 
(5.60)
***
 
0.0027 
(0.35) 
0.0381 
(6.73)
***
 
0.0178 
(2.51)
**
 
     
   Risk 0.1000 
(4.90)
***
 
0.0349 
(0.82) 
0.0415 
(1.50) 
0.0460 
(1.23) 
     
Q-variables     
   ROA 0.9479 
(1.80)
*
 
0.7822 
(0.82) 
1.1100 
(1.15) 
1.3680 
(1.77)
*
 
     
   OPrice -0.4915 
(-4.22)
***
 
-0.2828 
(-2.03)
**
 
-0.2058 
(-1.27) 
- 
     
   UW -0.0221 
(-0.60) 
- -0.0534 
(-1.07) 
-0.0733 
(-1.08) 
     
   PSO -0.2385 
(-1.78)
*
 
- - -0.0973 
(-0.53) 
     
   Ldel 0.1088 
(0.64) 
- - - 
     
   Age - -0.1089 
(-1.30) 
- - 
     
Adj. R
2
 0.4448 -0.0026 0.2480 0.1101 
F-value 14.76
***
 1.55 10.60
***
 2.76
**
 
     
   
The table presents the results of regressions estimated using stata on 1- and 15-trading day (Short-term performance) and 3- and 
6-month trading (Intermediate performance). Dependent variable is market adjusted abnormal returns whereas independent 
variables include: Sub = oversubscription ratio, Risk = aftermarket risk level of the IPOs, ROA = rate of return on total assets, 
OPrice = offer price, UW = underwriters‟ prestige, PSO = proportion of shares offered, Ldel = listing delay age Age = age of 
the firm prior to IPO. The t-statistics are based on Newey-West HAC standard errors.  ***, ** and * represent significance level at 
the 1, 5 and 10% respectively.  
 
Among the Q-variables, ROA is positive affecting the abnormal returns significantly in 
regression I and IV – contrary to earlier finding. This implies that firms having higher ROA prior 
to IPO subsequently desire the higher level of underpricing (Tian, 2012). The coefficient of offer 
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price is negative influencing significantly in regression I and II that implies low offer price 
results oversubscription thereby inflating underpricing (Zouari et al., 2009; Adjasi, et al., 2011). 
Proportion of shares offered is negative significantly impacting underpricing in regression I 
illustrating that offering of high proportion of shares reflect large proceeds obtained by issuing 
firm giving lower underpricing (Sohail and Nasr, 2007). Underwriters‟ prestige, listing delay and 
age of the firm are insignificant from the Q-variable. Underpricing is negatively affecting 
underwriters‟ prestige indicating that high prestige underwriters‟ having capability to obtain true 
offer price, therefore, underpricing would be lower (Johnson and Miller, 1988; Chang et al., 
2008). Positive relation of listing delay shows uncertainty associated with delay in offering and 
listing day (Ljungvist and Wilhelm (2002) and Loughran and Ritter (2004). Age of the firm 
shows negative relation but insignificant effect in regression II. This implies that large firms 
properly evaluate the value of new issues resulting lower underpricing (Kenourgios et al., 2007). 
Regression III shows that no variable is significant from the Q-variable but ROA is significant in 
regression IV from the Q-variable.  
5.3.9.3 Result of Basic Model with All Z-variables 
Table 5.12 reports the result when all the Z-variables are included. The size of the firm 
(FSize) and percentage of shares offered (PSO) are the significant variables in regression II from 
the Z-variables. The coefficient of firm size is positively correlated which shows that 
underpricing increases due to large size of the assets which is contrary to earlier findings. The 
size of the firm is seen to have no effect on in regression I, III and IV. The coefficient of 
financial leverage is positively influenced in regression I but negative in remaining regressions. 
Positive sign postulates that higher financial leverage shows larger ex-ante uncertainty which 
subsequently increase the underpricing (Lougrhan and Ritter, 1995) but negative relation  
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  Table 5.12 
  Estimation results of benchmark models with all Z-variables 
 
Regression 
Short-term Intermediate 
I II III IV 
     
Constant 0.2484 
(0.67) 
0.4591 
(0.81) 
0.1486 
(0.32) 
-0.1994 
(-0.40) 
     
X-variables     
   Sub 0.0351 
(5.36)
***
 
0.0056 
(0.64) 
0.0375 
(5.45)
***
 
0.0199 
(2.20)
**
 
     
   Risk 0.0899 
(4.37)
***
 
0.0302 
(0.63) 
0.0367 
(1.18) 
0.0555 
(1.49) 
     
Q-variables     
   ROA 0.9049 
(1.37) 
1.0726 
(1.06) 
1.1403 
(1.10) 
1.5511 
(1.35) 
     
   OPrice -0.3646 
(-2.8)
***
 
-0.2562 
(-1.30) 
-0.1555 
(-0.93) 
- 
     
   UW -0.0379 
(-0.86) 
- -0.0258 
(-0.38) 
-0.0166 
(-0.20) 
     
   PSO -0.2388 
(-1.57) 
- - -0.1790 
(-0.77) 
     
   LDel 0.1540 
(0.84) 
- - - 
     
   Age - -0.1949 
(-1.88)
*
 
- - 
     
Z-variables     
   OPrice - - - -0.1012 
(-0.52) 
     
   UW - -0.0119 
(-0.19) 
- - 
     
   PSO - 0.7289 
(3.85)
***
 
-0.1609 
(-1.04) 
- 
     
   LDel - -0.2995 
(-1.27) 
0.0126 
(0.06) 
0.0966 
(0.38) 
     
   FinLev 0.0276 
(0.29) 
-0.2223 
(-1.34) 
-0.0262 
(-0.16) 
-0.0141 
(-0.09) 
     
   Mkt_vol -0.1175 
(-0.02) 
2.1546 
(0.30) 
2.9955 
(0.48) 
5.2295 
(0.83) 
     
   Age 0.0506 
(0.68) 
- 0.1465 
(1.55) 
0.2174 
(1.55) 
     
   YDum 0.0218 
(0.33) 
0.0118 
(0.12) 
-0.1334 
(-1.14) 
-0.0768 
(-0.69) 
     
   Fsize -0.0083 
(-0.80) 
0.0474 
(4.08)
***
 
-0.0022 
(-0.13) 
-0.0012 
(-0.06) 
     
   EPS -0.0214 -0.0201 -0.0174 -0.0376 
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(-0.61) (-0.36) (-0.37) (-0.93) 
     
   Mkt_return 0.2974 
(1.42) 
-0.1807 
(-0.50) 
0.3139 
(1.06) 
0.0118 
(0.03) 
     
   Hot -0.0692 
(-0.85) 
-0.0631 
(-0.70) 
-0.1038 
(-1.00) 
-0.1016 
(-0.98) 
     
Adj. R
2
 0.4210 0.0317 0.2208 0.0767 
F-value 15.00
***
 1.82
**
 6.35
***
 2.49
***
 
     
   
The table presents the results of regressions estimated using stata on 1- and 15-trading day (Short-term performance) and 3- and 
6-month trading (Intermediate performance). Dependent variable is market adjusted abnormal returns whereas independent 
variables include: Sub = oversubscription ratio, Risk = aftermarket risk level of  IPOs, ROA = rate of return on total assets, 
OPrice = offer price, UW = underwriters‟ prestige, PSO = percentage of shares offered, Ldel = listing delay, FinLev = financial 
leverage, Mkt_vol = market volatility, Age = age of firm prior to IPO, YDum = dummy for year, FSize = firm size, EPS = 
earnings per share, Market return = return of KSE-100 Index and Hot = a dummy variable if IPO is issued in hot activity period, 
it is classified as 1 otherwise 0. The t-statistics are based on Newey-West HAC standard errors. ***, ** and * represent 
significance level at 1, 5 and 10% respectively.  
 
 
represents less uncertainty related to financial leverage, as a result underpricing would be higher. 
The coefficient of dummy for year (YDum) is positive in regression I & II demonstrating higher 
abnormal returns in short term during 2000–2011 while rest of equations showing negative signs 
which describe lower intermediate performance during the similar period. The EPS is negatively 
associated with underpricing in all cases which explains that due to high income earned by the 
firm, market adjusted abnormal returns would be lower. Mkt_ret is positive illustrating that 
benchmark index is obtaining more returns than the event firm thereby reflecting higher 
abnormal returns. Negative effect of Hot implying that firms went public during the hot activity 
period is less underpriced. In hot period, firms may obtain higher offer price leaving a small 
difference between offering and listing price. The Mkt_vol is negative in regression I but 
positive in rest of regressions showing insignificant effect. 
Comparing the results of Table 5.11 and 5.12, it suggests that performing statistical test 
economic theory does not provide a complete set of variables as to which are to be held 
constant? The EBA technique, however, is considered as an important one towards measuring 
sensitivity analysis as it appropriately identifies robust predictors in explanatory variables.  
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5.3.9.4 Result of Sensitivity Analysis 
Sensitivity analysis tests whether X- and Q-variables are robust or fragile? Out of fifteen, 
3 Z-variables are selected in each regression –220 forms, in total, are tested. Under the EBA 
approach, the variable shows significance at 10% is only selected. Table 5.13 presents results of 
the sensitivity test of the EBA method. The results indicate that (a) oversubscription, (b) 
aftermarket risk, (c) ROA, (d) offer price and (e) proportion of shares offered are the robust 
variables in determining short-term performance. However, (a) oversubscription and (b) ROA 
are two variables that robustly affect intermediate performance while the rest of the variables are 
fragile in the analysis. 
 
 
 
  Table 5.13 
  Summary of EBA tests 
  
Sign 
Short-term Intermediate 
 I II III IV 
 Robust / Fragile 
X-variable      
    Oversubscription + Robust Fragile Robust Robust 
    Aftermarket risk level + Robust Fragile Fragile Fragile 
       
Q-variable      
    Return on total assets + Robust Fragile Fragile Robust 
    Offer price     – Robust Robust Fragile – 
    Underwriters‟ prestige – Fragile – Fragile Fragile 
    Proportion of shares offered – Robust – – Fragile 
    Listing delay + Fragile – – – 
    Age of the firm – – Fragile – – 
 
 
5.4 Summary and Conclusions 
This chapter examines the short-term and intermediate IPO performance using 110 IPOs 
listed on KSE from 1995 to 2011. It is found that IPOs, on average, exhibit abnormal excess 
returns of 15.33% on the listing day. Abnormal returns deteriorate with an increase in trading 
days due to the fact that post-issue prices are adjusted accordingly. The short-term performance 
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indicates that investors earn positive excess returns over the period of 15-trading days. In 
intermediate performance, investors earn positive abnormal returns over the period of two 
months but not thereafter. Hence, it concludes that Pakistani IPOs outperform over the 2-month 
of trading. Year-on-year analysis portrays that IPO outperform on listing day except the year 
2010. During the period 2000–2005, the level of underpricing is higher as compared to 1995–
1998 and 2006–2011. Industrial analysis postulates that IPO investment in banking, insurance, 
chemicals & pharmaceuticals and cement is found profitable.  
This study also finds that average abnormal return is lower for small firms than large 
firms -- not supporting the ex-ante uncertainty hypothesis. Further, negative relationship between 
underwriters‟ prestige and short-term/intermediate performance is found which is consistent with 
underwriters‟ prestige hypothesis. There exist a positive relationship between investors‟ 
sentiment and underpricing which is in line with the investor sentiment hypothesis. Wealth 
relative is deployed to measure abnormal returns by including and excluding initial returns. It is 
concluded that Pakistani investors earn abnormal excess returns from listing to 6-month of 
trading when initial returns are included. After excluding initial return, investors do not benefit 
over 6-month from the listing date. Using EBA techniques to find the determinants of short-term 
underpricing on the first and fifteen trading day, the robust predictors include: (a) 
oversubscription, (b) aftermarket risk level of the IPO, (c) rate of return on total assets, (d) offer 
price, and (e) percentage of shares offered. The determinants of intermediate IPO performance 
over third and six month of trading suggest the robust predictors consist of (a) oversubscription 
and (b) rate of return on total assets.  
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CHAPTER 6 
 
LONG-TERM IPO PERFORMANCE  
 
6.1 Introduction 
A cursory review of the literature related to IPO pricing and performance has 
typically focused on two generic time horizons: (A) Short-term and (B) Long-term. In 
studies of short-term IPO performance, researchers have found that IPOs are significantly 
underpriced (Ibbotson, 1975; Ritter, 1984). The focal point of this section is to examine IPO 
performance over the second horizon or to examine whether IPOs underperform their 
respective benchmarks over longer-term time horizon. Ritter (1991) documented the 
existence of IPO underperformance up to three to five years after listing.  
Researchers have attempted to estimate the long-term post-IPO performance using 
event- and calendar-time methodologies, but their findings are inconclusive (e.g. Agarwal et 
al. 2008; Loughran and Ritter, 1995; Omran, 2005). Nevertheless, the empirical evidence, in 
terms of long-run IPO performance, seems to be less concrete when compared against 
studies of shorter-term abnormal performance and the reasons for this are as follows: (a) 
long-term pricing behavior causes researchers to have reservations about aftermarket 
efficiency (Ritter, 1991), (b) to exploit the underpricing and performance, investors would 
have to rely on actively trading strategies, and (c) there a substantial variations in the results 
of the underpricing if researchers use different methodologies to detect abnormal 
performance. Considering above areas of concern, there has been a long standing debate 
about magnitude of the long-term abnormal performance in the IPO research.  
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Ritter and Welch (2002) argued that the results of long-term abnormal performance 
are highly sensitive to the methodology applied for identification of abnormal performance 
and the time horizon examined. A generally accepted theory, thus, remains elusive to 
researchers. Empirical research for measuring post-IPO performance in emerging markets is 
limited when compared against developed countries. Preliminary studies, Sohail and Nasr 
(2007) took initiative to gauge one-year performance of IPOs in Pakistan and found the 
existence of underperformance. Subsequently, Rizwan and Khan (2007) analyzed IPO 
performance for two years after listing and documented that the IPOs produced negative 
abnormal returns. In India, Sahoo and Rajib (2010) investigated the three-year performance 
of 92 IPOs and reported that there was an existence of underperformance after adjusting for 
the benchmark‟s index return up to one-year after listing but not thereafter. Accordingly, I 
employed both the event- and calendar-time methodologies to detect long-term abnormal 
IPO performance over a three-year period from 1995 to 2010.  
This study finds that IPOs underperform over the sized based matched firm index 
over a three-year period after listing their shares for public trading. The EBA technique is 
used to identify the true predictors of IPO underperformance and the researcher found that: 
underpricing, financial leverage, age, oversubscription and affiliation with the textile 
industry a statistically significant predictors of long-term IPO underperformance using the 
BHAR methodology and underpricing, hot activity period, aftermarket risk level of the IPO, 
issuer proceeds, post issue promoters‟ holdings, affiliation with the technology & 
communication, engineering and other industries are statistically significant predictor of 
long-term IPO underperformance using the CAR methodology. 
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6.2 Empirical Methodology 
 Empirical findings argue that the results are highly sensitivity depending on the 
methodology used (Eckbo et al., 2000; Gompers and Lerner, 2003); therefore, researchers 
do not rely on the single methodology. Hence, I employ both event- and calendar-time 
strategies to examine the long-term abnormal IPO performance over the period of 36-month. 
The relationship of long-term performance is examined on issue proceeds, initial returns and 
hot & cold activity periods. To identify the true explanatory variables of long-term abnormal 
IPO performance, I tested them through the EBA technique.  
6.2.1 What Return is Normal? 
 Initially, Ritter (1991) found that IPOs significantly underperform in long-term as 
compared to the benchmark. Empirical findings support this argument that IPOs outperform 
on the initial trading day because underpricing is a short-term phenomenon for decades. 
However, if investors hold on IPOs for a longer period, the prime object is to earn abnormal 
returns persistently as a result of which Ritter rejects the hypothesis of market efficiency. 
Many researchers attempted to measure long-term IPO performance using generic 
methodologies along with simulations as the results are highly sensitive to the choice of 
method. Thus, the researchers do not agree on a single methodology. The variations in the 
results occur due to: (1) which benchmark is employed, (2) selection of study period, and (3) 
statistical inferences are biased. 
6.2.2 Buy-and-Hold Abnormal Returns 
Barber and Lyon (1997) argued that BHARs measure investors‟ experience in a 
precise manner. Under this approach, the abnormal returns are compounded over a specific 
time period. Since this methodology truly captures an investor‟s experience, thus, it is 
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considered as one of the important techniques to measure the abnormal performance 
(Mitchell and Stafford, 2000). To measure the long-term IPO performance, I examined the 
BHAR comparing the sized based matched firm index computed by the market 
capitalization. Abnormal returns are measured over a period of 36 months excluding initial 
day returns. According to Loughran and Ritter (1995), BHAR is used to examine the 
performance of event firm i at time period T as:  
 
       [∏(      )      
 
   
]                                                                                                                        
 
Following Ritter (1991) and Barber and Lyon (1997), the BHAR for event firm   at 
time   adjusted for a sized based matched firm benchmark is calculated as: 
 
      [∏(      )   ∏(       )
 
   
 
   
]                                                                                               
 
where  
Ri,t      : monthly return of IPO firm i at time t;  
Rmf,t     : monthly return of sized based matched firm benchmark; and 
T : time period for which the BHARs is measured describing returns are 
compounded where investors buy stock at first trading day and hold it until 
3-year anniversary
4
. 
 
 The mean BHAR
5
 for a period t is defined as:  
 
       ∑         
 
   
                                                                                                                                   
 
                                                          
4
   During the return estimation period, delisted firms have excluded from the sample. 
5
  wi = 1/n (equal-weighted), wi = MVi/ΣiMVi (value-weighted) where MVi denotes market value (outstanding shares x 
listing price) of event firm i. 
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To test the significance that the equal- and value-weighted BHAR is equal to zero, 
Lyon, Barber and Tsai (1999) suggested the skewness adjusted t-statistics. It is computed as 
under:  
 
t = √   (   
 
 
 ̂   
 
  
 ̂)                                                                                                             
                                              
where 
S = 
     
        
   and     ̂ = 


n
i 1
            
          
                                                                                                             
 
 
where  
BHART       : sample mean buy-and-hold abnormal return 
σ(BHARt) : standard deviation of abnormal returns 
n : Event firms in the sample 
 ̂ : an estimate of the coefficient of skewness. Adjusted t-statistics is used to 
overcome skewness problem.    
 
To test the mean monthly buy-and-hold abnormal equal to zero, following 
hypothesis is developed:   
Hypothesis 3: 
H0:   BHAR1-36 month = 0 
H1:     BHAR 1-36 month ≠ 0 
6.2.3 Cumulative Abnormal Returns 
This method accumulates the monthly abnormal returns of IPOs over a particular 
time period. To detect the abnormal returns, I examined the CAR methodology using sized 
based matched firm index over the period of 36-month. The abnormal returns (ARi,t) for 
event firm i initiating in period t is computed as:  
       [       
 
 
 

n
t 1
     ]                                                                                         (6.6)
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where Ri,t = the event firm‟s i monthly return at time t and Rmf,t = the sized based matched 
firm‟s return of the subsequent period. Following Lyon, Barber and Tsai (1999 p. 192), the 
τ-period cumulative abnormal return (CAR τ) for firm i commencing in period s is measured 
as: 
       


s
st
[       
 
  
 


s
st
     ]                                                                                                              
 
CAR is estimated from the first trading price and the cumulative mean return of 
sized based matched firm benchmark
6
 for month 1 to 36. Since CAR is less skewed than 
BHAR, conventional t-statistics provides well specified results. Ritter (1991) suggested 
following t-statistics and computed as: 
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where  
nt : event firms trading in each month 
var : the mean of variations over 36-month of the ARi,t 
cov : the first order auto-covariance of the ARt series 
 
Aggregate abnormal returns are tested to find that mean cumulative abnormal is 
equal to zero over the period of 36-month. Thus, I have developed the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 4: 
H0:   CAR1-36 month = 0 
H1:     CAR1-36 month ≠ 0 
 
                                                          
6
  wi = 1/n (equal-weighted) and wi = MVi/ΣiMVi (value-weighted) where MVi denotes market value (outstanding shares x 
listing price) of the event firm i. 
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6.2.4 Comparing the BHAR and CAR methodologies 
The BHARs and CARs methodologies are two different techniques that researchers 
have used to gauge abnormal performance. The BHAR methodology emphasizes the returns 
that the investor would receive if they participated in each of the offerings and roll their 
proceeds to each subsequent offering and the CAR methodology indicates what the average 
experience of the investor was. Barber and Lyon (1997) and Lyon, Barber and Tsai (1999) 
argue that BHARs accurately mimic investors‟ returns but the CARs do not reflect the 
abnormal returns for an investor buying the event firms and shorting the benchmark over the 
full horizon. Mitchell and Stafford (2000) also concluded that the buy-and-hold strategy is 
only one of many possible investment strategies. After comparing both the methods, Barber 
and Lyon (1997) provided evidence that CARs are biased estimator of BHARs. When the 
benchmark index is used, CARs are seriously affected due to a new listing bias which results 
in an overstatement of the CAR‟s significance level. In contrast to the biases in CARs, 
Barber and Lyon (1997) further argue that BHARs are mostly affected by the periodic 
rebalancing of the benchmark portfolios. This bias arises because the market index or 
another matched portfolio changes its composition when firms list and delist whereas the 
composition of the event portfolio remains constant. 
6.2.5 Calendar-time Approach 
 Brav, Geczy and Gompers (2000) and Brav and Gompers (1997) used the Fama-
French 3-factor model to examine the abnormal returns of event firms on calendar-time 
portfolio. Mandelker (1974) employed the variations of this portfolio method. These 
variations are captured using methods of calendar-time portfolio: (a) Fama-French (1993), 
and (b) Carhart (1997). The calendar-time approach has some benefits than the BHARs and 
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CARs methodologies. Among sample firms, this approach eradicates the issue of cross-
sectional reliance as the returns are compiled into single portfolio. Additionally, this method 
provides dynamic results in case of non-random samples.  
6.2.5.1 The Fama-French Three-Factor Model  
 This model is employed to measure the excess return earn on the portfolio. 
Therefore, the return on a portfolio is composed of event firms excluding initial day returns 
that are issued within last three-year. To estimate the calendar-time return on the single 
portfolio, following regression is computed:  
 
                    (        )                                                                
  
where Rpt is the portfolio return in month t calculated through equal- and value-weighted 
methods, Rft is 3-month treasury bill rate in month t, Rmt is the return on the KSE-100 Index 
in month t, SMBt is the return on a value-weighted portfolio of small minus large stocks in 
month t and HMLt is the return on a value-weighted portfolio of high minus low book-to-
market stocks in month t. Large and small size stocks are segregated by top and below 30% 
market capitalization respectively. Likewise, high and low value stocks are classified as top 
and bottom 30% BM respectively. βi, si and hi denote the loadings of the portfolio on each 
factor; the market, SMB (size) and HML (value measured by BM). αi is an intercept 
examining the null hypothesis i.e. average monthly abnormal return equals to zero. I 
estimate OLS using the Newey-West procedure (Newey and West, 1987) for removing the 
problems of heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation consistent standard errors.  
6.2.5.2 The Carhart Four-Factor Model   
The Carhart (1997) extends the Fama and French model. The Carhart four-factor 
model, thus, estimates the following regression: 
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where WMLt is the winner minus loser relating to the momentum factor. It measured by 
classifying all firms as per stock returns of previous 11 months followed by average returns 
of top 1/3 stocks (high returns) minus the average returns of  bottom 1/3 stocks (low 
returns). The intercept shows monthly abnormal returns earn on the portfolio and estimated 
through the Newey-West HAC standard errors. 
The abnormal returns obtained from the Fama-French and the Carhart models are 
tested using the following hypothesis:  
Hypothesis 5: 
H0:   Abnormal returns on portfolio using FF and Carhart1-36 month = 0 
H1:     Abnormal returns on portfolio using FF and Carhart1-36 month ≠ 0 
6.2.6 Determinants of Long-term Underperformance 
 Prior research ascertained different explanatory variables which affected the long-
term underperformance.  In a regression analysis, it is vital to identify robust determinants 
that truly influence IPO underperformance. Hence, I analyze the determinants of long-term 
underperformance using the EBA technique to select the robust predictors. The purpose is 
aimed to mitigate the uncertainty for selection of those factors that influence the long-term 
underperformance. The EBA technique can be described as BHARi or CARi =     + 

n
j 1
      
+     + 

m
j 1
          εi. where X is an important variable(s) used in every regression, the 
robustness of Q is tested and Z is a prospective essential variable. Under this method, 
thousands of regressions are regressed to enquire that variable of interest maintains the same 
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sign and its extreme values remains statistically significant. It will, thus, be a robust variable 
otherwise a fragile one. 
 Explanatory variables that may influence long-term IPO underperformance can be 
presented in following equation:    
 
                                                                         
                                                                                          
                                                                                               
                                                                                                                 
  
where  
BHAR & 
CAR        
 The equal-weighted buy-and-hold abnormal return and cumulative abnormal 
return adjusted sized matching-firms over the 36-month period;   
   
UP – Underpricing i.e. market adjusted abnormal return on listing day; 
   
Industry +/– Banks, other financial institutions, fuel & energy, chemicals, technology & 
communication, cement, engineering, textiles and other industries are used as 
dummy variables; 
   
Sub + Oversubscription ratio which is defined as number of shares demanded by 
number of shares offered; 
   
FinLev + Financial leverage of firm prior to IPO. It is derived as long-term debt to total 
assets; 
   
Risk + Aftermarket risk level of the IPO. It is calculated as standard deviation of post-
issue pricing of first 245 trading days; 
   
Age – Age of event firm prior to listing. It is scaled as the difference between year of 
establishment and going public;  
   
LT – Long-term investment ratio estimated by long-term investment to total assets;  
   
P/BV – Offer price divided by book value; 
   
PSO – Proportion of shares offered to the general public;  
   
ROA – Rate of return on assets. It is estimated as net income by total assets; 
   
Hot – A dummy variable if IPO is issued in hot activity period, it is classified as 1 
and 0 otherwise; 
   
PIPH – Post issue promoters‟ holding. It is measured through shares retained by 
promoters‟ group divided by total number of shares issued; 
   
FSize – Firm size measuring by natural logarithm of total assets; 
   
Oprice – Offer price which is natural logarithm of issue price; 
   
EPS – Earnings per share is obtained by net income to number of shares outstanding; 
   
OSize – Issue proceeds are obtained by logarithm of number of shares issued times 
offer price; 
   
Mkt_vol + Standard deviation of market return over 3-month prior to IPO; 
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Mkt_ret + Market return estimated on KSE-100 index over 3-month prior to IPO; and 
   
LDel + Listing delay which is measured by logarithm of number of days 
differentiating between closing of subscription and listing day. 
 
 
 To find the determinants using BHARs and CARs, this study considered twenty-six 
variables, out of which two X-variables are selected as fixed used in each regression while 
from the rest of twenty-four variables, Q and Z variables are selected. Each of remaining 
twenty-four variables is chosen as the variable of interest Q of which robustness is 
examined. Three Z-variables are chosen from the rest of twenty-three, giving 42,504 
regressions (1,771 regressions for each Q-variable) and in total 85,008 regressions.  
 
Table 6.1 
Descriptive statistics of variables 
Variables  Mean Median Min. Value Max. Value Std. Dev. 
      
BHAR -17.53 -18.21 -172.53 84.61 53.92 
CAR -23.16 -22.14 -227.30 221.01 79.56 
UP 15.27 5.30 -39.14 107.10 34.21 
Sub 2.76 1.07 0.01 28.51 5.32 
FinLev 17.22 4.69 0.00 78.00 22.04 
Risk 4.73 3.77 1.27 19.34 3.15 
Age 7.57 3.50 0.00 66.00 11.08 
LT 4.51 0.00 0.00 52.52 12.05 
P/BV 1.31 1.00 0.46 6.14 0.92 
PSO 32.06 27.02 2.50 100.00 19.71 
ROA 1.84 0.00 -12.54 26.73 4.93 
PIPH 54.55 50.34 0.00 95.00 22.01 
FSize 14,120.16 665.36 0.00 562,915.76 66,214.13 
OPrice 20.12 10.00 10.00 235.00 29.30 
EPS 2.06 0.00 -4.93 28.10 4.73 
OSize 446.17 150.00 17.00 8,107.50 959.90 
Mkt_ret -2.11 0.30 -42.63 26.46 16.34 
Mkt_vol 1.40 1.28 0.79 2.91 0.46 
LDel 60.23 53.00 9.00 211.00 30.56 
      
 
The table presents descriptive statistics of 90 IPOs issued from 1995 to 2010. Dependent variables include buy-and-hold 
abnormal returns (BHARs) and cumulative abnormal returns (CARs). Independent variables comprise underpricing (UP), 
oversubscription ratio (Sub), financial leverage (FinLev), aftermarket risk level of IPO (Risk), firm‟s age (Age), long-term 
investment ratio (LT), offer price to book value (P/BV), proportion of shares offered (PSO), rate of return on assets (ROA), 
post issue promoters‟ holding (PIPH), size of the firm (FSize), offer price (OPrice), earnings per share (EPS), issue 
proceeds (OSize), market return (mkt_ret), market volatility (mkt_vol) and listing delay (LDel). INDUSTRY (banks, other 
financial institutions, fuel & energy, technology & communication, cement, engineering, textiles, chemicals and others) and 
Hot activity period are considered as dummy variables. 
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Table 6.1 exhibits the descriptive statistics of variables used in the study. BHAR, 
CAR, underpricing (UP), financial leverage (FinLev), long-term investment ratio (LT), 
proportion of shares offered (PSO), post-issue promoters‟ holding (PIPH), market return 
(Mkt_ret) and market volatility (Mkt_vol) are denoted in percentages. Offer price (OPrice) 
and EPS is estimated in PKR per share. Firm size (FSize) and Offer size (OSize) are 
reflected in PKR in millions. Oversubscription ratio (Sub) and offer price to book value 
(P/BV) are represented in times. Age of the firm (Age) and listing delay (LDel) are scaled in 
years and days respectively. Risk is estimated by standard deviation of post-listing price 
behavior. 
The returns of equal-weighted BHAR and CAR are estimated over the period of 36-
month. Average & median BHAR and CAR are -17.53% & -18.21% and -23.16% & -
22.14% respectively illustrating that the underperformance in BHAR is lower than CAR. 
IPOs are underpriced by 15.27% on average with a median underpricing of 5.30%. 
Overpricing and underpricing range between 39.14% and 107.10%. Oversubscription is 2.76 
times on average and median value is more than one indicating that IPOs are slightly over 
subscribed. On average, financial leverage is 17.22% and the highest value is 78%. Small 
ratio of financial leverage interprets that IPO firms do not borrow huge financing before 
going public.  
Aftermarket risk depicts the average value of 4.73% with a standard deviation of 
3.15% showing the lesser fluctuations in post-issue pricing behavior. Average age of the 
firms is 7.57 years. Seven firms having more than 25 years of age and by eliminating them, 
the average age would be 4.92 years approaching close to median age of 3.50 years. The 
mean LT is 4.51% with a standard deviation of 12.05% describing that small proportion of 
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long-term investment is made by IPO firms. P/BV is 1.31 times on average with the highest 
value of 6.14. Average PSO is 32.06% with a median value of 27.02% elaborating that most 
of the firms offer small proportion of shares to the general public. On an average, ROA is 
1.84% while maximum value is 26.73%. This implies that IPO firms earned minimal income 
prior listing. Average PIPH is 54.55% with a median value of 50.34%. The mean value of 
FSize is PKR 14,120 million having standard deviation of PKR 66,214. By removing three 
largest firms, the average FSize decreases to PKR 3,866 million with a standard deviation of 
PKR 8,258 million.  
The mean OSize is PKR 446 million. The lowest and the highest offer size are PKR 
17 and 8,108 million respectively showing large variations in the sample due to inclusion of 
diversified IPOs. OPrice per share is PKR 20.12 on average. Mkt_ret seems negative on 
average but with a small volatility in market returns. The mean and median listing delay is 
60 and 53 days respectively. This large delay in days indicates uncertainty on the part of 
investors. Each firm earned PKR 2.06 per share on average representing meagre income 
obtained by firms prior to IPO.   
 
6.3 Empirical Findings 
6.3.1 Buy-and-Hold Abnormal Returns 
BHARs predict the investors‟ experience in a precise manner (Barber and Lyon, 
1997). This method is based on the buy-and-hold investment strategy and measured by the 
geometric method. A positive BHAR reflects outperformance while a negative BHAR 
represents underperformance of IPOs. Table 6.2 examines the equal- and value-weighted 
BHARs for 1-36 month period after the listing. The result of the equal-weighted BHAR 
exhibits that IPOs significantly underperform over the period of three-year. Average 12-
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month BHAR shows that a zero investment in IPOs would have incurred a loss of -19.0% (t-
statistics = -4.43). At the end of 24-month, average BHAR underperform by -15.3% (t-
statistics = -2.88). Over a 36-month window, underperformance significantly increases to -
24.2% (t-statistics = -4.07). This explains that, on average, purchasing of IPOs by the 
investors on the listing day and holding over a 3-year period can obtain significant negative 
abnormal returns. This finding is in accordance with that of Kooli et al. (2006) wherein they 
found significant negative abnormal returns over a period of 36-month adjusted for the 
matched-firm benchmark using 141 Canadian IPOs from 1986–2000.   
When KSE-100 Index is employed as a market benchmark, IPO firms underperform 
in long-run. Average BHAR is obtained to be -28.0% (t-statistics = -4.71), -40.1% (t-
statistics = -5.19) and -48.9% (t-statistics = -4.53), at the end of 12-, 24- and 36-month. In 
all the event windows, negative abnormal returns are highly significant at the 1% level. This 
indicates that IPO firms are not performing better than the market index resulting in 
generation of new listing and rebalancing biases. With an increase in time horizon, the 
results of BHARs show upsurge in negative abnormal returns which explain that benchmark 
index is performing better as opposed to sample IPOs in long-term. This finding is in line 
with the study of Cai et al. (2008) whereby investors obtained significant negative returns 
over the period of 3-year using 335 Chinese IPOs from 1997–2001.  
 
The results of the value-weighted BHARs demonstrate that IPO firms obtained less 
return as compared to sized based matched firm index. However, IPOs significantly 
underperform in the first 2-month representing the intermediate underperformance but 
thereafter it provides no evidence of under or overperformance over the 36-month period. At 
the end of 12-month, level of underperformance exists at -15.2% (t-statistic = -1.41). The 
underperformance reduces to -7.4% (t-statistic = -0.39) but improves later on to -19.8%  
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Table 6.2 
Aftermarket buy-and-hold abnormal return (BHAR) of 90 IPOs, 1995-2010 
  Equal-weighted  Value-weighted 
Month  BHARi,t BHARmf,t BHART t(BHART)  BHARi,t BHARmf,t BHART t(BHART) 
            
 1  -0.058 0.019 -0.077 (-4.15)
***
  -0.088 0.047 -0.135 (-2.43)
**
 
 2  -0.097 0.026 -0.123  (-4.86)
 ***
  -0.136 0.012 -0.148 (-2.26)
**
 
 3  -0.092 0.011 -0.103 (-3.71)
 ***
  -0.087 0.054 -0.141  (-1.27) 
 4  -0.114 -0.010 -0.104 (-3.67)
 ***
  -0.085 0.005 -0.090  (-1.09) 
 5  -0.110 0.018 -0.128 (-3.94)
 ***
  -0.025 0.037 -0.062  (-1.04) 
 6  -0.123 0.009 -0.132 (-3.76)
 ***
  -0.058 0.040 -0.099  (-1.11) 
 7  -0.154 -0.006 -0.149 (-4.20)
 ***
  -0.019 0.060 -0.079  (-0.72) 
 8  -0.197 -0.026 -0.171 (-5.10)
 ***
  -0.114 -0.034 -0.080  (-0.90) 
     9  -0.201 0.004 -0.205 (-5.80)
 ***
  -0.143 -0.065 -0.078  (-0.67) 
10  -0.188 0.014 -0.202 (-5.57)
 ***
  -0.157 -0.071 -0.086  (-0.73) 
11  -0.202 0.010 -0.212 (-5.92)
 ***
  -0.227 -0.034 -0.193  (-1.59) 
12  -0.172 0.018 -0.190 (-4.43)
 ***
  -0.237 -0.085 -0.152  (-1.41) 
13  -0.175 0.016 -0.191 (-4.14)
 ***
  -0.235 -0.083 -0.152  (-1.57) 
14  -0.186 -0.001 -0.185 (-4.15)
 ***
  -0.221 -0.080 -0.142  (-1.40) 
15  -0.175 -0.017 -0.157 (-3.12)
 ***
  -0.244 -0.148 -0.096  (-0.74) 
16  -0.204 -0.023 -0.181 (-3.58)
 ***
  -0.301 -0.240 -0.061  (-0.57) 
17  -0.205 -0.022 -0.183 (-3.26)
 ***
  -0.235 -0.177 -0.058  (-0.52) 
18  -0.208 -0.017 -0.190 (-3.55)
 ***
  -0.222 -0.143 -0.079  (-0.55) 
19  -0.211 -0.033 -0.177 (-3.56)
 ***
  -0.175 -0.069 -0.106  (-0.55) 
20  -0.208 -0.013 -0.195 (-3.91)
 ***
  -0.211 -0.077 -0.134  (-0.88) 
21  -0.207 -0.022 -0.184 (-3.63)
 ***
  -0.237 -0.112 -0.126  (-0.75) 
22  -0.205 -0.050 -0.156 (-3.00)
 ***
  -0.175 -0.115 -0.060  (-0.33) 
23  -0.186 -0.066 -0.121 (-2.32)
**
  -0.146 -0.125 -0.021  (-0.07) 
24  -0.203 -0.050 -0.153 (-2.88)
**
  -0.124 -0.050 -0.074  (-0.39) 
25  -0.207 -0.053 -0.153 (-3.07)
 ***
  -0.161 -0.087 -0.074  (-0.48) 
26  -0.197 -0.048 -0.149   (-2.78)
**
  -0.166 -0.085 -0.081  (-0.51) 
27  -0.196 -0.053 -0.143  (-2.95)
 ***
  -0.142 -0.085 -0.057  (-0.30) 
28  -0.211 -0.053 -0.158 (-3.37)
***
  -0.160 -0.087 -0.073  (-0.43) 
29  -0.216 -0.034 -0.182 (-3.55)
***
  -0.164 -0.095 -0.069  (-0.41) 
30  -0.207 -0.019 -0.187 (-3.36)
***
  -0.214 -0.110 -0.104  (-0.63) 
31  -0.197 0.009 -0.206 (-3.60)
***
  -0.183 -0.083 -0.100  (-0.51) 
32  -0.179 0.024 -0.203 (-3.68)
***
  -0.227 -0.096 -0.131  (-0.83) 
33  -0.172 0.030 -0.202 (-3.78)
***
  -0.239 -0.124 -0.115  (-0.75) 
34  -0.164 0.058 -0.222 (-3.91)
***
  -0.264 -0.103 -0.160  (-1.16) 
35  -0.186 0.049 -0.235 (-4.16)
***
  -0.323 -0.135 -0.188  (-1.43) 
36  -0.175 0.067 -0.242 (-4.07)
***
  -0.330 -0.132 -0.198  (-1.61) 
              
 
Sample covers 90 IPOs issued on KSE from 1995 to 2010 representing equal- and value-weighted BHAR for 1-36 month 
after listing. BHARt is computed as       [∏ (      )   ∏ (       )
 
   
 
   ] where Ri,t and Rmf,t are returns of event 
firm i and its sized based matched firm index respectively at time period t. The t-statistics are shown in parentheses. *** and 
** indicate statistical significant at the 1 and 5% level respectively.  
 
(t-statistic = -1.61) at the 24- and 36-month respectively. Consistent with Chen et al. (2011) 
in which they analyzed 936 Chinese IPO over the period of three-year and found that in the 
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first 3-month, the results of value-weighted BHAR are significant but afterward no evidence 
of under or overperformance is found. The value-weighted BHAR adjusted for benchmark 
index reports the underperformance of -33.1% (t-statistics = -2.19), -28.9% (t-statistics = -
1.25) and -65.6% (t-statistics = -3.94) at the end of 12-, 24- and 36-month.   
6.3.2 Cumulative Abnormal Returns 
 Table 6.3 reports the equal- and value-weighted cumulative abnormal returns for 1-
36 month period after listing. The equal-weighted CARs represent that IPOs underperform 
over the three-year period. Average underperformance is statistically significant in all the 
event windows except on the 22-, 29- and 32-trading month. For example, IPOs 
underperform by -19.9% (t-statistic: -2.00), -18.6% (t-statistic: -1.96) and -23.2% (t-statistic: 
-2.37) after the 12-, 24- and 36-month periods respectively. This demonstrates that IPO 
firms perform slightly better than sized based matched firm index during the period from 22 
to 31-month wherein the underperformance deteriorates. Using benchmark index, the 
average CAR is found to be -27.3% (t-statistic: -2.74), -36.3% (t-statistic: -3.85) and -36.3% 
(t-statistic: -3.71) at the end of 12-, 24- and 36-month respectively. This shows that IPO 
firms are unable to compete benchmark index.        
 The results of value-weighted CARs show that IPOs underperform over the sample 
period and found the statistical significance in most of the cases. For instance, 
underperformance reflects at -24.6% (t-statistic: -2.48) after one-year and -18.9% (t-statistic: 
-1.99) after two-year. On the third-year window, the value-weighted CAR is reported at -
23.4% (t-statistic: -2.40) explaining that IPOs obtained significant negative abnormal returns 
if investing on the listing date and holding on up to three-year. This evidence is consistent 
with prior studies (e.g. Ahmad-Zaluki et al., 2007). The results of value-weighted CAR 
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employing benchmark index reflect that IPOs significantly underperform at -43.6% (12-
month), -26.8% (24-month) and -51.4% (36-month).  
 
Table 6.3 
Aftermarket cumulative abnormal return (CAR) of 90 IPOs, 1995-2010 
  Equal-weighted  Value-weighted 
Month      ARt   t(ARt)  CART  t(CART)  ARt t(ARt) CART   t(CART) 
           
  1  -0.077 (-4.40)
***
 -0.077 (-4.40)
***
  -0.135 (-4.13)
***
 -0.135 (-7.67)
***
 
  2  -0.044 (-2.58)
**
 -0.121 (-5.03)
***
  -0.019   (-0.54) -0.154 (-6.38)
***
 
  3  0.027    (1.40) -0.094  (-2.78)
**
  0.023    (0.63) -0.130 (-3.86)
***
 
  4  0.001    (0.06) -0.093 (-2.95)
***
  0.045 (3.07)
***
 -0.085     (-2.71)
**
 
  5  -0.029   (-1.85)
*
 -0.122 (-3.49)
***
  0.037    (0.66) -0.049 (-1.40) 
  6  -0.010   (-0.60) -0.132 (-3.29)
***
  -0.041   (-1.05) -0.090      (-2.26)
**
 
  7  -0.021   (-1.03) -0.153  (-2.79)
**
  -0.001    (0.04) -0.091 (-1.66) 
  8  -0.026   (-1.70) -0.179 (-4.18)
***
  -0.002   (-0.02) -0.093      (-2.17)
**
 
  9  -0.046 (-2.68)
**
 -0.225 (-4.31)
***
  -0.050   (-0.65) -0.143      (-2.75)
**
 
10  0.013    (0.65) -0.212 (-3.28)
***
  -0.003   (-0.19) -0.146      (-2.27)
**
 
11  -0.019   (-1.50) -0.231 (-5.42)
***
  -0.136 (-2.11)
**
 -0.282 (-6.64)
***
 
12  0.032    (1.13) -0.199    (-2.00)
*
  0.036    (1.11) -0.246     (-2.48)
**
 
13  -0.008   (-0.46) -0.207 (-3.22)
***
  -0.011   (-0.83) -0.257 (-4.01)
***
 
14  0.019    (1.14) -0.188 (-3.05)
***
  0.034    (1.55) -0.223 (-3.63)
***
 
15  0.008    (0.41) -0.180  (-2.48)
**
  -0.021   (-0.16) -0.244 (-3.36)
***
 
16  -0.024   (-1.79)
*
 -0.204 (-3.85)
***
  0.036    (0.21) -0.208 (-3.93)
***
 
17  -0.008   (-0.52) -0.212 (-3.21)
***
  0.144    (0.40) -0.064 (-0.97) 
18  -0.005   (-0.35) -0.218 (-3.30)
***
  -0.060  (-2.11)
**
 -0.123   (-1.87)
*
 
19  0.017    (0.87) -0.201  (-2.34)
**
  -0.088 (-3.07)
***
 -0.211      (-2.46)
**
 
20  -0.015   (-0.63) -0.216  (-1.97)
*
  -0.020   (-0.48) -0.231      (-2.11)
**
 
21  0.008    (0.47) -0.209 (-2.85)
**
  -0.012   (-0.23) -0.243 (-3.32)
***
 
22  0.028    (1.23) -0.180  (-1.66)  0.079    (0.85) -0.164 (-1.51) 
23  0.030    (1.72)
*
 -0.151  (-1.83)
*
  0.043    (1.04) 0.121 (-1.47) 
24  -0.036   (-1.84)
*
 -0.186  (-1.96)
*
  -0.068   (-1.35) -0.189 (-1.99)
*
 
25  0.016    (0.87) -0.170  (-1.83)
*
  0.048  (2.42)
**
 -0.141 (-1.53) 
26  0.023    (1.41) -0.147  (-1.78)
*
  0.000   (-0.01) -0.142 (-1.72)
*
 
27  0.003    (0.24) -0.144 (-2.06)
**
  0.023    (1.71)
*
 -0.118 (-1.70) 
28  0.001    (0.08) -0.143  (-1.73)
*
  -0.002   (-0.18) -0.121 (-1.46) 
29  -0.012   (-0.64) -0.155  (-1.58)  0.005    (0.24) -0.116 (-1.19) 
30  -0.004   (-0.23) -0.158  (-1.78)
*
  -0.033   (-0.65) -0.149 (-1.67) 
31  -0.003   (-0.19) -0.161  (-2.17)
**
  -0.012   (-0.80) -0.160     (-2.16)
**
 
32  0.011    (0.65) -0.150  (-1.62)  -0.033   (-0.77) -0.193     (-2.09)
**
 
33  -0.037 (-2.72)
**
 -0.187  (-2.39)
**
  0.005    (0.61) -0.188     (-2.40)
**
 
34  -0.018   (-1.16) -0.205 (-2.30)
**
  -0.023   (-0.75) -0.211     (-2.38)
**
 
35  -0.034  (-2.54)
**
 -0.239 (-3.03)
***
  -0.028   (-0.69) -0.239  (-3.04)
***
 
36  0.007    (0.43) -0.232 (-2.37)
**
  0.005    (0.39) -0.234     (-2.40)
**
 
           
 
Sample covers 90 IPOs issued on KSE from 1995 to 2010 representing equal- and value-weighted CAR for 1-36 month 
after listing. τ-period cumulative abnormal returns (CAR τ) for event firm i beginning in period s is calculated as       
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  where Ri,t is the return of event firm i,   Rmf,t is the return of sized based matched firm index 
and n is no. of sample IPOs. The t-statistics are shown in parentheses. ***, ** and * indicate statistical significant at the 1, 5 
and 10% level respectively.  
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 In conclusion, the results of long-term abnormal IPO performance depend on the 
methodologies used to measure abnormal returns. Both the BHAR and CAR in the light of 
equal- and value-weighted schema posit that event firms obtain less return as compared to 
sized based matched firm index and benchmark index. During the examination of 36-month, 
the equal-weighted BHAR and CAR significantly underperform. In value-weighted BHAR, 
IPOs significantly underperform only in first two-month but find no evidence of under or 
overperformance thereafter. Further, the results of value-weighted CAR incur negative 
abnormal returns which are significant in most of the cases over the period of three-year.  
 Graphically, the BHARs and CARs can be presented for 1-36 months after the listing 
of 90 IPOs issued during the sample period:       
 
 
      
 
 
 
Figure 6.1. Aftermarket performance of IPO using the equal-weighted BHAR and CAR Methodologies.   
The sample covers 90 IPOs issued on KSE during the period 1995–2010 depicting mean BHAR and CAR adjusted 
by sized matching-firm and benchmark index for 1-36 month period. BHARmf describes BHAR adjusted sized 
matching firm benchmark and BHARm shows BHAR adjusted benchmark index. 
 
 
-0.600
-0.500
-0.400
-0.300
-0.200
-0.100
0.000
1 3 5 7 9 11 13 15 17 19 21 23 25 27 29 31 33 35
A
ft
er
m
ar
k
et
 p
er
fo
rm
an
ce
 
Months 
BHARmf 
BHARm 
CARmf 
CARm 
104 
 
 
Figure 6.2. Aftermarket performance of IPOs using value-weighted BHAR and CAR Methodologies 
The sample covers 90 IPOs issued on KSE during the period 1995–2010 depicting BHAR and CAR adjusted by 
sized matching-firm and benchmark index for 1-36 month period. BHARmf describes BHAR adjusted sized matching 
firm benchmark and BHARm shows BHAR adjusted benchmark index. 
 
 Figure 6.1 demonstrates that both the equal-weighted BHARs and CARs adjusted for 
sized based matched firm index and benchmark index significantly underperform over the 
period of 36-month. When the abnormal returns are adjusted through sized based matched 
firm index, underperformance is lower as compared to benchmark index. Higher 
underperformance in case of benchmark index is attributed to new listing and rebalancing 
biases. Similar to equal-weighted methodologies, abnormal returns adjusted by benchmark 
index is also higher than sized based matched firm index using value-weighted schema 
(Figure 6.2). However, it can be inferred that observed pattern of underperformance is not 
always statistically significant. In nutshell, it is argued that the magnitude of 
underperformance is lower when the abnormal returns are adjusted for sized based matched 
firm index which supports the earlier findings (Ang and Zhang, 2004; Lyon et al., 1999; 
Barber and Lyon, 1997).  
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6.3.3 Discussion of long-term performance in comparing the prior and current 
researches in Pakistan 
Table 6.4 presents a comparison of the equal-weighted BHAR and CAR results 
which are compared to prior studies of long-run abnormal IPO performance. Panel A reports 
the results of the long-run abnormal performance when researchers used the benchmark 
index. Sohail & Nasr measured the one-year performance and found that investors obtained 
negative returns of –38.10% using BHAR methodology and –19.67% when employing the 
CAR methodology. In another study, Rizwan and Khan (2007) analyzed the two-year 
performance using the BHAR methodology and documented negative returns of –23.68%. 
They also determined that IPOs generated an underperformance of -11.26% over the period 
of one-year. This study examines three-year long-run IPO performance using the equal- and 
value-weighted BHAR and CAR methodologies. For comparison purposes, the results of 
only the equally-weighed BHARs and CARs are reported. Using the benchmark index, this 
study finds that the level of underperformance increased over the three-year period when the 
BHAR is employed. Whereas the level of underperformance identified using the CAR 
methodology increases over the first two-years but remains constant in the third-year. Lyon, 
Barber and Tsai (1999) argued that the results of longer-term analyses are affected due to 
rebalancing, survivorship, and skewness biases when the benchmark index is used. To 
overcome these biases, this study formulated a sized based matched firm index and 
subsequently found that IPOs underperform relative to sized matching firms; however, the 
level of underperformance is lower (Panel B).   
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Table 6.4 
 Comparison of findings between prior and current studies 
 
Studies 
 
Period 
No. of 
IPOs 
BHAR CAR 
1-year 2-year 3-year 1-year 2-year 3-year 
        
Panel A: Benchmark Index 
         
Sohail & Nasr (2007) 2000-2005 36 
-38.1% 
(-4.62)*** 
- - -19.7% 
(-1.82)* 
- - 
         
Rizwan & Khan (2007) 2000-2006 35 
-11.3% 
(-0.78) 
-23.7% 
(-1.26) 
- - - - 
         
Present study 1995-2010 90 
-28.0% 
(-4.71)*** 
-40.1% 
(-5.19)*** 
-48.9% 
(-4.53)*** 
-27.3% 
(-2.74)** 
-36.3% 
(-3.85)*** 
-36.3% 
(-3.71)*** 
         
Panel B: Sized based matched-firm index 
         
Present study 1995-2010 90 
-19.0% 
(-4.43)*** 
-15.3% 
(-2.88)** 
-24.2% 
(-4.07)*** 
-19.9% 
(-2.00)* 
-18.6% 
(-1.96)* 
-23.2% 
(-2.37)** 
         
 
***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at 1, 5 and 10% level. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
6.3.4 Industry clustering and long-term abnormal performance 
 To add further depth to the analysis of long-term abnormal performance, the IPOs 
are evaluated on the basis of industry classification. Table 6.5 demonstrates the results test 
of the longer-term performance of firms that issued shares within the bounds of the study 
based upon industry affiliation using equal-weighted BHAR and CAR methodologies over a 
36-month examination period. When the results of equal-weighted BHARs are evaluated, it 
is observed that IPOs obtain less return when compared to matching the firm‟s return on the 
basis of market capitalization in all the cases except the engineering sector. The textile 
sector (–57.3%) performed the worst, which was followed by the technology and 
communications (–42.7%) sectors; however, the chemicals and pharmaceuticals (15.1%) 
and engineering (7.5%) sectors yielded positive returns over the 36-month period. While 
examining the equal-weighted CAR, the other sectors (–66.1%) followed by banking 
industry (–50.1%) categories produced negative returns; however, engineering (85.2%) and 
technology and communication (38.3%) registered positive returns in three year period 
following the IPO using the CAR methodology. 
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Table 6.5 
Industry clustering and long-term performance 
Industry 
No. of 
IPOs 
BHAR CAR 
IPO Return 
 
Sized matched 
firm Avg. return 
Avg. 
Abnormal 
returns 
IPO Return  
Sized matched 
firm Avg. return 
Avg. 
Abnormal 
returns Average Median Average Median 
          
1.   Other financial institutions 20 -0.331 -0.397 -0.132 -0.199 -0.183 -0.140 -0.073 -0.303 
2.   Fuel & Energy  11 -0.160 -0.298 0.041 -0.200 0.102 0.071 0.073 -0.018 
3.   Banks 10 -0.415 -0.462 -0.075 -0.340 -0.381 -0.306 -0.255 -0.501* 
4.   Textiles  10 -0.493 -0.560 0.081   -0.573** -0.209 -0.350 1.112 -0.329 
5.   Investment Cos. 9 0.280 -0.372 0.396 -0.116 -0.138 -0.084 -0.101 -0.258 
6.   Tech. & Comm. 7 0.048 -0.192 0.475 -0.427 0.502 0.200 0.430 0.383 
7.   Chem.& Pharm. 7 -0.238 -0.459 -0.389 0.151 -0.133 -0.249 -0.318 -0.252 
8.   Cement 7 0.324 -0.743 0.560 -0.236 -0.208 -0.783 0.194 -0.328 
9.   Engineering  2 0.768 0.768 0.693 0.075 0.972 0.972 0.793     0.852*** 
10. Other  7 -0.605 -0.629 -0.270 -0.295* -0.541 -0.561 -0.026  -0.661** 
          
Total 90 -0.175 -0.399 0.067   -0.242*** -0.112 -0.103 0.120 -0.232** 
 
Based on the industry classification, 90 IPOs are allocated into 10 industries. Then, 36-month abnormal return based on equal-weighted BHAR and CAR is calculated relative to 
sized based matching firms. The table reports number of IPOs in each industry, the average and median industry return and the corresponding average return of sized based 
matching firms measuring equal-weighted BHAR and CAR. Other financial institutions include: leasing (6 Nos.), mutual funds (6 Nos.), insurance (4 Nos.) and modaraba (4 Nos.) 
The last row provides these statistics for the full sample. ***, ** and * represent significance at 1, 5 and 10% level.  
 
108 
 
6.3.5 Issue proceeds and long-term abnormal IPO performance 
 Effect of issue proceeds on long-term abnormal IPO performance is examined by 
segregating the sample into size quartiles formed on the basis of gross proceeds. The results 
of equal-weighted BHAR exhibit that IPOs underperform over 36-month period in all 
groups (Table 6.6).  Lowest gross proceeds (<Rs.84m) depicts average BHAR of -35.3% (t-
statistic: -2.96) and the highest gross proceeds (>Rs.450m) presents -27.7% (t-statistic: -
2.35) illustrating that underperformance in the lowest proceeds is more than highest 
proceeds over 36-month examination period.  
 
Table 6.6 
Issue proceeds and long-term performance 
 
Gross proceeds quartiles N BHART t(BHART) CART t(CART) 
      
 < Rs.84 million 22 -0.353  (-2.96)
**
 -0.258  (-1.18) 
 Rs.85 million – Rs.150 million 23  -0.161       (-1.42) -0.072  (-0.31) 
 Rs.151 million – Rs.450 million 22 -0.181       (-1.37) -0.378    (-2.04)
*
 
 > Rs.450 million 23 -0.277   (-2.35)
**
  -0.225    (-2.02)
*
 
Small size 45 -0.255    (-3.09)
***
 -0.163  (-1.01) 
Large size 45 -0.230  (-2.66)
**
 -0.300     (-2.72)
**
 
Small – Large   -0.025 (-0.19)  0.137    (1.94)
*
 
      
 
Sample covers 90 IPOs issued on KSE from 1995 to 2010. It demonstrates equal-weighted BHARs and CARs over 36-
month after listing based on sized matching-firm. All IPOs are segregated on the basis of size quartiles. Rs.84 m, Rs.150 m 
and Rs.450 m are used as cut-offs points to first, median and third quartile values, respectively. Small group relates to firms 
of which issue sizes are less than Rs.150 m. ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10% level, 
respectively. 
 
 
 
 
 This indicates that small-size firms may have high risk as well as provision of less 
publish information for the investors before going public. Thus, volatility of stock prices for 
small firms is more due to the fact that institutional investors have the ability to buy at large 
to manipulate the prices thereby resulting into uncertainty and speculation in future prices. 
On average, small size issues underperform (-25.5%, t-statistics = -3.09) slightly more than 
large size issues (-23.0%, t-statistics = -2.66). Table 6.6 reports the equal-weighted CAR 
describing underperformance in all the cases over 36-month period. Among others, issue 
proceeds ranging from Rs.85m – Rs.150m show low level of underperformance (-7.2%). 
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The quantum of long-run underperformance in small size issues (-16.3%, t-statistics = -1.01) 
is less than large size issues (-30.0%, t-statistics = -2.72), however, large size issues 
significantly underperform.   
6.3.6 Initial returns and long-term abnormal IPO performance 
It is imperative to examine the relationship between initial day returns and long-term 
performance. Table 6.7 reports the equal-weighted BHAR whereby overpriced IPOs 
underperform less than underpriced IPOs. The underperformance of both underpriced and 
overpriced IPOs are statistically significant. The result of equal-weighted CAR shows that 
overpriced IPOs underperform more than underpriced IPOs. The level of underperformance 
in overpriced IPOs is statistically significant leading to an impression that overpriced IPOs 
would be underpriced in long-run.  
 
Table 6.7 
Initial returns and long-term performance 
 
Initial returns N BHART t(BHART) CART t(CART) 
      
IR < -8.80% 22 -0.402      (-3.25)
***
 -0.628   (-4.95)
***
 
-8.79% < IR < 5.25% 23 -0.057        (-0.49)  0.007        (0.04) 
5.26% < IR < 28% 22  0.002  (0.01)  0.051        (0.23) 
IR > 28% 23 -0.509      (-4.37)
***
 -0.361       (-1.46) 
      
 
Sample covers 90 IPOs issued on KSE from 1995 to 2010. The relationship is depicted between initial day returns and 
long-run performance using the equal-weighted BHAR and CAR over 36-month after listing comparing sized based 
matched firm index. IR – initial returns (i.e. initial market adjusted abnormal returns). *** indicates significance at the 1% 
level.  
 
6.3.7 Long-term abnormal IPO performance of hot and cold IPOs 
The firms going public during hot activity period underperform more than those 
issued in cold period. Poor performance of hot IPOs in long-term is attributed to market 
timing where market optimism prevails resulting IPOs are overvalued. Subsequently, market 
determines the true value of IPOs which causes underperformance. Helwege and Liang 
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(2004) defined „hot‟ by number of IPOs in the offering month and found that IPO floated 
during hot activity period are performed worse than cold period. 
Table 6.7 reports mean stock return of post-listing three-year BHAR and CAR for 90 
IPO firms from 1995 to 2010 segregated by hot / cold issues. Hot activity period is defined 
as >5 IPOs are issued in a year. From the results of mean BHAR, it appears that issues in hot 
period underperform less than cold period. However, underperformance in both periods is 
statistically significant. This result is consistent with Ljungqvist et al. (2006) and Trauten et 
al. (2007) because large IPOs underperform less or small number of IPOs issued in different 
years. When mean CAR is used to examine the long-run performance of hot or cold issues, 
it is observed that hot issues underperform more than cold issues (Helwege and Liang, 2004; 
Agathee, Brooks and Sannassee, 2012).  
 
Table 6.8 
Long-term performance of hot and cold IPOs 
 
Types of issues N BHART t(BHART) CART t(CART) 
      
Hot issues 70 -0.216 -3.54
***
 -0.259    -2.29
**
 
Cold issues 20 -0.336       -2.01
*
 -0.136 -0.75 
Sample 90 -0.242       -4.07
***
 -0.232         -2.37
**
 
      
 
Sample covers 90 IPOs issued on KSE from 1995 to 2010. Long-run performance of hot and cold IPOs is observed using 
the equal-weighted BHAR and CAR adjusted for sized based matched firm index over 36 month after listing. ***, ** and * 
represent significance at the 1, 5 and 10% level respectively.  
 
6.3.8 Calendar-time Approach 
 Table 6.9 presents the regression results using calendar-time approaches i.e. the 
Fama-French model (Panel A) and the Carhart model (Panel B). Equal- and value-weighted 
monthly excess returns of the portfolio are the dependent variables while the excess market 
returns, size, book-to-market and momentum factors are considered as independent 
variables. 
111 
 
 Panel A exhibits negative coefficient of intercepts in both the regressions. This 
clearly infers that IPO underperform over the period of three-year when controlled through 
the market, size and value factors. When equal-weighed method is employed, the mean α is -
28.0% and t-statistic shows monthly abnormal return as statistically significant. In case of 
equal-weighted, IPOs underperform by -18.0% (t-statistics = -16.13) indicating the 
significance of monthly abnormal return. Systematic risk (β) in case of equal-weighted 
portfolio is -0.20 as opposed to 0.06 in value-weighted portfolio. Negative β represents 
negative returns obtained by equal-weighted portfolio relative to market returns (significant 
 
Table 6.9 
Long-run calendar-time portfolio regressions 
 
 
Panel A: Fama-French (1993) Three-Factor Model 
  Dependent variable: Equally  
weighted IPO portfolio returns 
Dependent variable: Value-  
weighted IPO portfolio returns 
 
Variables  Coefficient t-test Coefficient t-test 
Intercept  -0.280     -33.41
***
 -0.180    -16.13
***
 
Rm–Rf  -0.203     -2.69
**
  0.060   0.96 
SMB  -0.035  -0.16 -1.028    -44.19
***
 
HML   0.090   0.40  0.034               1.56 
Adj. R
2
   0.187   0.991  
F-stat.   2.41
*
      4835.84
***
  
 
 
Panel B: Carhart (1997) Four-Factor Model 
  Dependent variable: Equally  
weighted IPO portfolio returns 
Dependent variable: Value-  
weighted IPO portfolio returns 
 
Variables  Coefficient t-test Coefficient t-test 
Intercept  -0.324     -12.50
***
 -0.115    -12.60
***
 
Rm–Rf  -0.104 -1.17  0.035 0.48 
SMB  -0.220 -0.86 -1.056    -26.93
***
 
HML   0.230  0.89  0.059 -1.79
*
 
WML   1.070   1.73
*
  0.109              1.32 
Adj. R
2
   0.272   0.991  
F-stat.    2.80
**
       3713.99
***
  
      
 
Long run performance of 90 IPOs is investigated by calendar-time strategies from 1995 to 2010. The Fama-French 
(1993) model is estimated as: Rpt – Rft  =  αi   βi(Rmt – Rft) + siSMBt + hiHMLt + ϵit and the Carhart (1997) model is 
defined as: Rpt – Rft  =  αi   βi(Rmt – Rft) + siSMBt + hiHMLt + wiWMLt + ϵit. where Rpt =  IPO portfolio return in month t, 
Rft = 3-month t-bill rate, Rmt = return on KSE-100 index, SMBt = portfolio return of small minus large size stocks, HMLt = 
portfolio return of high minus low value stocks, and WMLt = average portfolio return of winner minus loser stock. Large 
and small size stocks are segregated by top and below 30% market capitalization respectively. High and low value stocks 
are classified as top and bottom 30% BM respectively. Winners are losers are explained as top and bottom ⅓ average 
return of past 11 months. The t-statistics are based on the Newey-West HAC standard errors. ***, ** and * represent 
statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10% level respectively.  
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at 5%) while positive β describes the value-weighted portfolio getting nominal returns than 
market returns by reducing the underperformance. The coefficient of SMB is negative in 
both the regressions as large firms are obtaining higher returns than small firms. This finding 
is in contrast to earlier findings (e.g. Chen et al. 2011); because in developing markets large 
firms may attain more risk and subsequently acquire high returns. SMB in value-weighted 
portfolio is statistically significant. HML is positive in both equations elaborating that firms 
with high BM ratio may obtain higher returns relative to small BM ratio – insignificant effect 
(Ahmad-Zaluki et al., 2007).   
 Panel B depicts the results of the Carhart model wherein the coefficient intercepts are 
negatively representing that IPOs significantly underperform over the period of three-year 
using equal- and value-weighting schema. The systematic risk is negative in equal-weighted 
portfolio while it is positive in value-weighted portfolio. However, β in both regressions are 
statistically insignificant. Similar to the Fama-French model as described above, SMB is 
negative and HML is positive in both the equations. The coefficients of SMB and HML are 
significant in value-weighted portfolio. WML is introduced by the Carhart that captures the 
momentum factor measuring winners (high returns) minus losers (low returns). In both the 
equal- and value-weighted portfolios, WML is positive showing that winners are obtaining 
higher returns than the losers. In addition, WML is statistically significant in value-weighting 
portfolio.   
6.3.9 Determinants of Long-term Underperformance 
 To examine the determinants of long-term underperformance, EBA technique is used 
to test the sensitivity as well as robustness of the explanatory variables. The dependent 
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variables comprise 36-month equal-weighted BHAR and CAR. The sensitivity results are 
presented as under: 
6.3.9.1 Some Preliminary Results 
Using BHAR as the dependent variable, the preliminary regression includes the 
underpricing (UP) and financial leverage (FinLev) as X-variables. The regression can be 
specified as: 
 
                                                                                                                                            
                                    **                  *                                                                                                                                                                                                              
 
 
Equation (6.12) is estimated by the OLS method, Adj. R
2
 = 0.0382, no. of IPOs = 90 
and t-value are shown in parentheses. It appears that underpricing is the significant variable 
of long-term underperformance. Employing CAR as the dependent variable, X-variables 
include UP and hot activity period (Hot).  The regression can be presented as:  
 
                                                                                                                                                    
                               **                **                           *** 
 
 
Adj. R
2
 = 0.1152, no. of IPOs = 90, and t-value are shown in parentheses. Equation 
(6.13) shows that UP and Hot are significantly affecting the long-term underperformance of 
IPOs.  
6.3.9.2 Results of Basic Models using BHAR  
To investigate the determinants of long-term underperformance, the 36-month equal-
weighted BHAR is used as the dependent variable while the age of the firm (Age), 
oversubscription (Sub), proportion of shares offered (PSO) and Industry (Technology & 
Communication and Textiles) are considered as the Q-variables. Regression I (Table 6.10) 
presents the estimation results with all the Z-variables. The results show that the FinLev is 
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the only significant factor from the X-variables which indicates that higher financial 
leverage will distort the financial health of the firm. However, no variable is statistically 
significant from the Q- and Z-variables. There exists a negative association between long-
term investment ratio (LT) and underperformance which implies that long-term investment 
shows a modest signal towards an improvement of the firm‟s performance. Size of firm 
(FSize) and issue proceeds (OPrice) demonstrated a negative relationship with 
underperformance; however, these findings support the ex-ante uncertainty hypothesis. The 
Mkt_vol variable produced a negative sign, which indicates that the higher volatility in post-
issue pricing results in a lower level of underperformance. Prior to listing, high EPS reflects 
the window dressing of pre-IPO earnings through discretionary reporting of accruals (Teoh 
et al., 1998); therefore, it documents that there is a negative association with post-IPO 
returns. Industries like banks, other financial institutions, engineering, chemicals, fuel and 
energy, cement and other have no effect on long-term underperformance.  
Regression II exhibits the estimation results without Z-variables indicating that both 
X-variables i.e. UP and FinLev are statistically significant. The coefficient of underpricing is 
negative and significantly affects long-run IPO returns (Ritter, 1991, Kooli, L‟her and Suret, 
2006; Kutsuna, Smith and Smith, 2009), which corroborates the signaling hypothesis. This 
implies that the higher initial returns produced consequently poor long-term performance, 
which indicates that the investors‟ initial expectation fails to continue in the following years. 
It can also be interpreted as excessive mispricing caused by information asymmetry which 
subsequently is corrected in the aftermarket. The results also support the overreaction or 
fads hypothesis. The coefficient of financial leverage is positively significant at the 1% level 
(Sahoo and Rajib, 2010). This confirms that financial leverage creates uncertainty due to  
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Table 6.10 
Estimation results of benchmark models – BHAR as dependent variable 
Regression With Z-variables (I)  Without Z-variable (II) 
    
Constant 1.3001 (0.72)  0.0755 (0.62) 
 
   
X-variables    
   UP -0.3828 (-1.67)  -0.4718 (-2.35)
**
 
    
   FinLev 0.5944 (1.70)
*
  0.6981 (2.50)
**
 
    
Q-variables    
   Age -0.0766 (-0.81)  -0.1197 (-1.95)
*
 
    
   Sub 0.0166 (1.11)  0.0167 (1.72)
*
 
    
   PSO -0.1470 (-0.23)  -0.2310 (-0.88) 
    
   Technology & Communication -0.3246 (-0.90)  -0.3330 (-1.31) 
    
   Textiles -0.6226 (-1.88) 
 
-0.4281 (-2.84)
 ***
 
    
Z-variables    
   Ldel -0.2734 (-1.56)   
    
   LT -0.6211 (-0.85)   
    
   FSize -0.0058 (-0.40)   
    
   Risk 0.3847 (0.17)   
    
   Hot -0.0183 (-0.10)   
    
   Mkt_ret -0.7162 (-1.48)   
    
   Mkt_vol -12.0548 (-0.78)   
       
   EPS -0.0099 (-0.51)   
    
   ROA 0.5171 (0.28)   
    
   P/BV 0.0142 (0.12)   
    
   OSize 0.0107 (0.13)   
    
   OPrice -0.0297 (-0.12)   
    
   Banks -0.0443 (-0.13)   
    
   Other financial institutions -0.0427 (-0.13)   
    
   Engineering 0.0872 (0.17)   
    
   Chemicals 0.0120 (0.04)   
    
   Fuel and energy 0.0279 (0.09)   
    
   Cement -0.3890 (-1.03)   
    
   Other -0.2236 (-0.62)   
    
    
Adj. R
2
 0.0000  0.1190 
R
2
 0.2914  0.1907 
F-value 0.95  2.36
**
 
    
 
The table presents estimated results of the benchmark models with all Z-variables (regression I) and without Z-variables 
(regression II) using 90 IPO issued on KSE from 1995 to 2010. Dependent variable is three-year equal-weighted buy-
and-hold abnormal returns adjusted sized matching-firm in both regressions. Independent variables are defined as 
follows: UP = underpricing, FinLev = financial leverage, Age = age of the firm, Sub = oversubscription, PSO = 
proportion of shares offered, Industry = industry a dummy variable (i.e. technology & communications, textiles, banks, 
other financial institutions, engineering, chemicals, fuel & energy, cement and other), Ldel = listing delay, LT = long-
term investment ratio, FSize = size of the firm, Risk = aftermarket risk level of the IPO, Hot = a dummy variable taking 1 
for IPOs issued in hot activity period and 0 otherwise, Mkt_return = market return, Mkt_vol = market volatility, EPS = 
earnings per share, ROA = rate of return on assets, P/BV = offer price to book value, Osize = issue proceeds and OPrice 
= offer price. The t-values are shown in parentheses.  ***, ** and * represent significance level at the 1, 5 and 10% 
respectively.  
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high debt servicing which leads to lower financial performance. Conversely, the low 
financial burden firms may underperform less because they have minor obligations to fulfill. 
The age of the firm is inversely proportional to long-term underperformance and significant 
at 10% level (Carter et al., 1998; Goergen, Khurshed and Mudambi, 2002). This illustrates 
that older firms perform much better than younger firms (Ritter, 1991) beacuse they have 
more resources to allocate efficiently to obtain positive returns resulting in lower 
underperformance. The coefficient of oversubscription is positively significant at 10% level 
(Omran, 2005), which implies that the initial enthusiasm fails to continue and this results in 
poor aftermarket performance. There exist a negative and insignificant relationship between 
PSO and underperformance, which emphasizes that the floatation of a large proportion of 
shares will lower the underperformance because a diversified shareholder base may improve 
the firm‟s performance. Two industries (i.e. Technology & Communications and Textiles) 
pass the sensitivity tests and are included in the Q-variables. Both industries negatively 
affected the long-run IPO returns. The evidence of the negative return in textile sector is 
statistically significant at 1% level showing the existence of long-run underperformance 
over 36-month period.  
Regression 1 shows that R
2
 is 0.2914 and the adjusted R
2
 is 0.0000. This implies that 
by adding the explanatory variables, the value of R
2
 increases but insignificance of all the 
variables except FinLev, some variables pulls the effect of the others which converted 
adjusted R
2
 into zero. The Adj. R
2
 is 0.1907 in regression II indicating that most of the 
variables are significant. Thus, the EBA technique robustly identifies the true predictors of 
the explanatory variables. 
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6.3.9.3 Results of Basic Models using CAR  
To examine the determinants of long-run underperformance, 36-month equal-
weighted CAR is used as the dependent variable whereas the underpricing (UP) and hot 
activity period (Hot) are considered as the X-variables. Aftermarket risk level of the IPO 
(Risk), issue proceeds (OSize), offer price to book value (P/BV), post issue promoters‟ 
holding (PIPH) and technology & communications, engineering and other industries are 
considered as the Q-variables. Table 6.11 describes the estimation results of basic model 
including with and without Z-variables. Regression III shows that the OSize, PIPH, 
technologies & communication and engineering industries are significant determinants while 
Risk, P/BV and Other have insignificant effect from the Q-variables. Negative relationship 
of LDel is observed contrary to earlier finding opposing to ex-ante uncertainty hypothesis. 
Then Mkt_ret is inversely proportion to underperformance which is contrasting earlier 
result. EPS, FinLev ROA and Mkt_vol are showing positive relationship with 
underperformance.  
 Regression IV reports that both the X-variables (UP and Hot) are statistically 
significant. Hot activity period is influenced negatively long-term underperformance and 
significant at 1% level. This finding supports the window of opportunity hypothesis 
(Helwege and Liang, 2004). Flotation of IPOs during hot activity period produces less 
aftermarket return which results to inflate long-term underperformance (Sahoo and Rajib, 
2010). Except P/BV, all the variables are significantly affecting long-run underperformance 
from the Q-variables. The coefficient of Risk is positively related to underperformance 
showing that higher risk in post-IPO pricing behavior caused higher underperformance 
(Sahoo and Rajib, 2010). The coefficient of OSize is negatively significant at 10% level  
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 Table 6.11 
Estimation results of benchmark models – CAR as dependent variable 
Regression With Z-variables (III)  Without Z-variables (IV) 
    
Constant 4.5150 (2.17)
*
  1.9736 (1.57) 
 
   
X-variables    
   UP -0.3399 (-1.21)  -0.3535 (1.69)* 
    
   Hot -0.3670 (-1.66)  -0.4085 (-1.99)* 
    
Q-variables    
   Risk 4.6194 (1.59)  4.7291 (2.18)
**
 
    
   OSize -0.2261 (-2.21)
**
  -0.1395 (-2.07)
**
 
    
   P/BV -0.2026 (-1.32)  -0.1263 (-0.90) 
    
   PIPH 1.2925 (2.63)
**
  1.3331 (4.09)
***
 
    
   Technology and Communications 0.8516 (1.99)
*
  0.6258 (3.13)
***
 
    
   Engineering 1.2358 (2.00)
*
  0.9486 (5.84)
***
 
    
   Other -0.5275 (-1.21)  -0.4636 (-1.88)
*
 
    
Z-variables    
   Ldel -0.3305 (-1.60)   
    
   LT -0.4672 (-0.51)   
    
   FSize 0.0051 (0.28)   
    
   Sub -0.0198 (-1.03)   
     
   Age -0.0410 (-0.35)   
    
   Mkt_ret -0.2020 (-0.33)   
    
   Mkt_vol 0.4236 (0.02)   
       
   EPS 0.0092 (0.37)   
    
   ROA 3.0404 (1.32)   
    
   FinLev 0.4789 (1.12)   
    
   OPrice 0.0641 (0.22)   
    
   Cement 0.0347 (0.08)   
    
   Banks 0.3990 (0.94)   
    
   Other financial institutions 0.5326 (1.41)   
    
   Fuel and energy 0.2141 (0.57)   
    
   Chemicals 0.3767 (0.90)   
    
   Textiles -0.1445 (-0.36)   
    
Adj. R
2
 0.2322  0.2888 
R
2
 0.4565  0.3607 
F-value  2.04
**
    5.02
***
 
    
 
The table presents estimated results of the benchmark models with all Z-variables (regression I) and without Z-variables 
(regression II) using 90 IPO issued on KSE from 1995 to 2010. Dependent variable is three-year equal-weighted buy-
and-hold abnormal returns adjusted sized matching-firm in both regressions. Independent variables are defined as 
follows: UP = underpricing, FinLev = financial leverage, Age = age of the firm, Sub = oversubscription, PSO = 
proportion of shares offered, Industry = industry a dummy variable (i.e. technology & communications, textiles, banks, 
other financial institutions, engineering, chemicals, fuel & energy, cement and other), Ldel = listing delay, LT = long-
term investment ratio, FSize = size of the firm, Risk = aftermarket risk level of the IPO, Hot = a dummy variable taking 1 
for IPOs issued in hot activity period and 0 otherwise, Mkt_return = market return, Mkt_vol = market volatility, EPS = 
earnings per share, ROA = rate of return on assets, P/BV = offer price to book value, Osize = issue proceeds and OPrice 
= offer price. The t-values are shown in parentheses.  ***, ** and * represent significance level at the 1, 5 and 10% 
respectively.  
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supporting the ex-ante uncertainty hypothesis (Chong et al., 2010). This elaborates that large 
offer size require large size funds to be used for managing business activities as well as 
exploring new opportunities for effective management of funds resulting lower 
underperformance. The relationship between P/BV and underperformance is negative 
exhibiting overoptimistic growth for IPOs. PIPH and underperformance are positively 
correlated and significant at 1% level which is in contrast to earlier finding (Sahoo and 
Rajib, 2010). Small post issue promoters‟ holding reflects diversified ownership which may 
effectively manage the business activities reflecting lower underperformance. Affiliation 
with the technology & communication, engineering and other industries significantly 
influenced long-run underperformance.  
 To compare the results of regressions considering with and without Z-variables, it 
explains that applying statistical test economic theory does not provide a complete set of 
variables as to which are to be held constant. The EBA technique is more effective to obtain 
accurate results in identifying the explanatory variables.   
6.3.9.4 Results of Sensitivity Analysis  
Sensitivity analysis of X- and Q-variables is examined to inquire whether or not they 
are robust and fragile? Out of seventeen Z-variables, three are chosen as regressors in each 
regression – a total of 1,771 forms are tested. The objective of the sensitivity analysis is to 
identify variables being significant at 10%. The results of sensitivity analyses are reported at 
Table 6.12. The results of regression II show that underpricing, financial leverage, age of the 
firm, oversubscription and textile industry while in regression IV underpricing, hot activity 
period, aftermarket risk level, issue proceeds, post issue promoters‟ holding, affiliation with 
technology & communications, engineering and other industries are the robust variables in 
determining long-term underperformance.  
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 Table 6.12 
 Summary of EBA tests 
 
Sign 
Regression II Regression IV 
 Robust/ Fragile 
    
X-variable    
   Underpricing – Robust Robust 
   Financial leverage + Robust - 
   Hot activity period –  - Robust 
    
Q-variable    
   Age of the firm – Robust - 
   Oversubscription + Robust - 
   Proportion of shares offered – Fragile - 
   Technology and Communication – Fragile Robust 
   Textiles – Robust - 
   Aftermarket risk level of IPO + - Robust 
   Issue proceeds – - Robust 
   Offer price to book value – - Fragile 
   Post issue promoters‟ holding + - Robust 
   Engineering + - Robust 
   Other – - Robust 
    
Weighted R
2
  0.1703 0.2909 
Weighted Alpha  0.0690 2.3967 
    
 
The robustness of the variables is assumed at the significance level of 10%.   
 
6.4 Summary and Conclusions 
The long-term IPO performance was investigated over the period of three-years after 
listing from January 1995 to December 2010. A sample of 90 IPOs were chosen to measure 
abnormal returns using the event- and calendar-time approaches to detect abnormal 
performance. The level of underperformance identified using the adjusted benchmark index 
is higher when compared against the size-based matched firm approach. The findings of the 
Fama-French three factor model and the Carhart four factor models confirm the evidence of 
long-run underperformance over 36-month period. 
This study also uses the EBA technique to identify the robust predictors of long-term 
underperformance. The following determinants of long-term underperformance are found in 
terms of the equal-weighted BHAR: (a) Underpricing, (b) Financial leverage, (c) Age, (d) 
Oversubscription and (e) Textile industry. In addition, the study identifies the robust 
predictors of long-run underperformance using the equal-weighted CAR, which are: (a) 
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Underpricing, (b) Hot activity period, (c) Aftermarket risk level of the IPO, (d) Issue 
proceeds, (e) Post issue promoters‟ holdings, (f) Technology & Communication, (g) 
Engineering and (h) Other industries. The empirical findings support the argument that the 
results are consistent with the fads hypothesis, the ex-ante uncertainty hypothesis, and the 
window of opportunity hypothesis, which explicitly states that the enthusiasm for investing 
in new issues reduces as time progresses. 
In conclusion, the Pakistani IPOs underperformed their respective benchmarks over 
three-year period of which the results are highly sensitive to the techniques used to detect 
abnormal performance.  
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CHAPTER 7 
 
IPO PRICING: GROWTH RATE IMPLIED IN OFFER PRICES 
 
7.1 Introduction 
In the life of a firm, a vital landmark is to go public. However, it is difficult as to 
how to determine the offer price of the new issues? This is critical from the view point of 
investors to select the best IPO firms. Empirical studies argued that valuation of IPOs 
require a number of steps to be understood for participation purposes as far as investment 
decision is concerned. Earlier studies e.g., Chemmanur et al. (2009) and Kojima (2007) 
emphasized that private information provide institutions to find value of the firm excluding 
those not worth performing. Conversely, individuals face worse returns because they find 
difficult to compete institutions to measure the value of firm. The prime distinction is the 
availability and usage of public information exists between institutional and individual 
investors (Barber and Odean, 2008). More likely, institutions tend to participate in firms 
performing efficiently for attaining higher returns on their investments. According to Field 
and Lowry (2009), the difference in valuing the firms exists due to the fact that institutions 
have the resources to do their homework to find the true offer price whereas individuals 
construe the value of firm at their own.      
Empirical studies reveal that the DCF model is commonly used to estimate the IPO 
prices (Koller et al., 2005; Rossenboom, 2012). It is, therefore, imperative to inquire that at 
what rate IPO firms may expect to grow? Most importantly, IPO prospectus issued in 
Pakistan does not mention any method used for the valuation of a firm to determine the 
prices. In developing market, it is more crucial to determine the persistent growth in IPO 
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prices. The empirical analysis used 35 issues listed on the KSE from January, 1995 to 
December, 2008. By working backward, the reverse engineering discounted cash flow 
method is used to address the research question that implicit growth rate in free cash flow 
over the next 5 years (Cogliati and Paleari, 2011). It is an effective technique from the 
perspective of individual investors to estimate the growth rate without having availability of 
the private information. Like measuring the return considering market values and coupon 
payments of a bond, it is the same process. 
Recently, Cogliati and Paleari (2011) analyzed the growth is implied in offer prices 
using the data base of three European countries. In line with the analyses of Cogliati and 
Paleari, this study examines the ratio of growth used in offer prices of Pakistani IPOs. 
Firstly, the empirical results support the existence of IPO overvaluation (Purananadam and 
Swaminathan, 2004) and optimism in growth forecasts (Dechow et al., 2000). The results 
postulate that market implies to expect high growth. Secondly, on average, it is expected that 
cash flow grows by about ¼ annually for five-year. The results of ex-post realizations differ 
than ex-ante target of growth expectations. The median ex-post IPO growth rates are 11.5% 
over 5 years after the IPO. The difference between ex-ante expectations and ex-post 
realization occurs due to performance of firms after the issuance of IPOs. Thirdly, the post-
IPO performance over 3- and 5-year as well as its determinants are investigated using the 
EBA technique. The study further finds that IPOs underperform over the sample period and 
the robust predictors that affect long-run underperformance are: (a) short-term implied 
growth rate, (b) market momentum, (c) firm‟s age, and (d) size of the firm. Finally, the 
determinants of estimation errors‟ are also examined which include: (a) P/E, (b) 
124 
 
participation, (c) market momentum, (d) financial leverage, (e) age of the firm, and (f) 
dilution.  
 
7.2 Empirical Methodology 
 This study investigates that at what rate the growth is implied in offer price? To 
estimate the growth rate, the reverse engineering DCF model (Cogliati and Paleari, 2011) is 
used. The post-IPO performance is examined by BHAR over 3- and 5-year. To examine the 
factors that influence long-run abnormal IPO performance and estimation errors, the EBA 
technique is employed.  
7.2.1 Reverse Engineering Discounted Cash Flow Model 
Following the methodology of Cogliati and Paleari (2011), this study estimates the 
expected growth rate implied in offer price using a reverse-engineering DCF model. This 
method is alike up to some extent to measure the interest rate on a bond considering coupon 
payments and market values as well. While estimating the growth rate, a number of firm-
specific factors are accounted for. Cogliati and Paleari followed a similar methodology for 
prior accounting studies, e.g., Ohlson (1995) and Feltham and Ohlson (1995) emphasize that 
inverse the residual income valuation method to get estimates of the proposed return on 
stocks investment. Assuming that in the beginning, the market may expect high growth rate 
as most of the IPO firms are young but have small accounting information to the general 
public. Cogliati et al. emphasized to analyze the short-term growth until the firm may take 
competitive advantages. Empirical studies (e.g. Cassia et al., 2004) pointed out that 
estimating cash flow growth in short-run is complex.  
In line with the model as developed by Cogliati and Paleari (2011), the growth 
expectation is illustrated as under: 
 IPO    
    IPO
        pre
 [
    1          
T        2      1    
        T
]   
 IPO
   pre
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Equation (7.1) posits that any bias in the other factors may affect the first-stage 
growth rate (g1), an undefined estimator and function of other firm specific variables. The 
notation used in the reverse engineering DCF model is presented in Table 7.1. Following 
three firm-level variables are always reported in the IPO prospectuses of firms going public: 
(1) Offer price (ρIPO); 
(2) Existing shares before IPO (NSHpre); 
(3) Outstanding debt prior to IPO (DIPO); 
The two variables are estimated through IPOs prospectus and financial statements as: 
(4) Firm Free Cash Flow before IPO (FFCFIPO); 
(5) Weighted Average Cost of Capital (WACC); 
The other variables assumed are: 
(6) Length of the first stage typically is a five year forecast. T = 5 years assumed 
        for all firms; and 
 
(7) Long-term growth rate (g2) is a stable growth construed as constant after the   
        end of first stage. 
 
Table 7.1 
Notation used in the reverse-engineered DCF model 
Notation Explanation  
 
EVIPO Enterprise value at IPO = EIPO + DIPO – CIIPO  
  
EIPO Equity value at IPO price =  ρIPO . (NSHpre + NSHnew) 
  
DIPO Outstanding debt prior to the IPO 
  
CIIPO Cash inflow of subscribed shares at the IPO = ρIPO . NSHnew 
  
FFCFIPO Firm Free Cash Flow before the IPO 
  
WACC Weighted Average Cost of Capital 
NSHpre Number of existing shares before the IPO 
  
NSHnew Number of newly issued shares 
  
g1 First stage growth rate (extra growth)  
  
g2 Second stage growth rate (stable growth) 
  
T Duration of the first stage 
  
ρIPO Offer price = (EVIPO – DIPO) / NSHpre 
  
υIPO Fair price = (EV – DIPO)/NSHpre 
  
EEi,j Estimation Error for firm j in year i 
  
O.V.I. Over-valuation index = (ρIPO –  IPO) / ρIPO 
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The valuation variables are estimated as: 
1. FFCF Firm Free Cash Flow (FFCF) is calculated as: 
 
                                                         
                                                      
 
2. WACC Weighted Average Cost of Capital (WACC) is measured as: 
 
        
 IPO
 IPO   IPO
   E   
 IPO
 IPO   IPO
  D 
 
where outstanding debt (DIPO) and market values of equity (EIPO) are obtained from the 
IPO prospectus and the KSE-100 Index database respectively. KE is the cost of equity 
capital computed by Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM): KE = rf   βE(rm – rf) where rf 
= risk-free rate, rm = market return measured as the cumulative market return for the 6-
month period ending prior to listing day, βE = firm‟s levered beta
7
 and KD = cost of 
debt.(1-tc). The corporate income tax rate is denoted by tc.  
 
3. T For all firms the first stage is assumed as constant equals 5 years. 
 
4. g2 A nominal long-term growth rate for all firms assumed as constant equals 4%. It 
is estimated using the historical growth of real GDP in Pakistan
8
. 
 
 
Following the IPO, the expected cash flows for each firm j in individual years i are 
estimated depending on the availability of information (Eq.7.1). Therefore, ex-ante 
underwriters‟ expectations are compared to actual ex-post values through Estimation Errors 
(EEi,j),  determined by expected minus actual cash flows divided by expected cash flows 
(Eq.7.2).   
 
 
    [       ]                       
                                                                                    
 
 
        
                 
            
                 
 
                                                                                                        
                                                          
7
 Betas are computed after IPO trading of 250 days excluding first 21 days to avoid a potential bias. Betas are estimated 
using ex-ante information. 
8
 The true worth of a firm‟s stock is estimated using nominal cash flows at nominal rate. It is assumed that discount rate, 
inflation rate and real growth rate are constant during second stage. Both the methods are similar in nature. When inflation 
is higher, its nominal cost of equity will be higher -- nominal growth rate will also be higher. According to Ritter and Warr 
(2002), the results of valuation are distorted if investors are using nominal discount rate but are unable to incorporate a 
higher nominal growth rate. In the analysis, WACC is a nominal amount, therefore, future values are discounting more 
when inflation is found higher than expected. In general, IPOs firms don‟t outperform in the long-run as they are matured 
and growth rate thereof may approach to their competitors. Thus, it is avoided to consider a higher steady state perpetual 
growth (g2) for a particular firm (Damodaran, 2006). Long-term assumption (g2 = 4%) is assumed as constant for all the 
sample firms.    
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  This issue can be further investigated by comparing the offer prices (PIPO) to fair 
value estimates. Cogliati and Paleari (20111) argued the fair value at the IPO (υIPO) using the 
reverse-engineering DCF model but with actual ex-post realizations of the cash flow over 
five-year rather than pre-IPO cash flow
9
. Long-term growth rate (g2) is similar for all firms. 
Over Valuation Index is the difference between actual IPO prices (PIPO) and fair values 
estimated using ex-post actual FFCF(υIPO), divided by IPO prices. 
 
                    10    
           
    
                                                                                          
 
  To estimate the growth rate as well as Compound Annual Growth Rate (CAGR) over 
five years, two hypotheses are tested:  
  Hypothesis 1: 
  H0: Growth rate implicit in IPO price 
  H1: Growth rate does not implicit in IPO price 
  Hypothesis 2: 
  H0: CAGR is positive over five years but negative in first year 
  H1: CAGR is not positive over five years  
 
7.2.2 Long-term IPO Performance  
When the estimated growth in cash flow is higher than its actual realization; it is 
important to determine whether such bias in implied growth may indicate an opportunity to 
earn profit for investors, for instance, investigate the underperformers‟ ex-ante. This section 
examines whether estimation errors and implied growth are correlated with post-IPO 
                                                          
9
 “Fair value” is defined as actual ex-post realizations of cash flows over 5 years. It is argued that cash flow determined by 
underwriters‟ at the IPO may have been perfectly fair based on the availability of data with regard to growth prospects at 
that time. 
10
   PIPO  =  EVIPO – DIPO       
                     NSHpre 
     υIPO  =  EVIPO 
actual FFCF – DIPO  
                            NSHpre  
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returns. Following the Loughran and Ritter (1995), BHAR is used to examine the 
aftermarket performance of IPOs computed for firm i at time period T as: 
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where Ri,t represents the return of stock i at time t and Rm,t indicates the return on benchmark 
index (KSE-100). To determine the market adjusted normal returns
11
, the corresponding 
KSE-100 Index is used as benchmark for each IPO firm. n denotes number of IPOs. The 
hypothesis is tested as follow: 
  Hypothesis 3: 
H0:   BHAR = 0 
H1:     BHAR ≠ 0 
 
7.2.3 Determinants of Long-term IPO Performance 
Earlier research argued that post-IPO performance depends on the number of firms 
as well as offer-specific characteristics (Chan at al., 2008). To examine the long-run 
performance, it is imperative to select variables available to any investors relating to firm 
and offer quality. While measuring performance, control variables include age and size of 
the firm. However, in absence of these variables the underwriters may find difficulty to 
value these issues (Field and Lowry, 2009).  
                                                          
11
 To circumvent the potential bias from the price stabilization period of the underwriters, it is, therefore, excluded first 21 
trading days after issuance of IPO.  
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Prior research also ascertained a number of factors that caused long-term 
performance, i.e. leverage (Sahoo and Rajib, 2010), underpricing (Ritter, 1991, Kooli, L‟her 
Suret, 2006), dilution of shareholding (Leland, 1997) and external factor such as market 
momentum (Carhart, 1997). The estimation of cash flow is one of the major factors in 
valuing new issues. It is expected to generate errors in this variable which is an important 
determinant of long-run performance.  
 To determine the robust predictors of post-IPO performance, Extreme Bounds 
Analysis (EBA) is used (Leamer, 1983 and 1985). This technique analyzes the sensitivity 
and robustness of the control variables. In addition, it reduces the model uncertainty while 
selecting variables (Leamer and Leonard, 1983). The EBA technique can be described in the 
form of linear regression as: BHARi =     + 

n
j 1
      +     + 

m
j 1
          εi. where X is a 
fixed variable, Q is the variable of interest and Z is a potentially important variable. This 
method identifies the robust variables that maintain the same sign as well as significant in 
the exercise of exhaustive regressions otherwise it is a fragile variable. 
 The possible determinants of post-IPO performance are presented in the following 
equation (7.6): 
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where  
g1        – The short-term growth rate (g1) implicit in offer prices obtained from the 
reverse engineering DCF model;   
   
Momentum – Market momentum measured as KSE-100 index return over 6-month prior to 
listing; 
   
EEi,j – Estimation Error (EEi,j) is calculated as: 
 
        
                 
            
                  
 
   
Leverage – Book value of debt / book value of equity prior to IPO; 
   
Underpricing – First day market adjusted stock return; 
   
Dilution – A ratio between new shares and pre-IPO shares; 
   
Participation – A ratio between disposal of existing shares and number of pre-IPO shares; 
   
Age – Natural log of one plus the firm‟s age – IPO year minus establishment year; 
   
B2M + Book to market (B2M) = book value of equity plus capital inflow at IPO / 
market value; and 
   
Size – Logarithm of pre-IPO sales (PKRm). 
   
 
 
 It is hypothesize that EE will be inversely affecting BHAR if investors employ cash 
flow expectations that are implicit in IPO valuations. The estimation of underwriters‟ if 
becomes inaccurate, IPO prices then adjust accordingly. To find the determinants using 
BHAR, ten explanatory variables are used. Of these, two are X-variables selected as fixed 
for use in each regression while Q and Z variables are selected from rest of eight variables. 
The robustness of the Q-variable is examined from eight variables giving in total 560 
regressions.  
7.2.4 Determinants of Estimation Errors 
In the wake of growth rate, can investors‟ ex-ante identify the extent of bias? To 
examine the determinants of estimated errors scaled at the difference between actual and 
estimated cash flows, the possible explanatory variables are written in the following form:  
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All the variables are explained above except P/E i.e. the ratio of market price and 
earnings per share. The sensitivity and robustness of the explanatory variables are examined 
through the EBA technique.  
The sample consists of 92 fixed priced IPOs issued on the KSE during the period 
from January, 1995 to December, 2008. It excludes financial firms covering banks, 
insurance, leasing, modaraba, mutual funds, etc. Privatized IPOs are also excluded due to 
the reason that political objectives may distort the sample. The following filters are used as: 
(1) The pre-IPO FFCF was positive (losing 8 IPOs), and (2) Availability of cash flows for 5 
years after the IPO (losing 10 IPOs). The final sample covers 35 IPOs for which inverse the 
DCF model is used.  
 
7.3 Empirical Findings 
7.3.1 Implied Growth Rates and Estimation Errors 
  This section investigates that at what rate IPO firms are expected to grow? The 
reverse engineering DCF model (Eq. 7.1) is used to assess the growth embedded in IPO 
price. Table 7.2 reports the results of short-term implied growth rates and forecast errors. It 
is found that on average IPO firm, 25.5% is expected to grow per year during its first 5 years 
as a public company (14.1% in median). From the view point of underwriters‟ optimistic 
tendencies, it is argued that such growth rates implied by IPO prices are higher than their 
actual realization. Cogliati and Paleari (2011) applied the reverse engineering DCF model 
using 184 IPOs and reported that IPO firms grew on average by 33.8% per year after 5 years 
(21.5% in median).    
  The median Compound Annual Growth Rate (CAGR1) of FFCF is -141.2% showing 
that most of the sample firms in the first year after listing incurred a negative cash flow. The 
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negative CAGR reflects the signal of intense investment behavior or market timing 
motivation to go public, for instance, the window dressing and signal jamming hypotheses. 
As the time goes on, IPO firms recover cash flows; therefore, the median CAGR is positive 
at 11.5% over 5 years (CAGR5). It is observed that actual growth rate is slightly lower than 
expected (g1 = 14.1% representing median value implied by offer price). In addition, actual 
cash flows of 46% firms are more than expected. Cogliati and Paleari (2011) reported the 
median CARG5 was 1.8% representing 36% firms having actual cash flows more than 
expected.      
 
Table 7.2 
Implied growth rates and forecast errors 
 Average 25th Median 75th Aggregate Std Dev 
       
g1 25.5 -6.1  14.1 43.8  48.3 
CAGR1 n.s. -517.3 -141.2 114.6 -421.3 805.2 
CAGR3 -50.1 -42.7 -10.2 54.3 -5.2 212.7 
CAGR5 -20.4 -18.3 11.5 37.4 15.4 114.9 
EE3 29.2 -61.4 52.0 89.5 51.5 211.1 
EE5 20.7 -112.3 18.8 94.6 19.9 263.8 
O.V.I. 68.6 27.6 80.6 93.8  69.4 
       
 
To estimate the reverse engineering DCF model, the sample covers 35 IPOs issued on KSE from 1995 to 2008. It 
describes: g1 = short-term implied growth rate, CAGR = actual post-IPO cash flows, EE = estimation error and O.V.I. = 
overvaluation indices. The result of CAGR1 is not reported due to negative FFCF1 in year 1 following the IPO. The values 
of aggregate CAGR are determined by adding the cash flows of IPO firms. Aggregate estimation errors are obtained by the 
difference between sum of estimated and actual cash flows divided by sum of estimated cash flows. All values are in 
percentages.  
 
Table 7.2 presents a median Estimation Error of 52.0% after 3 years of IPO (EE3) 
and 18.8% after 5 years (EE5). This finding supports the strong evidence of over-optimism 
in the DCF model employed by the underwriters. Cogliati and Paleari (2011) reported the 
median EE3 of 99.6% after 3 years and EE5 of 61.0% after 5 years. The aggregate values of 
estimation errors are almost the same (51.5% after 3 years) whereas it is 19.9% after 5 years. 
This indicates that investing in IPOs is not an appropriate strategy. It might be a losing 
133 
 
strategy but has the ability to cherry-pick concerns a lot. Thus, the benefit of rightly 
selecting the best IPO firms ex-ante is substantial.  
The results of Over-valuation Index are shown in Table 7.2. The middle firm is 
overvalued by 80.6% at its offering as compared to ex-post fair value. This overvaluation 
indicates the ex-post realized cash flows representing rightly skewed. Short-term implied 
growth rates, on the whole, are slightly higher reflecting higher values in the average 
estimation errors and overvaluation index. The observed differences i.e. 14.1% vs 11.5% are 
small and confirm the goodness of the assumptions as well as robustness of the model. 
Moreover, various robustness measures are performed to test the model (Eq. 7.1) as 
presented in Appendices 7.1, 7.2 and 7.3.  
In nutshell, it is concluded that the reverse engineering DCF model is an effective 
tool to estimate the expected growth rate implicit in offer price; even no valuation 
information is disclosed in the IPO prospectus.  
7.3.2 Long-term IPO Performance and Determinants 
  The long-term IPO performance is examined over 3- and 5-year using buy-and-hold 
market adjusted abnormal returns. The results reveal that IPOs underperform over 3- and 5-
year by 29.5% (t-statistic = -2.06) and 69.7% (t-statistic = -3.46) respectively whereby IPO 
stocks are not better off than benchmark index. It reflects that investors who participate on 
the offer price and keep IPOs up to 3- or 5-year obtain negative abnormal returns. This 
finding confirms that investment in Pakistani IPOs for a longer period is not beneficial. To 
circumvent the potential bias from the price adjustment period, the first 21 trading days are 
excluded. As a result, IPOs underperform by 22.8% (t-statistic = -1.65) and 61.7% (t-
134 
 
statistic = -3.93) over 3- and 5-year respectively thereby registering a decrease in abnormal 
returns by 7%.  
  The determinants of long-run underperformance are investigated using Extreme 
Bounds Analysis
12
. The preliminary regressions include the X-variables of BHAR
13
 i.e., 
short term implied growth rate (g1) and market momentum (Momentum) estimated by the 
Newey-West procedure (Newey and West, 1987). In both the equations, X-variables 
significantly influence the long-run underperformance. Without Z-variables, two regressions 
are tested to examine the robust predictors of long-run underperformance over 3- and 5-year. 
EE (estimation errors), Underpricing, Participation (the ratio of exiting shares to pre-IPO 
shares), Age (firm‟s age) and Size (sales of firm) are considered as the Q-variables.  
  Table 7.3 reports the results of estimation in regression I and II. The results report 
that the X-variables are significantly affecting the post-IPO returns over 3- and 5-year in 
both the regressions. The coefficient of short-term implied growth rate (g1) is significant 
negatively affecting long-run underperformance. This illustrates in long-run IPOs 
underperform less because higher growth implicit in offer price (Cogliati and Paleari, 2010). 
Market momentum is positively correlated with underperformance exhibiting KSE-100 
Index obtained higher returns relative to IPO firms thus, increasing the underperformance. 
Regression I describes that only Age is inversely and significantly correlated with long-run 
underperformance. This shows that matured firms perform better than younger firms and 
obtain higher returns which subsequently improve the financial performance thereby 
resulting lower underperformance (Brau et al., 2012). Other Q-variables include EE3, 
underpricing and participation which are insignificant in determining 3-year 
                                                          
12
 Under the EBA technique, ten explanatory variables are considered. Of these, two X-variables are fixed and the 
robustness of eight variables is tested using three Z variables giving 560 regressions in total. 
13
 Buy-and-hold abnormal return (BHAR) is measured over 3- and 5-year excluding the first 21 trading day. 
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underperformance. EE3 and long-run underperformance have positive relation but 
insignificant effect. This demonstrates that higher estimation errors will inflate short-term 
growth thereby resulting higher underperformance – contrary to earlier finding (e.g. Cogliati 
and Paleari, 2011). Underpricing is showing a positive relation which opposes the prior 
result. It may be interpreted that excessive mispricing occurs due to information asymmetry 
hypothesis and market is not correcting them lowering the underperformance. 
 
Table 7.3 
Estimation results of benchmark models without Z-variables 
 Descriptive statistics (I) BHAR year IPO + 3   (II) BHAR year IPO + 5  
      
Constant   0.4966 
  (1.90)
*
 
 -0.2552 
(-1.14) 
      
X-variables      
   g1 25.5% 
(14.1%) 
 -0.7988 
      (-2.47)
**
 
 -1.1804 
     (-2.22)
**
 
      
   Momentum  4.00% 
(4.74%) 
 1.2989 
      (3.23)
***
 
 1.8484 
     (3.10)
***
 
      
Q-variables      
   EE3 29.2% 
(52.0%) 
 0.0359 
                (0.66) 
 – 
      
   EE5 20.7% 
(18.8%) 
 –  -0.0210 
(-0.37) 
      
   Underpricing 32.7% 
(3.7%) 
 0.0881 
(0.52) 
 0.2532 
(1.51) 
      
   Participation 4.2% 
(0.0%) 
 2.0485 
(1.23) 
 0.8802 
(0.60) 
      
   Age 7.60 
(5.00) 
 -0.3960 
    (-2.74)
**
 
  
      
   Size 864.67 
(65.76) 
   -0.0712 
  (-1.98)
*
 
      
Adj. R
2
   0.2770  0.2301 
F-value     7.13
***
   4.89
***
 
      
 
The table presents the results of benchmark model without Z-variables covering 35 IPOs from 1995 to 2008 period. Two 
cross-sectional OLS regressions include: BHAR3y = α0   β1g1   β2Momentumi   β3EE3   β4Underpricingi + 
β5Participationi   β6Agei + ϵi and BHAR5y = α0   β1g1   β2Momentumi   β3EE5   β4Underpricingi   β5Participationi + 
β6Sizei + ϵi, where dependent variable is 3- and 5-year buy-and-hold market adjusted abnormal returns and independent 
variables include: g1 = short-term implied growth rate, Momentum = market momentum, EE = estimation errors, 
Underpricing = stock return on the first day of trading, Participation = the ratio of exiting shares to pre-IPO shares, Age = 
age of the firm at the IPO and Size = pre-IPO sales. The t-statistics are based on Newey-West HAC standard errors.  ***, 
** and * represent significance level at the 1, 5 and 10% respectively.  
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The coefficient of Participation is positively associated with the underperformance 
explaining that dilution of promoters‟ holding means diversified shareholding which is 
unable to manage the business activities and deteriorates financial performance. This finding 
corroborates the agency cost hypothesis.  
Regression II describes that only Size significantly affects 5-year underperformance 
from the Q-variable. It is argued that firms having higher sales reflecting more demand as 
well as prospective growth which may have lower underperformance. EE5 are negatively 
influenced underperformance but insignificant. The relation depicts negative reaction of the 
market towards disclosure of lower than expected cash flows illustrating investors are 
constantly evaluating the accuracy of pre-IPO estimates. As a result, investors are revising 
their expectation accordingly. Moreover, Underpricing and Participation are having 
insignificant effect. 
  Table 7.4 presents the results of the basic model with all Z-variables included. 
Among Z-variables, only book to market ratio (B2M) is significant negatively influencing 
underperformance over 3-year in regression III – contrary to earlier finding (Bonardo et al., 
2011). The negative relation posits that when book- relative to market-value of equity is 
higher showing the good financial position resulting lower underperformance. The 
coefficient of Size and Leverage is negatively influenced. Large size of sales indicates high 
demand of the products or services which ultimately lower the underperformance. High 
financial leverage describes availability of higher financing and utilization thereof in an 
effective manner may reduce the underperformance. Dilution positively affects the 
underperformance demonstrating that high ratio of issuance of shares to the general public 
leads to agency problems affecting financial performance. 
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Table 7.4 
Estimation results of benchmark models with all Z-variables 
  (III) BHAR year IPO + 3   (IV) BHAR year IPO + 5  
     
Constant  0.6915 
(1.85)
*
 
 -0.2712 
(-0.39) 
     
X-variables     
   g1  -0.8061 
(-2.26)
**
 
 -1.1708 
(-2.12)
**
 
     
   Momentum   1.2832 
(2.37)
**
 
 1.8823 
(2.43)
**
 
     
Q-variables     
   EE3  0.0456 
(1.30) 
 – 
     
   EE5  –  -0.0218 
(-0.32) 
     
   Underpricing  0.0694 
(0.50) 
 0.1398 
(1.35) 
     
   Participation  1.8759 
(0.63) 
 0.0526 
(0.02) 
     
   Age  -0.3163 
(-1.074) 
 – 
     
   Size  –  -0.0696 
(-1.03) 
     
Z-variables     
   Age  –  0.0478 
(0.11) 
     
   Size  -0.0148 
(-0.37) 
 – 
     
   B2M  -0.3878 
(-2.38)
**
 
 0.0917 
(0.29) 
     
   FinLev  -0.0518 
(-0.28) 
 -0.1046 
(-0.47) 
     
   Dilution  0.3065 
(0.93) 
 -0.2866 
(-0.55) 
     
Adj. R
2
  0.2380  0.1159 
F-value   9.90
***
  2.60
**
 
     
 
The table presents the estimation results of benchmark model with all Z-variables covering 35 IPOs issued from 1995 to 
2008 period. Two cross-sectional OLS regressions include all the variables reported above. The dependent variable is 3 
and 5-year buy-and-hold market adjusted abnormal returns in regression III and IV. The independent variables include: g1 
= short-term implied growth rate, Momentum = market momentum, EE = estimation errors, Underpricing = stock return 
on the first day of trading, Participation = the ratio of exiting shares to pre-IPO shares, Age = age of the firm at the IPO, 
Age = age of the firm at the IPO, Size = pre-IPO sales, B2M = book to market ratio, FinLev = financial leverage prior to 
IPO, and Dilution = the ratio between newly issued shares and number of pre-IPO shares. The t-statistics are based on 
Newey-West HAC standard errors.  ***, ** and * represent significance level at the 1, 5 and 10% respectively.  
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In regression IV, no variable is significant from the Z-variables. There is a positive 
relationship between firm‟s age and underperformance reflecting matured firms may take 
more risk while investing in new projects with the perspective to get higher returns. Due to 
riskiness of the projects, the stock returns may become volatile increasing the 
underperformance. B2M shows positive relation indicating increase in net worth of firm 
without taking future projects which may not increase the market price of shares inflating 
underperformance. Negative sign of dilution reflects diversified ownership involve in 
effective management of resources thereby reducing underperformance.  
  The sensitivity of the X- and Q-variables is examined to test whether these variables 
are robust or fragile? The purpose is to select those significant at 10% level. The results 
indicate that robust predictors of long-run IPO underperformance include: (a) short-term 
implied growth rate (g1), (b) market momentum, (c) age of the firm, and (d) size of the firm.  
7.3.3 Determinants of Estimation Errors 
Table 7.5 exhibits the results of the basic model without Z-variables (I and II). X-
variables include P/E and Participation. Q-variables include B2M, Momentum and Age in 
equation I and Momentum, Age, Dilution and Leverage in equation II. The results of 
regression I indicate that both X-variables are significantly influenced EE3. Participation is 
positively associated with estimation errors indicating that higher participation of diversified 
ownership may create agency problems thereby resulting higher estimation errors (Cogliati 
and Paleari, 2011). P/E and EE3 are negatively associated showing higher P/E reflects higher 
market price results lower estimation errors. Momentum is only significant at 10% level 
illustrating that high market momentum prior to IPO leads to increase in estimation errors --- 
contrary to earlier finding describes higher the market momentum, higher the underpricing 
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 Table 7.5 
Estimation results of benchmark models without and will all Z-variables 
 Without Z-variables With all Z-variables 
 EE3 EE5 EE3 EE5 
 I II III IV 
X-variables     
   P/E -0.0597 
   (-2.21)
**
 
-0.1382 
 (-1.19) 
-0.0308 
(-1.16) 
-0.1199 
(-0.98) 
     
   Participation 7.4426 
    (3.69)
***
 
0.7383 
(0.20) 
7.8381 
     (3.06)
***
 
-0.427 
(-0.07) 
     
Q-variables     
   B2M -0.3431 
(-0.91) 
 -0.2053 
(-0.61) 
 
     
   Momentum -1.8449 
  (-1.92)* 
-1.8238 
(-1.48) 
-1.2274 
(-1.03) 
-1.4120 
(-1.31) 
     
   Age -0.2235 
 (-0.94) 
0.5898 
  (2.02)
*
 
0.1294 
(0.29) 
0.8926 
(1.25) 
     
   Dilution  1.6859 
  (1.74)
*
 
 1.6288 
(1.39) 
     
   Leverage  -0.524 
     (-2.29)
**
 
 -0.7527 
(-1.53) 
     
Z-variables     
   B2M    -0.0995 
(-0.42) 
     
   Dilution   -0.9727 
(-1.44) 
 
     
   FinLev   0.3110 
(0.80) 
 
     
   Underpricing   -0.0353 
(-0.10) 
0.0996 
(0.16) 
   Size   -0.1743 
(-1.17) 
-0.0870 
(-0.83) 
     
Constant 0.7190 
(1.22) 
-1.1502 
     (-2.98)
***
 
0.6049 
(0.93) 
-1.2554 
(-172) 
Adj. R
2
 0.1575 0.0562 0.1486 -0.0863 
F-value    4.10
***
 3.88
**
    5.38
***
 2.32
*
 
 
The table presents the estimation results of benchmark model without Z-variable (Regression I and II) and with all Z-
variables (Regression III and IV) covering 35 IPOs issued from 1995 to 2008 period. The dependent variable is 3- and 5-
year estimation errors. The independent variables include: P/E = price/ earnings ratio, Participation = the ratio of exiting 
shares to pre-IPO shares, B2M = book to market ratio, Momentum = market momentum, Age = age of the firm, Dilution = 
the ratio between newly issued shared and number of pre-IPO shares, Leverage = financial leverage prior to IPO, 
Underpricing = stock return on the first day of trading and Size = pre-IPO sales. The t-statistics are based on Newey-West 
HAC standard errors.  ***, ** and * represent significance level at the 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. 
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and lower the estimation errors. B2M and Age are insignificant variables. Regression II 
posits that both X-variables are insignificant while Age, Dilution and Leverage are 
significant factors to determine the estimation errors over 5-year from the Q-variable. Age is 
positively and leverage is negatively associated with EE5. Both the findings are in contrary 
to earlier results (Cogliati and Paleari, 2011). It reflects that matured firms may incur high 
estimation errors as they intentionally underprice their shares causing to inflate estimation 
errors. Dilution is positively affecting EE5 explaining that higher dilution may cause agency 
conflicts between management and shareholders that inflate estimation errors. When all Z-
variables are included, Table 7.5 reports the estimation results (Regression III and IV). In 
regression III, Participation is only significant from the X-variable while no variable is 
significant from the Z-variable over 3 years. However, no Q- or Z-variable is significant 
from regression IV.   
  The sensitivity results posit that P/E, Participation and Momentum are the robust 
determinants in regression I while Age, Dilution and Leverage are the robust variables in 
regression II which influence estimation errors. Other variables are treated as fragile 
variables. 
 
7.4 Summary and Conclusions 
To determine the value of the IPOs, a variety of models have been developed. Of 
these, the most popular is the Discounted Cash Flow model. In this study, reverse 
engineering DCF model (Cogliati and Paleari, 2011) has been used to infer the growth 
expectations implicit by offer price. Generally, high growth rates are compensated by 
excessive valuation because investors seemingly are overoptimistic in their evaluations 
(Loughran and Ritter, 1995). The distribution of realized future cash flows are rightly 
skewed depending on the estimation made by investors either to overestimate high profits 
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(right tail) or underestimate low profits (left tail). As a result, valuation of almost all IPOs 
becomes too high.   
  Covering a sample with positive FFCF on the Pakistan market from 1995-2008, it is 
estimated that growth rate in cash flows to be realized through offer price relative to bias of 
implied growth. To have persistence future growth, typical pricing is done by IPO firms so 
as to get the extreme expectations achieved. I found that cash flow of the average IPO firms 
is expected to grow by one-fourth annually over 5 years showing that actual CAGR of cash 
flows are lower than expected. „Fair value‟ is estimated by actual ex-post cash flow and 
found that median IPO firm is overvalued by 80%. This overvaluation is higher than the 
earlier studies e.g. Purnanadam and Swaminathan (2004) and Cogliati and Paleari (2011) 
which concluded that median estimates are overvalued by 50% and 74% respectively.  
The results of BHARs reveal that IPOs underperform over the period of 3- and 5-
year. To determine the influential predictors of long-run underperformance, Extreme Bound 
Analysis is used and found that short-term implied growth rate, market momentum, firm‟s 
age and size of sales are the significant factors. The robust determinants of estimation errors, 
thus, comprise P/E, participation, market momentum, leverage, age and dilution in the 
analysis. In addition, overvalued IPOs yield lower long-run return as compared to 
undervalued IPOs (Purnanadam and Swaminathan, 2004). Primarily, overestimation and 
desperation thereafter may lead to cause post-IPO underperformance. These results 
corroborate the divergence of opinion hypothesis (Miller, 1977) and the window of 
opportunity hypothesis (Loughran and Ritter, 1995).         
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Appendix 7.1 
Estimation by listing year, industry and operating FFCF 
 
Table: 7.7 
 IPOs g1 CAGR EE3 EE5 OVI 
       
Panel A: IPOs by year       
1995–2001  16 16.44 
(9.85) 
6.25 
(18.74) 
16.85 
(33.42) 
-54.12 
(-68.25) 
58.61 
(66.53) 
       
2002–2008 19 33.12 
(14.93) 
-42.87 
(6.69) 
39.64 
(59.53) 
83.76 
(81.32) 
76.97 
(85.34) 
       
       
Panel B: IPOs by industry       
Industrials 19 38.04 
(16.58) 
-29.84 
(14.44) 
24.24 
(52.03) 
33.16 
(38.30) 
65.20 
(61.50) 
       
Oil and Gas  6 14.52 
(4.62) 
35.67 
(32.82) 
-77.37 
(5.91) 
-156.82 
(-117.35) 
66.92 
(73.30) 
       
Technology & 
Communications 
 5 2.57 
(20.06) 
12.11 
(14.65) 
284.50 
(186.90) 
-11.15 
(9.46) 
33.10 
(81.69) 
       
Others  5 13.89 
(6.17) 
-84.41 
(-25.49) 
-79.18 
(-168.31) 
218.43 
(97.88) 
118.86 
(98.94) 
       
Panel C: IPOs by size (FFCFIPO)   
< PKR 15m  8 46.08 
(48.21) 
-12.02 
(9.41) 
102.36 
(37.08) 
140.53 
(68.84) 
44.39 
(70.90) 
       
PKR 15 – 100m  14 30.21 
(8.04) 
-7.39 
(12.59) 
-1.37 
(67.90) 
-72.27 
(-72.56) 
63.31 
(73.30) 
       
> PKR 100m 13 7.75 
(10.16) 
-39.60 
(11.46) 
17.17 
(40.10) 
47.15 
(18.80) 
89.13 
(82.44) 
       
 
The table summarizes short-term implied growth rates on the basis of offer price using reverse engineering DCF model. 
Sample is segregated by listing year, industry, and operating free cash flow prior to IPO. It reports mean and median values 
(in brackets). All values are percentages. From results, the median values can be looked. Underwriters‟ growth expectation 
(g1) is higher in most of cases relative to actual ex-post realization (CAGR of free cash flows). It is calculated by both the 
estimation errors (at 3 and 5 years) and overvaluation index. It can be seen that short-term implied growth rate is higher 
during 2002–2008 due to expanding business opportunities in Pakistani Market. Industrial sectors expected to have the 
highest growth as compared to the lowest growth in technological sector. Lastly, sample was divided into three FFCFIPO 
segments to examine the sensitivity of these indices to firm size. It is reported that firms with lower FFCFs before IPO are 
characterized by higher expectations (g1). Very low initial cash flows (FFCFIPO < PKR 15m) entail very high growth 
potential to justify a high IPO valuation. The expectations might be correct from the perspective of fast growing nature of 
small firms of which median CAGR is 9.41% as compared to median CAGR of 11.46% for the largest firms.  
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Appendix 7.2 
Estimation of Results by Offer Price and First Day Closing Market Price 
 
Table: 7.8 
 Average 25th Median 75th Aggregate SD 
       
Panel A: Estimations (short-term implied growth rate)    
       
g1 Offer 25.5 -6.1 14.1 43.8  48.32 
       
g1 Ist day 38.6 -4.3 25.9 54.3  67.44 
       
       
Panel B: Realisations (actual CAGR of FFCF)    
       
CAGR1 n.s. -517.3 -141.0 114.6 -421.3 805.23 
       
CAGR3 -50.1 -42.7 -10.2 54.3     -5.2 212.66 
       
CAGR5 -20.4 -18.3 11.5 37.4    15.4 114.90 
       
Panel C: Estimation errors     
EE3 Offer 29.2 -61.4 52.0 89.5   55.2 211.07 
       
EE3 Ist day 64.8 -32.8 69.0 97.4   66.7 172.15 
       
EE5 Offer 20.7 -112.3 18.8 94.6   31.6 263.75 
       
EE5 Ist day 22.0 -78.3 37.2 97.6  58.4 231.69 
       
Panel D: Over-valuation indices     
O.V.I. Offer 68.6 27.6 80.6 93.8   69.43 
O.V.I. Ist day 73.5 44.0 84.6 92.5   54.44 
       
 
The table presents short-term implied growth rates (Panel A), the actual post-IPO cash flows (Panel B), estimation errors 
(Panel C) and over-valuation indices (Panel D) using the reverse engineering DCF model. “Offer” refers the actual offer 
price and “Ist day” shows the first day closing market price. The values of aggregate CAGR are determined by adding the 
cash flows of IPO firms. Aggregate estimation errors are obtained by sum of estimated cash flows minus sum of actual cash 
flows divided by sum of estimated cash flows. All values are percentages. Generally, offer price is lower than the first day 
market price and the estimation results posit that average implied growth rate on the first day market price is 38.6% and 
20.7% refers to offer  prices.  
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Appendix 7.3 
Sensitivity Analysis of the Reverse Engineering DCF Model 
 
 A sensitivity analysis was conducted with several assumptions on these parameters so as to 
check the robustness and obtained similar results. When the reverse engineering DCF model is 
applied, short-term implied growth rate (g1) has the strongest impact on the estimates that involved 
long-term growth rate (g2) and T. g1 refers to the short term growth rate during the first 5 years while 
g2 is the long-term growth rate for years 6 onwards. The following table reports that long-term 
growth rates (g2) as well as T are higher; it results to decrease in short-term growth estimates (g1). 
However, the change in g2 and T, the main results are not affected in the analysis. 
  
                                       Table: 7.9 
g2 
T 
5 6 7 
    
3 25.91 
(14.42) 
23.92 
(12.55) 
22.69 
(11.24) 
    
4 25.49 
(14.11) 
23.60 
(12.48) 
22.38 
(11.00) 
    
5 25.13 
(13.80) 
23.24 
(12.02) 
22.08 
(10.77) 
    
 
Table shows the results of average and median (in brackets) 
short term implied growth using the reverse engineering DCF 
model (Eq. 7.1) with different values of g2 and T.  
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CHAPTER 8 
 
SUMMARY, CONCLUSION, AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
8.1 Introduction 
 This chapter reviews the findings of the analyses conducted in the prior chapters and 
summarizes the conclusions drawn. Further, I discussed the implications of the analyses for 
shareholders, managers and market participants and recommendations thereon are 
suggested.  
 
8.2 Interpretation of Findings 
 This section attempts to integrate the findings of the results by conjectured 
relationship described in the literary review. The results are interpreted in the following 
order: (a) short-term and intermediate IPO performance, (b) long-term IPO performance, (c) 
identification of factors that influence short-term, intermediate and long-term performance, 
and (d) growth rate implied in offer price.   
8.2.1 Short-term and Intermediate IPO Performance 
 The important question I addressed to answer in this section of the analysis is 
whether IPOs obtained initial abnormal returns? Researchers have previously documented 
that abnormal performance is significantly positive on the initial trading day. I analyzed 
short-term IPO performance over the period of 15-trading days and found that on average, 
IPOs significantly earned initial abnormal return of 15.33% -- the magnitude of underpricing 
is relatively lower than other emerging markets. At the end of 15-trading day, investors 
significantly obtained average return of 11.86%. A few studies have investigated whether 
investors earn abnormal returns over the one-month period? (Sohail and Rehman, 2010; 
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Alagidee and Heerden, 2012). In extension of earlier studies, I analyzed intermediate 
performance over the period of 6-month starting from the first month and found that IPOs 
earned significant abnormal returns of 9.74% and 6.52% at the end of first and second 
month of trading respectively but no evidence is found thereafter. By segregating the sample 
into two sub periods i.e. 1995–1998 and 2000–2011, lower underpricing was found during 
1995–1998 which reduced overall underpricing level. In addition, it is argued that short-term 
and intermediate IPO performance support the underwriter‟s prestige hypothesis and the 
investors‟ sentiments hypothesis but not the ex-ante uncertainty hypothesis.  
8.2.2 Long-term IPO Performance 
 The academic community has reviewed analyses of long-term IPO performances 
critically. However, the skeptics have not been unreasonably critical, methodological 
problems and a lack of integrated analyses of various components of long-term performance 
quandary have been lacking. In the Pakistani market, Sohail and Nasr (2007) found the 
significant underperformance of -38.4% using BHAR and -19.7% returns employing CAR 
methodology. In another study, Rizwan and Khan (2007) found underperformance of -
23.7% over two-year period. Both these studies used benchmark index to detect abnormal 
performance. In my view, Barber and Lyon (1997) and Lyon et al. (1999) provided the best 
methods to model normal performance in event studies. Barber and Lyon (1997) spent a 
great deal of time extensively discussing biases pertaining to methods used to measure 
abnormal performance and pointed out that all of these were overcome when using the 
matched-firm approach. In the hypothesis test, I used matched-firm approach developed on 
the basis of market capitalization and benchmark index (KSE-100) to measure abnormal 
performance. Both the event- and calendar-time approaches predicted the existence of 
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underperformance over the period of three-year. The results of equal-weighted BHAR 
adjusted for matched-firm index and benchmark index suggested that IPOs significantly 
underperformed by -24.2% and -48.9% respectively. Likewise, the results of equal-weighted 
CAR adjusted for sized based matched-firm index and benchmark index postulated that 
IPOs significantly underperform by -23.2% and -36.3% respectively. Using the value-
weighted sized based matched-firm BHAR, short-run underperformance is found in the first 
two-months but not thereafter but considering the benchmark index, IPOs underperformed 
by -65.6% over the sample period. The results of the value-weighted CARs adjusted for 
matched-firm index and benchmark significantly underperformed by -23.2% and -51.4% 
respectively. The results of the Fama-French and the Carhart models predicted significant 
underperformance over three-year period. To summarize, the findings of the analyses argued 
that long-term IPO performance relied upon the methodologies through which abnormal 
performance was detected. 
8.2.3 Determinants of Short-, Intermediate- and Long-Term IPO Performance  
 To find the determinant factors that influence the short-, intermediate and long-term 
performance, I used the EBA technique. This technique identifies the robust predictors of 
the dependent variable and reduces the chances of model uncertainty. The determinants of 
short-term IPO performance were examined on the first and fifteen trading days and the 
findings revealed that robust factors include: (a) oversubscription, (b) after market risk level 
of IPO, (c) rate of return on assets, (d) offer price, and (e) percentage of shares offered. The 
determinants of intermediate IPO performance were investigated on third and six month of 
trading and found that only oversubscription and rate of return are the robust predictors. To 
investigate the determinants of long-term underperformance over three-year the equal-
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weighted sized based matched-firm index BHAR and CAR are used. The results postulated 
that: (a) underpricing, (b) financial leverage, (c) age of the firm, (d) oversubscription, and 
(e) textile industry were the robust variables in case of BHAR methodology. When the CAR 
technique is used, I found (a) underpricing, (b) hot activity period, (c) aftermarket risk level 
of the IPO, (d) issue proceeds, (e) post issue promoters‟ holding, and (f) affiliation with 
technology and communication, engineering and other industries were the significant factors 
in explaining long-term underperformance.  
8.2.4 Growth Rate Implicit in Offer Prices 
 To examine the growth rate implicit in IPOs prices, the reverse engineering DCF 
model is used (Cogliati and Paleari, 2011) which is based on two stages: (a) first stage as 
„extra growth‟ and (b) second stage as „constant growth‟. Following a similar methodology, 
this study found that IPOs are overvalued at their offer prices illustrating that average IPO 
firm grew by 25.5% per annum over 5-years --- consistent with earlier findings where 
average IPO firm grew by 33.8% per year (Cogliati and Paleari, 2011). The median 
compound annual growth rate was 11.5% over 5-years describing actual growth rate 
marginally lower than expected. In addition, the evidence of over-optimism is found in the 
estimation errors. While analyzing the overvaluation index, it is found that median IPO firm 
is overvalued by 80.6%. In nutshell, it is concluded that growth rate implied in Pakistani 
IPOs. By working backward, the reverse engineering DCF model is more effective to value 
IPOs. The factors that caused long-term IPO underperformance comprise: (a) short-term 
implied growth rate (g1), (b) market momentum, (c) firm‟s age, and (d) size of sales. In 
addition, it was determined that factors influencing estimation errors include: (a) price-
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earnings ratio, (b) participation, (c) market momentum, (d) leverage, (e) age, and, (f) 
dilution.  
 
8.3 Implications for Shareholders, Managers and Market Participants 
 This section contains the findings pertaining to abnormal performance of IPOs and 
the concepts of market efficiency. A few relations are visible but in some instances these are 
invisible. This section covers: (a) short-term IPO performance, a factor that increases the 
income disparity, (b) hidden problems related to market efficiency, i.e., abnormal IPO 
performance provides evidence that markets are inefficient.  
8.3.1 Short-term IPO Performance and Income Disparity 
 To reiterate the finding on the listing day, IPOs generate 15.33% abnormal return on 
the initial day of public trade. This describes that investors will earn the highest return on 
listing day. Though the role of underwriter syndicate is complicated as it discretionally 
allocate the shares ignoring the prime role meant to create interest in the offering.  It 
provides an argument for the promoters of the offerings where investors yield higher returns 
as compared to average investors. In the backdrop of a mechanism, underwriting syndicate 
could use to transfer ownership of the firm‟s share these underwriters would refrain from 
using an alternative means to allocate the shares because a portion of their compensation is 
their ability to generate and sustain interest in the issue. However, the Dutch auction process 
is an efficient means to allocate shares and provides the underwriter and the firm with an 
approximate fair-value at the time of issuance without offering discounts on price of the 
issue. Nevertheless, this method of issuance has not become the standard being complex in 
nature.  
150 
 
 It is concluded that the economic opportunity should be the same in cross section of 
people to achieve the equivalence at all level. The Dutch auction process appears to be a 
good proposition of this problem.  
8.3.2 Chinks in the Armor of Market Efficiency 
 Empirical studies emphasized on identifying abnormal performance of IPOs leading 
to EMH lying somewhere in between the weak and semi-strong forms of the hypotheses. 
Performances obtained prior to public trading have nothing to do with discrediting market 
efficiency but if researchers consider that companies issue these newly issued shares at or 
above their intrinsic value, when compared against their peers they may find question the 
efficiency of the issuance process. Purnanandam and Swaminathan (2004) found that the 
strength of initial misvaluation of IPOs is excessively positive and the ensuing initial 
performance is greater than when IPOs are either appropriately valued or undervalued.   
 Should an efficient market understand when a systematic misvaluation occurs and 
correct this inefficiency rapidly? In longer-term analyses, IPOs underperform benchmarks 
by a substantial amount until either fourth or fifth year. Should it take four to five years for 
the market to adjust for an initial misvaluation of shares? Abnormal performances and 
misvaluations of substantial proportions found in short- and long-term analyses of IPO 
performance may be considered more than a chink in the armor but a significant 
deterioration in the quality and effectiveness the concept of market efficiency.  
8.3.3 Integration and Summary 
 I focused on two arguments developed in the prior section are very important 
elements of economic justice and understanding. We allow the markets to operate and an 
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unequal distribution of economic outcomes throughout the population. However, we have to 
ensure that every citizen has an equal opportunity to participate in economic activities.  
 In the global economy, investors are now search for information, the underwriting 
syndicate no longer requires to sell investors on a concept – investors can evaluate the 
information obtained in the prospectus and find if the issue may be included into their 
investment strategy. Market forces will commonly make a more accurate assessment of a 
firm‟s prospectus than a group of privileged investors or for that manner the underwriting 
syndicate. Floating shares to the general public, investors earn positive 15.33% abnormal 
returns between the offer and initial day trading. 
 To explain, why the actions taken by the underwriting syndicate encumber market 
efficiency? It elaborates: (a) choosy allocation of shares, and (b) determining a price without 
reference to market forces. The market efficiency questions are easier to address, researchers 
understand either the magnitude of an anomaly is significant enough to answer market 
efficiency. The researcher has different interpretations of the magnitude of the anomalies 
found in this analysis. Abnormal performance on the initial trading day, which still persists 
up to 2-trading month, followed by a 3-year period of adjustment to trend back towards 
normality, does not fit within the concept of market efficiency. A problem affecting both the 
investors and the firm results through the interference of underwriting syndicates‟ in price 
discovery providing unnecessarily the rapid nature of the dissemination information among 
all.  
 
8.4 Recommendations for Action 
 I propose one recommendation for action, that is, to let market control the process of 
initial public offerings. Let the market determine the initial value for the offering, stabilize 
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the price of the stock and select to deploy the valuable resources which presently interfere in 
the IPO market. The underlying assumption to uphold the current process is that the market 
requires creating demand for an IPO through some forces and subsequently requires a force 
to stabilize the prices after its issuance. To explain briefly as to why this process persists 
unlikely and who requires to demand the change in the system? Market forces are allowed to 
determine IPO prices which initially affects to issuers and underwriters in a negative 
manner. Preliminary, the underwriters overestimate the price of new issues as compared to 
similar non-issuing firms. They constrain to generate excess demand pushing up the price in 
the secondary market. 
 As issuers and underwriters have no incentive to change, there might be some other 
governing force requires to promote change in the financial markets. Legislative solutions 
are very seldom but the best way is to provoke change especially in a market system. In my 
opinion, free market would have to determine that the process for issuance of shares is 
inefficient and warrant essential changes. This implies that there is a need of exposure for 
better dispersions in a way to change the system most efficiently, though a difficult 
proposition from general public. The process in my view is an effective way to complete the 
most difficult task apparently from an average citizenship.   
 
8.5 Recommendations for Further Study 
 There are many prospective recommendations for future study that could naturally 
flow from the results; however, I would like to focus on the most important ones. Firstly, 
considering different firm characteristics to match-firm on the basis of market capitalization, 
book-to-market and industry affiliation, it might be more appropriate to detect abnormal 
performance. Secondly, determining the influential factors that affect short-, intermediate 
and long-term IPO performance, more explanatory variables may be added for obtaining 
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interesting results with the use of Extreme Bounds Analysis. Thirdly, estimating growth rate 
that implicit in IPO prices, the sample may be enhanced as the imposition of different filters 
reduces the size of the firms. Other suggestion for the researchers is to consider alternate 
method to examine the ratio of growth rate implied in IPO prices eventually overcoming the 
estimation errors. This may enable to test the validation and authentication of the results in 
line with reverse engineering DCF model. 
 
8.6 Conclusion 
 In this dissertation, I have (a) identified short-term and intermediate abnormal IPO 
performance as positive, (b) presented long-term abnormal IPO performance in the event- 
and calendar-time studies over the period of three-year, (c) shown factors that affect short-, 
intermediate and long-term IPO performance, and (d) found the growth implied in offer 
prices. The results of the analyses related to short-term performance revealed that on 
average investors obtained abnormal excess return of 15.33% on the listing day. If investors 
retain those IPOs they will make positive abnormal returns at the end of 2-month of trading 
but thereafter no evidence of abnormal returns exist. Abnormal performance over three-year 
period is examined using different methodological techniques whereby it found that long-
term performance depends on the techniques used to detect abnormal performance. 
However, the observed pattern of underperformance is not always statistically significant 
which leads to serious concerns on the concept of market efficiency. Using reverse 
engineering DCF method, it is determined that the cash flow is expected to grow by about ¼ 
every year over five-year. Further research needs to be conducted on some of the 
conclusions drawn and an alternative hypothesis to be framed to oust the idea of market 
efficiency.   
154 
 
References 
Abubakar, N.B. & Uzaki, K. (2012). A test of IPOs underpricing performance in Malaysian stock 
exchange. Paper presented at the Third Asian Business and Management Conference, Osaka, 
Japan. November 16-18, 2012. 
Adjasi, C. K. D., Osei, K. A. & Fiawoyife, E. U. (2011). Explaining underpricing of IPOs in frontier 
markets: evidence from the Nigeria stock exchange. Research in International Business and 
Finance 25, 255-265. 
Affleck-Graves, J., Hedge, S. & Miller, R. E. (1996). Conditional price trends in the aftermarket for 
initial public offerings. Financial Management 25(4), 25-40. 
Afza, T., Yousaf, H. & Alam, A. (2013). Information asymmetry, corporate governance and IPO 
underpricing. Science International (Lahore) 25(4), 989-997. 
Agathee, U. S., Sannassee, R. V. & Brooks, C. (2012). The underpricing of IPOs on the stock 
exchange of Mauritius. Research in International Business and Finance 26(2), 281-303. 
Agathee, U. S., Brooks, C. & Sannassee, R. V. (2012). Hot and cold IPO markets: The case of the 
Stock Exchange of Mauritius. Journal of Multinational Financial Management 22, 168-192. 
Agarwal, S., Liu, C. & Rhee, S. G. (2008). Investor demand for IPOs and aftermarket performance: 
evidence from the Hong Kong stock market. Journal of International Financial Markets, 
Institutions and Money 18(2), 176-190. 
Aggarwal, R., Rivoli, P. (1990). Fads in the initial public offering market? Financial Management 
19, 45-57. 
Aggarwal, R., R. Leal & L. Hernandex (1993). The aftermarket performance of initial public 
offerings in Latin America. Financial Management (Spring), 42-53. 
Ahmad-Zaluki, N. A., Cambill, K. & Goodacre, A. (2007). The long-run share price performance of 
Malaysian initial public offerings (IPOs). Journal of Business Finance and Accounting 
34(1), 78-110. 
Ahrend, R. (2012). Understanding Russian regions‟ economic performance during periods of decline 
and growth – an extreme bounds analysis approach. Economic Systems 36(3), 426-443. 
Aijo, J., Vahamaa, S. & Hal, T. (2014). Value versus growth in IPOs: new evidence from Finland. 
Research in International Business and Finance 31, 17-31. 
Alagidede, P. & Heerden G. V. (2012). Short run underpricing of initial public offerings (IPOs) in 
the Johannesburg Stock Exchange, Review of Development Finance 2, 130-138. 
Al-Deehani, T. M. (2005). The determinants of stock prices in Kuwait stock exchange: an extreme 
bounds analysis. Investment Management and Financial Innovation 3, 16-24. 
Alexander, S. S. (1961). Price movements in speculative markets: Trends or random walks. 
Industrial Management Review 2, 7-26 
Alqahtani, F. & More, V. (2012). Underpricing phenomenon in New Zealand IPO market. 
http://ssrn.com/abstract= 2215402  
Allen, D.E., Kingsbury, J, M- & Piboonthanakiat, W. (1999). The long-run performance of initial 
public offerings in Thailand. Applied Financial Economics 9, 215-232 
Ahrend, R. (2012). Understanding Russian regions‟ economic performance during periods of decline 
and growth – An extreme bounds analysis approach. Economic Systems 36, 426-443. 
Amihuda, Y., Hauserb, S. & Kirshc, A. (2003). Allocations, adverse selection and cascades in IPOs: 
Evidence from the Tel Aviv Stock Exchange. Journal of Financial Economics 68, 137-158 
Ang, J. S. & Zhang, S. (2004). An evaluation of testing procedures for long horizon event studies. 
Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting 23, 251-274. 
Avelino, R. G. R. (2013). The underpricing of Brazilian IPOs and the adjustment of public and 
private information. Rio de Janeiro 67(1), 3-23. 
Bachelier, L. (1900/1964). Theory of Speculation. In Cootner, P. H. (Eds), The Randam Character of 
Stock Market Prices (pp. 17-78). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press (1964).  
155 
 
Ball, R. & Brown, P. (1968). An empirical evaluation of accounting income numbers. Journal of 
Accounting Research, 159-178. 
Banerjee, S., Dai, L. & Shrestha, K. (2011). Cross-country IPOs: what explain differences in 
underpricing? Journal of Corporate Finance 17(5), 1289-1305.  
Barber, B. & J. Lyon (1997). Detecting long-run abnormal stock returns: The empirical power and 
specification of test statistics. Journal of Financial Economics 43, 341-372. 
Barber, B. & Odean, T. (2008). All that glitters: the effect of attention on the buying behavior of 
individual and institutional investors. Review of Financial Studies 21, 785–818. 
Belghitar, Y. & Dixon, R. (2012). Do venture capitalists reduce underpricing and underperformance 
of IPOs? Applied Financial Economics 22, 33-44. 
Berkman, H., Bradbury, M.E. & Ferguson, J. (2000). The accuracy of price-earnings and discounted 
cash flow methods of IPO equity valuation. Journal of International Financial Management 
and Accounting 11, 71-83. 
Bessler, W. & Thies, S. (2007). The long-run performance of initial public offerings in Germany. 
Managerial Finance 33(6), 420-441. 
Boissina, R. & Sentisb, P. (2014). Long Run Performance of IPOs and the role of financial analysts: 
some French evidence. European Journal of Finance 20(2), 125-149. 
Bonardo, D., Paleari, S. & Vismara, S. (2011). Valuing university-based firms: the effects of 
academic affiliation on IPO performance. Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice 35(4),  
755-776. 
Brown, S. J. & Warner, J. B. (1985). Using daily stock returns: The case of event studies. Journal of 
Financial Economics 14, 3-31. 
Borges, M.R. (2007). Underpricing of IPOs: The case of Portugal. International Advances in 
Economic Research 13, 65-80. 
Brau, J. C., Couch, R. B. & Sutton, N. K. (2012). The desire to acquire and IPO long-run 
underperformance. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 47(3), 493-510. 
Brav, A. & P. Gompers (1997). Myth or reality? The long-run performance of initial public 
offerings: evidence from venture and non-venture capital-backed companies. Journal of 
Finance 52, 1791-1821. 
Brav, A., C. Geczy & Gompers, P. A. (2000). Is the abnormal return following equity issuances 
anomalous? Journal of Financial Economics 56, 209-249. 
Brennan, M. J. & J. Franks (1997). Underpricing, ownership and control in initial public offerings of 
equity securities in the U.K. Journal of Financial Economics 45, 391-413. 
Bunyamin, ER (2012). The accuracy of price-earning ratio and discounted cash flow methods in 
predicting the offer price of IPO stocks. International Research Journal of Finance and 
Economics 97, 425-456. 
Cai, X., Liu, G. S. & Mase, B. (2008). The long-run performance of initial public offerings and its 
determinants: the case of China. Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting 30, 419-
432. 
Campbell, J. Y., Lo, A. W., MacKinlay, A. C. (1997). The econometrics of financial markets. 
Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 
Canina, I., R. Michaely, R. Thaler & K. Womack (1998). Caveat compounder: A warning about 
using daily CRSP equally-weighted index to compute long-run excess returns. Journal of 
Finance 53, 403-416. 
Carhart, M. (1997). On the persistence of mutual fund performance. Journal of Finance 52, 57-82. 
Carter, R. B. & Manaster, S. (1990). IPOs and underwriters reputation. Journal of Finance 45, 1045-
1067. 
Carter, R. B., Frederick, H.D.  & Singh, A.K. (1998). Underwriter reputation, initial returns and the 
long-run performance of IPO stocks. Journal of Finance 53(1), 285-311. 
Cassia L., Palcari, S. & Vismara, S. (2004). The valuation of firms listing on the nuovo mereato: the 
peer comparables approach. Advances in Financial Economics 10, 113-129. 
156 
 
Cassia, L., Giudici, G., Paleari, S. & Redondi, R. (2004). IPO underpricing in Italy. Applied 
Financial Economics 14, 179-194. 
Chahine, S. (2008). Underpricing versus gross spread: New evidence on the effect of sold shares at 
the time of IPOs. Journal of Multinational Financial Management 18, 180-196. 
Chambers, D. & E. Dimson (2009). IPO underpricing over the very long-run. Journal of Finance  
64, 1407-1443. 
Chan, K., Cooney, J.W., Kim, J. & Singh, A.K. (2008). The IPO derby: are there Consistent losers 
and winners on this track? Financial Management 37, 45–79.  
Chang, X., Gygx, A. F., Elaine, O. & Zhang, H. F. (2008). Audit quality, auditor compensation and 
IPO underpricing. Journal of Accounting & Finance 48(3), 391-416. 
Chemmanur, T., He & S. Hu, G. (2009). The role of institutional investors in seasoned equity 
offerings. Journal of Financial Economics 94, 384-411. 
Chen, S., Bangassa, K. & Brookfield, D. (2011). Long-Run Performance of Chinese Initial Public 
Offerings: Further Evidence. Asia-Pacific Journal of Financial Studies 40, 285-316. 
Cheng, W., Cheung, Y. L. & Po, K. (2004). A note on the intraday patterns of initial public 
offerings: evidence from Hong Kong. Journal of Business Finance and Accounting, 31(5-6), 
837-860. 
Chi, J., McWha, M. & Young, M. (2010). The performance and the survivorship of New Zealand 
IPOs. International Review of Financial Analysis 19, 172-180. 
Chong, T. T-L., Yuan, S. & Yan, I. K-M. (2010). An examination of the underpricing of H-share 
IPOs in Hong Kong. Review of Pacific Basin Financial Markets and Policies 13(4), 559-
582. 
Chi, J., Wang, C. & Young, M. (2010). Long-run outperformance of Chinese initial public offerings. 
The Chinese Economy 43(5), 62-88. 
Chorruk, J. & Worthington, A.C. (2010). New evidence on the pricing and performance of initial 
public offerings in Thailand, 1997-2008. Emerging Markets Review 11, 285-299. 
Chuanrommanee, W. & Boonchuaymetta, E. (2013). Management of the IPO performance in 
Thailand. Journal of Multinational Financial Management 23, 272-284. 
Cogliati, M. G. & Paleari, S. (2011). IPO pricing: growth rates implied in offer prices. Annals of 
Finance 7(1), 53-82. 
Conrad, J. & G. Kaul (1993). Long-term market overreaction or biases in computed returns? Journal 
of Finance 48, 39-63. 
Cooley, T. F. & LeRoy, S. F. (1981). Identification and estimation of money demand. American 
Economic Review 71, 825-844. 
Cowles, A. & Jones, H. E. 1937. Some A Posteriori probabilities in stock market action. 
Econometrica, 5(3), 280-294. 
Darmadi, S. & Gunawan, R. (2013). Underpricing, board structure, and ownership: An empirical 
examination of Indonesian IPO firms. Managerial Finance 39(2), 181-200. 
Dechow, P.M., Hutton, A. & Sloan, R.G. (2000). The relation between analysts‟ forecasts of long-
term earnings growth and stock price performance following equity offerings. Contemporary 
Accounting Research 17, 1–32.  
Deloof, M. De Maeseneire, W. & Inghelbrecht, K. (2009). How do investment banks value IPOs? 
Journal of Business Finance and Accounting 36(1&2), 130-160. 
Drobetz, W., Kammermann, M. & Walchi, U. (2005). Long-run performance of initial public 
offerings: The evidence of Switzerland. Schmalenbach Business Review 57, 253-275. 
Ernst & Young (2007). Global IPO Trends Report. 
Eckbo, B., R. Masulis & O. Norli (2000). Seasoned public offerings: resolution of the new issues 
puzzle. Journal of Financial Economics 56, 251-291. 
Ecker, F. (2008). Information risk and long-run performance of initial public offerings. Gabler 
Edition Wissenschaft, Germany. 
157 
 
Engelen, P-J. & Essen, M.v. (2010). Underpricing of IPOs: Firm-, issue- and country-specific 
characteristics. Journal of Banking & Finance 34, 1958-1969. 
Espenlaub, S., Gregory, A. & Tonks, I. (2000). Re-assessing the long-term underperformance of UK 
initial public offerings. European Financial Management 6, 319-342. 
Falck, F. (2013). Underpricing of Norwegian IPOs: Empirical testing of selected underpricing 
theories on the Oslo Stock Exchange from 2003 to 2012 (Master Thesis). Copenhagen 
Business School, Denmark. 
Fama, E. F. (1970). Efficient capital markets: A review of theory and empirical work. The Journal of 
Finance 25(2), 383-417. 
Fama, E. F. (1976). Foundations of Finance. Portfolio Decisions and Securities Prices. New York, 
NY: Basic Books, Inc. 
Fama, E. F. & K. French (1993). Common risk factors in the returns on stocks and bonds. Journal of 
Financial Economics 33, 3-56. 
Fama, E. F. & French, K. R. (2012). Size, value and momentum in international stock returns. 
Journal of Financial Economics 105, 457-472. 
Fama, E. F. & French, K. R. (1996a). Multifactor explanations of asset pricing anomalies. Journal of 
Finance 51, 55-84. 
Fama, E. F. (1998). Market efficiency, long-term returns and behavioral finance. Journal of 
Financial Economics 49, 283-306. 
Fama, E. F. & Fisher, L., Jensen, M. C. & Roll, R. (1969). The adjustment of stock prices to new 
information. International Economic Review, 10(1), 1-21. 
Feltham G.A. & Ohlson, J.A. (1995). Valuation and clean surplus accounting for operating and 
financial activities. Contemporary Accounting Research 11, 689-731. 
Field, L.C. & Lowry, M. (2009). Institutional versus individual investment in IPOs: the importance 
of firm fundamentals, Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 44, 489-516. 
Ghosh, S. (2005). Underpricing of IPOs: The Indian experience. Emerging Markets Finance and 
Trade, 41(6), 45-57. 
Gomper, P. & J. Lerner (2003). The really long-run performance of initial public offerings: The pre-
NASDAQ evidence, Journal of Finance 63, 1355-1392. 
Goergen, M., Khurshed, A. & Mudambi, R. (2007). The long-run performance of UK IPO: can it be 
predicted? Managerial Finance 33(6), 401-419. 
Gounopoulos, D., Nounis, C. & Thomadakis, S. (2012). Long-term performance of Greek IPOs. 
European Financial Management 18(1), 117-141. 
Guo, R., Baruch, L. & Charles, S. (2006). Explaining the short- and long-term IPO anomalies in the 
US by R&D. Journal of Business Finance and Accounting 33, 550-579. 
Haan, J. & Seldadyo, H. (2006). The determinants of corruption. EPCS conference, Turku, Finland. 
Hassan, T. & Quayes, S. (2008). Underpricing of initial public offerings in Bangladesh. Applied 
Financial Economic Letters 4, 5-8. 
Helwege, J. & Liang, N. (2004). Initial public offerings in hold and cold markets. Journal of 
Financial and Quantitative Analysis 39(3), 541-569. 
Henricson, T. (2012). Underpricing in the Swedish IPO market: can investors earn abnormal returns 
by investing in IPOs? (Master Thesis). Jonkoping University, Jonkoping International 
Business School. 
Hou, K., P. Olsson & D. Robinson (2001). Does takeover increase stockholder value? Duke 
University, Working Paper. 
Houston, J., James, C. & Karceski, J. (2006). What a difference a month makes: stock analyst 
valuations following IPOs. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 41, 111-137. 
Huang, Yen-S. (1999). The price behavior of initial public offerings on the Taiwan Stock Exchange. 
Applied Financial Economics 9, 201-208. 
Hwang, C. Y. & N. Jayaraman (1995). Long-term performance of IPOs and non-IPOs: Japanese 
evidence, Advances in Pacific Basin Financial Markets 1, 317-337. 
158 
 
Ibboston, R. G. (1975). Price performance of common stock new issues, Journal of Financial 
Economics 2, 235-272. 
Islam, A., Ali, R. & Ahmad, Z. (2010). An empirical investigation of the underpricing of initial 
public offerings in the Chittagong stock exchange, International Journal of Economics and 
Finance 2(4), 36-46. 
Jenkinson, T.J. & A.P. Ljungqvist (2001). Going public: The theory and evidence on how companies 
raise equity finance. Second Ed., Oxford University Press. 
Jensen, M. C. & H. W. Meckling (1976). Theory of the firm: managerial behavior, agency costs and 
ownership structure. Journal of Financial Economics 3(4), 305-360.  
Jewartowski, T. & Lininska, J. (2012). Short- and long-term performance of Polish IPOs. Emerging 
Markets Finance & Trade 48(2), 59-75. 
Johnson, J. & Miller, R. 1988. Investment Banker Prestige and the Underpricing of Initial Public 
Offerings. Financial Management 17(2), 19-29. 
Kaplan, S.N. & Ruback, R.S. (1995). The valuation of cash flow forecasts: an empirical analysis. 
Journal of Finance 50, 1059-1093. 
Kayani, S. & Amjad, S. (2011). Investor interest, underpricing and trading volume in Pakistan 
secondary market. Business and Economic Journal 39, 1-15. 
Kenourgios, D.F. & Papathanasiou, S., Melas, E. R. (2007). Initial performance of Greek IPOs, 
underwriter‟s reputation and oversubscription. Managerial Finance 33(5), 332-343. 
Khurshed, A. & Mudambi, R. (2002). The short-run price performance of investment trust IPOs on 
the UK main market. Applied Financial Economics 12, 697-706. 
Kim, M. & Ritter, J.R. (1999). Valuing IPOs. Journal of Financial Economics 53, 409-437. 
Kiymaz, H. (2000). The initial and aftermarket performance of IPOs in an emerging market: 
Evidence from Istanbul stock exchange. Journal of Multinational Financial Management 10, 
213-227 
Kojima, N. (2007). IPO share allocation and conflicts of interest. Annals of Finance 3, 369-387 
Koller, T., M. Goedhart & D. Wessels (2005). Valuation: measuring and managing the value of 
companies. 4th Ed. (New York: John Wiley and Sons). 
Kooli, M., & Suret, J. M. (2002). The underpricing of initial public offerings: Further Canadian 
evidence. CIRANO Working Paper No. 2001-50. 
Kooli, M. & Suret, J.M. (2004). The aftermarket performance of Canadian IPOs. Journal of 
Multinational Financial Management 14, 47-66. 
Kooli, M, L‟her, J. & Suret, J., 2006. Do IPOs really underperform in the long-run? New evidence 
from the Canadian market. Journal of Private Equity 9(4), 48-58. 
Kucukkocaoglu G. (2008). Underpricing in Turkey: a comparison of the IPO methods. International 
Research Journal of Finance and Economics 13, 162-182. 
Kutsuna, K., J.K. Smith & R. L. Smith (2009). Public information, IPO price formation and long-run 
returns: Japanese Evidence. Journal of Finance 64(1), 505-546. 
Kumar, S. & Rao, B. B. (2012). Error-correction based panel estimates of the demand for money of 
selected Asian countries with the extreme bounds analysis. Economic Modelling 29(4), 
1181-1188. 
Kunz, R.M. & Aggarwal, R. (1994). Why initial public offerings are underpriced: Evidence from 
Switzerland. Journal of Banking and Finance 18, 705-723 
Leamer, E. E. (1983). Let‟s take the con out of econometrics. American Economic Review 73, 31-43. 
Leamer, E. E. (1985). Sensitivity analyses would help”. American Economic Review 75 (3), 308-313. 
Leamer, E. E. & Leonard, H. (1983). Reporting the fragility of regression estimates. Review of 
Economics and Statistics 65, 307-317. 
Leedy, P., Ormrod, J., 2005. Practical research: planning and design, 8
th
 edition. Upper Saddle, NJ: 
Pearson Prentice Hall. 
Leland, H. & Pyle, D. (1977). Informational asymmetries, financial structure, and financial 
intermediation. Journal of Finance 32, 371–387. 
159 
 
Levine, R. & Renelt, D. (1992). A sensitivity analysis of cross-country growth regressions. American 
Economic Review 82(4), 942-963. 
Levis, M. (1993). The long run performance of initial public offerings: The U.K. experience 1980-
1988. Financial Management 22, 28-41. 
Liu, J., Nissim, D. & Thomas, J. (2002). Equity valuation using multiples. Journal of Accounting 
Research 40, 135-172. 
Liu, X. & Ritter, J. R. (2010). Economic consequences of IPO spinning. Review of Financial Studies 
23(5), 2024-2059. 
Ljungqvist, A., Nanda, V. K. & Singh, R. (2006). Hot markets, investor sentiment and IPO pricing. 
Journal of Business 79, 1667-1702. 
Ljungqvist, A. & W. J. Wilhelm (2002). IPO allocations: discriminatory or discretionary? Journal of 
Financial Economics 65, 167-201. 
Ljungqvist, A. (1997). Pricing initial public offerings: Further evidence from Germany. European 
Economic Review 41, 1309-1320 
Logue, D. (1973). On the pricing of unseasoned equity issues, 1965-69. Journal of Financial and 
Quantitative Analysis 8(1), 91-103. 
Loughran, T. & Ritter, J. R. (1995). The new issue puzzle. Journal of Finance 50, 23-51. 
Loughran, T. & Ritter, J. R. (2000). Uniformly least powerful test of market efficiency. Journal of 
Financial Economics 55(3), 361-389. 
Loughran T. & Ritter J. (2004), Why has IPO underpricing changed over time? Financial 
Management 33(3), 5-37. 
Loughran, T., Ritter, J. R. & Rydqvist, K. (2013). Initial public offerings: international insights. 
http://bear.warrington.ufl.edu/ritter/int.pdf 
Lyon, J.D., B.M. Barber & C.-L. Tsai (1999). Improved Methods for Tests of Long-Run Abnormal 
Stock Returns. Journal of Finance 54 (1), 165–201.  
Mandelker, G. (1974). Risk and return: The case of merging firms. Journal of Financial Economics 
1, 303-335. 
Mazzola, P. & Marchisio, G. (2003). The strategic role of going public in family businesses‟ long-
lasting growth: a study of Italian IPOs. In 14
th
 FBN World Conference, New Frontiers in 
Family Business Research – The Leadership Challenge. Lausanne: Academic Research 
Forum Proceedings. 
McDonald, J. G. & Fisher, A.K. (1972). New-issue stock price behavior. Journal of Finance 27(1), 
97-102. 
Megginson W.L. & Weiss, K.A. (1991). Venture capital certification in initial public offerings. 
Journal of Finance 48, 879-904. 
Miller, E. (1977). Risk, uncertainty and divergence of opinion. Journal of Finance 32, 1151-1168. 
Mitchell, M. & E. Stafford (2000). Managerial decisions and long-term stock price performance. 
Journal of Business 73, 287-329. 
Mok, H. M. K. & Hui, Y. V. (1998). Underpricing and aftermarket performance of IPOs in 
Shanghai, China. Pacific-Basin Finance Journal 6(5), 453-474. 
Moosa, I. A. (2009). The determinants of foreign direct investment in MENA countries: an extreme 
bounds analysis. Applied Economic Letters 16, 1559-1563. 
Moosa, I. A. & Cardak, B. A. (2006). The determinants of foreign direct investment: an extreme 
bounds analysis. Journal of Multinational Financial Management 16, 199-211. 
Morck, R, Shleifer, A. & Vishny, R. (1988). Management ownership and market valuation: an 
empirical analysis. Journal of Financial Economics 20(1/2), 293-315. 
Moshirian, F., Ng, D. & Wu, E. (2010). Model specification and IPO performance: New insights 
from Asia. Research in International Business and Finance 24, 62-74. 
Newey, W. K. & West, K. (1987). A simple, positive semi-definite, heteroskedasticity and 
autocorrelation consistent covariance matrix, Econometrica 55(3), 703-708. 
160 
 
Ohlson, J.A. (1995). Earnings book values and dividends in equity valuations. Contemporary 
Accounting Research 11, 661-687.  
Ohlson, J. A. (2009). Accounting data and value: the basic results. Contemporary Accounting Review 
26, 231-259. 
Omran, M., Delgado, F. & Al-Hassan, A. (2010). The underpricing of IPOs in Gulf cooperation 
council countries. Research in International Business and Finance, 24, 344-360 
Pande, A. & Vaidyanathan, R. (2009). Determinants of IPO underpricing in the National Stock 
Exchange of India. The Icfai Journal of Applied Finance 15(1), 14-30. 
Penman, S.H. (2007). Financial Statement Analysis and Security Valuation. 3
rd
 Edn. McGraw-Hill, 
New York. 
Perera, W. & Kulendran, N. (2012). New evidence of short-run underpricing in Australian IPOs. 
Paper presented in Financial Markets and Corporate Governance Conference, January 4, 
2012. 
Purnanandam, A.K. & Swaminathan, B. (2004). Are IPOs really underpriced? Review of Financial 
Studies 17(3), 811-848. 
Reilly, F. K. & Hatfield, K. (1969). Investor experience with new stock issues. Financial Analysts 
Journal, 73-80. 
Ritter, J. R. (1984). The hot issue market of 1980. Journal of Business 57, 215-240. 
Ritter, J. R. (1991). The long-run performance of initial public offerings. Journal of Finance 42, 365-
394. 
Ritter, J. R. (1998). Initial public offerings. In WGL (Ed.), Handbook of modern finance, pp. 5-30. 
John Wiley & Sons., New York. 
Ritter, J. R. & Welch, I. (2002). A Review of IPO Activity, Pricing, and Allocations. Journal of 
Finance 57 (4), 1795-1828. 
Ritter, J. R. (2003). Differences between European and American IPO markets. European Financial 
Management 9(4), 421-434. 
Rizwan, M.A., & Khan, S-A. (2007). Long term performance of public vs. private sector initial 
public offerings in Pakistan. The Pakistan Development Review 4(46), 421-433 
Rock, K. (1986). Why new issues are underpriced. Journal of Financial Economics 15, 187-212.  
Roosenboom, P.G.J. (2007). How do underwriters value IPO? An empirical analysis of the French 
IPO market. Contemporary Accounting Research 24, 1217-1243.  
Roosenboom, P. G. J. (2012). Valuing and pricing IPOs, Journal of Banking and Finance 36, 1653-
1664. 
Rumrill, P. (2004). Non-manipulation quantitative designs. Work 22, 255-260. 
_______ 2012. Valuing and pricing IPOs. Journal of Banking and Finance 36, 1653-1664. 
Sahoo, S. & Rajib, P. (2010). Aftermarket pricing performance of initial public offerings: Indian IPO 
market 2002-2006. VIKALPA 35(4), 27-43.  
Sahoo, S. & Rajib, P. (2011). Risk proxies and IPO underpricing: an empirical investigation. The 
IUP Journal of Applied Finance 17(4), 38-57. 
Sahoo, S. (2012). Valuation of fixed price offers: an IPO perspective. The IUP Journal of Financial 
Economics 10(1), 42-61. 
Sala-i-Martin, X. (1996). I just ran four million regressions. Department of Economics, Columbia 
Univeristy, Mimeo. 
Sala-i-Martin, X. (1997). I just ran two million regressions. American Economic Review 87, 178-183. 
Samarakoon, L. P. (2010). The short-run underpricing of IPOs in the Sri Lankan stock market. 
Journal of Multinational Financial Management 20, 197-213. 
Schaeffer, J. (2005). A link between IPO underperformance and long-term performance. University 
of Chicago, Dissertation, 1-58. 
Schultz, P. (2003). Pseudo market timing and the long-run underperformance of IPOs. Journal of 
Finance, 58(2), 483-517. 
Securities and Exchange Ordinance, 1969 
161 
 
Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan Act, 1997 
Sehgal, S. & Singh, B. (2007). The initial and aftermarket performance of Indian IPOs. Journal of 
Applied Finance 13(11), 16-36. 
Sohail, M. K. & Nasr, M., 2007. Performance of initial public offerings in Pakistan. International 
Review of Business Research Papers 3(2), 420-441. 
Sohail, M. K. & Rehman, A. (2009). Determinants of underpricing of IPOs regarding financial and 
non-financial firms in Pakistan. European Journal of Economics, Finance and 
Administrative Sciences 15, 62-73. 
Sohail, M. K. & Rehman, A. (2010). Examining the short-run IPOs performance in stat of economy: 
normal, boom and recession. International Research Journal of Finance and Economics 35, 
173-186. 
Song, S., Tan, J. & Yi, Y. (2014). IPO initial returns in China: underpricing or overvaluation? China 
Journal of Accounting Research 7, 31-49. 
Stoll, H. R. & Curley, A. J. (1970). Small business and the new issues market for equities. Journal of 
Financial and Quantitative Analysis 5(3), 309-322. 
Sturm, J-E. & Haan, J. (2005). Determinants of long-term growth: New results applying robust 
estimation and extreme bounds analysis. Empirical economics 30, 597-617  
Temple, J. (2000). Growth regressions and what the textbooks don‟t tell you. Bulletin of Economic 
Research 52(3), 181-205. 
Teoh S. Wong, T. & Rao G. (1998). Are accruals during initial public offerings opportunistic? 
Review Account Studies 3, 175-208. 
Tian, Y. (2012). An examination factors influencing underpricing of IPOs on the London Stock 
Exchange (Master Thesis). Saint Mary‟s University, London. 
Trauten, A. Schulz, R. C. & Dierkes, M. (2007). The performance of IPO investment strategies and 
pseudo market timing – evidence from Germany, Working Paper, Westfalische Wilhelms-
Universitat Munster. 
Vreeland, J.M., Lamla, M. J. & Gassebner, M. (2010). Extreme bounds of democracy. Journal of 
Conflict Resolution 57(2), 171-197. 
Wang, E.C. (2010). Determinants of R&D investment: The extreme bounds analysis approach 
applied to 26 OECD countries. Research Policy 39, 103-116. 
Welch, I. (1989). Seasoned offerings, imitation costs, and the underpricing of new issues. Journal of 
Accounting and Economics 8, 159-172. 
Yan, I. Kit-Ming, Chong, T. Tai-Leung, & Yuan, S. (2010). An examination of the underpricing of 
H-share IPOs in Hong Kong. Review of Pacific Basin Financial Markets and Policies 13(4), 
559-582 
Zachary, A. S. 2008. An empirical investigation of initial public offering performance, Working 
Paper. 
Zarafat, H. & Vejzagic, M. (2014). The long-term performance of initial public offerings: evidence 
from Bursa Malaysia. Journal of Applied Economics and Business Research 4(1), 42-51. 
Zouari, S., Boudriga, A. & Boulila, N. (2009). What determines IPO underpricing? Evidence from a 
frontier market. Working paper 18069.  
 
